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Political Representation and
Accountability Under
Don't Ask, Don't Tell
Tobias 13al'rington \Vo/jf

IinSTJIIlCT: The

u.s.

Illilitm)!'s Don't Asli, DOIL't Tell policy constitutes a
singulwlyjle ojsjJeech regulation: an e.xj)licit jJlohibition on idclLtily speech
by a defined pOjJ'Ldation of inclividurtls thai lIulndates a state oj complete
social inV1sibility in bOlhmilitCII)' and civilian liji:. The imjJact of such a
reg"1dation 1ljJOn the jJublic s/Jeerh values jJrolecled by Ihe Filst Amendment
should not be cliffirult to ajJjnehend. Vet, as the tenth annivenm)J oj the
policy passes, First Amendment sclwlms have largely ignored this seemingly
irresistible subject of study, and the federal courts have refused to engage
with the /Jolicy \ imjJlications for jJublic speech values in any serious way.
The SUjJreme Court's lanrhna:rk decision ilL Lawrence v. Texas malies the
time ripe to fill this analytical breach.

I'll. this Article, 1 explore thier im.portant concejJtv.al issues that converge
under Don't A sli, Don't 7 'ell. Firs I, I provide an overuiew of Ihe true nature
* Visiling Professor oC l.all', Sranfmd
Universil)' oC Calilornia L,nl' School al Da\'i,.

L.;\W

Scl\Oo], ~OO:~~04; Assislanr ProCessor of Law,

A,lron Belkin, Associ,llt~ J'rol"t:ssor of Polnictl Science ell dw Uni\'ersity of Cdil'ornia dt
Sanla BadJ,u'a ,wd DireclOr of lhe Ccnter for the Study of Sexu,t! :Vlinorities in the Military,
Illiist receive priruacy of place in this acknowledgment. lL is quite possible that Belkin has done
more than anI' other single indi\'idual to bring dignity, hurnauity, and, above ,Ill, rationality to
the national c1eb,ltc over the service oC gay men ,mel lesbians in thc American milital)'. lie has
always been as generous in his assisrance to mc as hc hds beetl in his <tdvocacy for gay and
lesbian sel\'icemembers, ,md llty work has hcnefited gre,nly trom his wisdom. I also owe
particular thanks to A]an Brownsteitl, Dick Craswc!], Ricl, Fencl, Katharine Franke, Ylichelle
Friedland, Mark Kel'llan, DeboLdl Rhode, \'ladiLlvi Sundcr, and Sharon 'T"ennan for theil
thoughtCul commcnts, which influenced l11y thoughts ,It key junctures, ,11lclto Jack Ayer, :vlarcus
Colt:, Tino CUt:llar, 'Vlichele I.andis Dauber, Chris Elmendorf, Holly Doremus, Floyd Feeney,
George Fisher, Barbara Fried, Joe Crundfcst, fVlarg,net.Johns, Kevin Johnson, ,md Pam KarLm
for their comments and suggestions. Speci;tl thauks go to Erika \Vayne, whuse assistance in
assembling sollte of the research underlying this Article was excellent. as always. Finally, my
thanks to Owen Fiss, whuse inspit'alion contitHlcs to inform all my work.
I preslcnted an earlier version of this Article at J)on'l Ash, {Jon '/ Telt: Ten Years Later, a
conference organized by Holslr<l Law School in September 2003. T am grateful to the
conferencc organizers~panicularlyJames Carland and Eric Ll1le~(or offering me such a
distinguished platform.
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and smjle of the sjm'lli rep,'lIlatiulls tliat tlu' j)olily imj)o\I'S IIjmll gil\' alld
leshilill so{dins (flld /IlIlj) Ollt tlie public speech va{lIes tltat Iltl!.ll' 1I'.!!,'lI{l/tiuIIS
o/Fnd. 'witli (f prllticlI{ar fOULS on po/itirrt{ lelm',f/lt(ftio/l {[nd
aC({JulltalJlllt\,. SP!'olld, I (',x-plmp IlII important issue iI/fin' '/Jel'ch tlli'l)!)'thp !p{atlOllship betll'l'ffI a speakers Imblic identity alld tlil' IIINwillg and
!)()!.itical impact of tlil' spmkN:~ contrihutions to jmblir disrowsp-tlwt has
gone largely unexamined in the continuing debatp hl'twem mllPltl7 ist mzd
individualist Fint ,-i.mendment scholars. And third, f illllstmte alU{ allalyzp
the depp relationship between the fO'rm of subordination that £JolI'[ Ask,
Don't Tell imposes upon gay soldiers and the reilp/ation of that foun of
subordination in the impoverished analysis of tlU' jJOlil)' that the fedfral
Judiciary has offered thus far. With the grmter insight thai 1m ymrs of
enforcement provides inlo the !Jolic)"s lrue imJ)([ct u!Jon jmblll speech
values, Don't Ask, Don't Tell ojJers an impmlant ojJf}ortullitv to eXjJ{ore the
broader change Ihat Lawrence v, Texas promises to Inillg I/bout in the
review of claims by gay and lesbian litigants,
J
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The job of an acadell1ic is sometimes to state the obvious and then to
restate the obviollS, and then restate it again, and to continue in this lask
until he succeeds in making the obvious comprehensible. If this observation
sounds counterintuitive or seems an attempt at clever irony, it is intended as
neither. The mosl obvious facts can also be the ones that we are least able to
acknowledge openly or the significance of which we are least able to
appreciate. The job of the academic is sometimes to elltploy persistent
analysis as a tool for piercing wl11ful blindness.
J\s the tenth anniversary 01 the U.S. military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy passes, I this ObStTvatio'n has a dual sigllific~nce. It is relevant, fin;t, to
the distinctive dynamic that cl1araetcrizes much alltigay discrimination, of
which Don't Ask, Don't Tell is a pmmincllt example. The subordination of
gay men and ksbians often depends upon an outright denial of their
existence, despite tilt': fact-certainly obvious in modern America-that. gay
people exist as a ubiquitous presence in society. This phenornenon of denial
is often described as ~\ "heterosexual presl.lmption"-a pervasive assumption
tllat people are straight unless provel1 otherwise.~ I think, however, that
"denial of the hOlllosexual pos"ibility" is a male accurate term. The phrase
bener captllres the ~1Cli\'e qualil), of tile refusal to <lcknowledge that a person
whose sexual sclf-idcntilication is Il1lkno\\'l1 might, in faer, identify as
something other lhan slr<tighl.:" This active re['usal is inscribed, explicitly,
into the DOll't I\sk, DOll't Tell jwlicy, which cuntemplates llle presence oj'
gay, lesbian, and bise~n,li soldiers in the lllililar/ and yet relies for its
J.
l're~idclli C1illloll siglwd J)UIl'[ Ask, DOIl'l Tell ililU LlW ill
ovclllber of 1993, ancllilc
Defense Dep;ll'tlllClll J!r(llllldg:Ll(~d the lirsl sct or comprehensivc rcgu\;llions under tile pnlic)'
in Febru;ll)' 1994. SII" i\'alioll:,1 fkfellsc AUlllIlIizatioll Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103IGO, § sn, 107 SI;ll. ]60, 1670-7:-\ (codil'i"cl as amended ell 10 USc. § G54 (2000)); DEl,'TOI'
DEl'., DJR.ECTIVE No. 1'r\2.1'1, ENt.lsnD ,\DMli'<ISTRATI\TE S[f'.. \RATIO~S (1993) (effective Feb. 5,
1994), {/1!ailablr' al h ltV/'/ 1V1V1V.cll ic Illi I/,dls/ d ircetivcs/ corres/ pdf} d 133214\1'ch 1_122193/
d133214p.pdf (on n1e with the low;1 LlII' Rcview).
2.
SI'I', e.g., ADRIEi\:!"Y RICII, COl/lim.lsl!I)' l-Il'lerasl'xualil)' and Lesbian ~'xislen((l, in BLOOD,
BREAD Ai':ll POeTRY ~:l, 40--·1:! (I ~)~(i) (diSLl'ssing the "Clllnpuisory heterosexuality" that lesbi,ms
I',lee in jJtiV;lle and prol't-ssiolLti inlcr,letiollS), rVJor-.:I(~I:F "VIrIlC, 01/ I/i.e Socinl COlltract. in TilE
STRAICIIT 1vll;\Ll :\'<Ll OTIII·R [SS.\\'S Tl, 4()-'I:, (19c)2) (di'icussing the ubiquity of heterosexuality
"in ;tlIll1C"llla1 cdtegnrie,s"):j;lllcl I~. 1Lilky, n l l l COl/s/l'lI.cliol/. ojf-lell'IDsexnalily, m FLAR 01':\ Ql.'LFR
PIJ\NET 8~, 82-8'\ (1\-licll;Il·,1 WaIner cd., ICJl)~); sl'e also Tobi;l.'i l3arriliglOn 'vVo1ff, Crl)I/!)('lIed
,-11ftl'll/atiolls, Fin'S'jIl?I'I'Ir, lind I!I,? US. ,\lili/rll)"5 !Jo))'1 "Ish, DOIl't TI'!l Pobc)', (j,1 f3ROOK. [,. RE.\'. I] 'II,
I [56-'19 I\.: n 11.:15-40 (1997) (discnssing I hese authorilics).

'l.
Cj Kenji Yushil!(), ·I'h,· "/Jis"'ll/ic COlllmrl o[lJisexllIIll,'l'{fml'l', 52 ST.·\!~. l.. REV. 353, 353
(2000) (;'lrglling th:ll bisexualir.1' is ck!ihcr;llclv cr:lsl'd through its denial ;lS an erotic possibility
bv those with ;111 invesnn(,lIl ill moIl' st<lhk definitions ufst':(ua1 iclclllit)').

-1
S"I" Ahle v. l'llill·d SClles, 08 F.:lcl 1200, 12'lS (2d Cil'. I 99li) (]isting the thrt~e
CirC1lll1stallct's thal ·'n.'qllirc[.1 Ihe clisch;llgc 01' a sen.-icc 1I1clllber") , DLP'T OF DtT., DIRFCTIVF
'0.1332.14, F",·USTLD·\ll\IINISTR:\TI\T. SI·P!\R\TIO/,:S S E3 ..'\I.U-\.I.], ;It 26 (l993) ("[S]exual
orientation is considered a persoll:t! alld private Il'lart,'l' [under the policy], and is not a bar to
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operation upon the widespread, consensual halhJCination that these soldiers
will simply disappear when they are compelled to silence." A policy that
counts upon straigh.t soldiers to deny the possibility tlL:lt their fellow soldiers
might be gay, despite the fact that the policy itself expressly permits gay
soldiers to serve, would seem to embody "denial" in its most literal form.(j
TV!y observation also bears upon the distinctive dynamic tbat has
characterized judicial review of the military's policy thus far. That review has
suffered from a willful blindness that is, if" anything, even more breathtaking
than the conceit underlying the policy itself. The weight of the burden that
Don't Ask, Don't Tell lays upon speech values in its regulation of gay and
lesbian sel\'icemcmbers is both singLtlar and intense. The policy levies
categorical, content-based restrictions against a limited class of speakers on
the most personal of topics, restrictions that are applicable twenty-four hours
a day, outside rnilitary propeny as well as inside, off active duty as well as
during, when speaking with family members and friends as well as with
military personnel. Yet most of the federal appeals courts that have analyzed
Don't Ask, Don't Tell have concluded that the policy does not even
implicate the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 1 feel obliged to
repeat this observation, lest it be misunderstood. These courts have not held

continued sen'ice.
IIII less maniksted by homosexual conduc!.."), a.vaila.ble at http://
www.dtic.mil/\\·hs/direni\"es/corrcs/pd!Jd I:IT:21.4wch 1_1221. ~3/ d 1:l3214p.pdf (on Ii Ie with the
Iowa Law Rc\"ie\v) : Wolff, sUjJra nOle 2. at 11 '14 n.2 (discnssillg the I avy's implementing
regulations fOI· policy) .
.'J. The Lue .Judge Eugcnc NicktTslJn has offClcd the most nwtllorable .Judicial
recognition of lhe illogical f()Ulldatic)Ils of till· policy, notc\Vot"thy for its SiUgllL"tl·ity as well as its
eloquence. Hc wrole, "[iJI is unlikely in the extreme that any enlisted member fit to serve
\\'ould believe thal c10setcd homusexllals are Ilot ser\'iug or \Vould long retain that belief after
asking another enlistnl mcmber his or her sexllal orielltaLiclIl ;ulcl receiving the reply 'no
coml11enc'" Able v. United Sr.:·lIes, 968 F. Sltpp. R'iO, 859 (LO.N.Y. 1997), In/d, 155 F.:ld 628 (2d
Cir. 1998). Presumably, the Il\'I)(Jthetical straight soldier who canllot bear the though t of b,~ing
spied upon ill the shower also would takc link COII!l(Jr! frlJm such a reply. BUI .lee Aaron Belkin
& l'vlclissa Sheridel1 Enlhser-Herben, A Modes/. Pm/JlJsrtl: Pnvary as a Flawed R.atioNale for the
Exdu.sion of Cays (l1Id Lesbians from /.he us. Atihtm), at Imp:! /www.gaYll1ilitaITucsb.edu/
Publications/2003_BelkiuEmbscrI1erben2.hlm (jan. 20U?» (arguing that the privacy rationale
is factually unsupported given the CUITelH slale of military facilities) (on file \vith Ihe Iowa Law
P.e\iew).
6.
Indeed, the apparent irratinn<llity of the policy'sjusLilication-ollici<dly permilling gay
soldiers to senT, yet insisting th:u their avowed presence wutild inlerfere with unit cnhesionsuggests thai "denial" mal' 110t be the gOlcTning dynMnic :It all. Don't. Ask, Don't Tell may in
fan retain a population of gal' soldiers precisely so that the mililaq' can treat those men and
women as whipping boys, defining them as secuncl-c1a:;s citil.l:n:; ;md encoul~aging milil<ll)' units
to "cohere" around the har:tssn1ellt :lIld perscclitiou of r.heir gay peers. CI lZelldall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy PTinrijJle, 92 COLU\'1. L.. RE\'. 1<131 (1992) (reading Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. I. 6 (1986), oVICITnled by Lawrence v. Texas, lOG S. Cl. 2472 (2003), ::IS lending government
sanction to \'ioleuce against sexual miuorilies). UnfoJ"1.un:H.d)', the record of ::I!Juse heaped
Ilpon gay servicclllcndlCr:; in the last ten years-·:uld tile disprlJponiunatt' targeting of women
under the policy-lends support to thi:; di:;!urhing possibility. 1 explore this isslle in Pan [I.E.
See inJi"a t('xt aCCOlll p;ulyi llg nOies ::'01- J ().
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that the First Amendment simply is not violated in these cases-for example,
that compelling rnilitary interests render necessary these burdens upon
servicemembers' speech rigllts. Rather, they have held that the Amendment
is not even implicated-that no serious speech issue exists for the coun to
consider.' The degree of se1f~deception that is required for a federal judge
to conclude that this policy-entitled "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," no Jess-does
not even implicate speech values simply beggars description. s
I believe that these two phenomena are deeply linked. Indeed, Don't
Ask, Don't Tell hetS given rise to a situation that properly warrants the use of
the term "meta-phenomenon": The species of willful blindness that federal
judges have adopted in their analvsis of the policy is a reiteration of the very
same mode of subordination-the willful refusal to acknowledge the
existence and the human experience of gay men and lesbians-that makes it
possible for tIle policy to operate in the first place. That willful judicial
blindness is traceable, at least in pan, to the Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, <] which trivialized the life experiences of gay people and gave
other judges a broad license to do the same. Thlls, the Coun's dramatic
1il
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas mety have ;r vivid irnpae:t upon the manner in
which the speech claims of gay litigants will be heard and received in future
cases.
III an earlier article on Don't Ask, Don't Tell, J focused on one
panicular expressive harm that the policy impost's upon gay soldiers-the
requirernent th(\t they proclailll a Elise slretight identity [0 the world, either
by remaining silent in the face oLl persistent "heterosexual presumption" Of
by actively claiming a hetcn)sexual identity as the only realistic rnethocl of

7.
.'leI' I-IOllllfcS v. Cal. N;II'j (;lIanl, l~" I'.:ld ll~l), II:'\t) (9th Cir. 19 J7) ("[I3Jecause
'
\,Valsull alld Holilles were disch;lrgl~d fill' Their COlldllCl. alld IlUl for spt"~ch [the totaliTy of thaI
cOllduct beillg the Lltlt'r;lllce "f the wurds. 'I aIll gal"], the Fil·.'! ;\lllelldlll~nt is not
implicaTed."); Richenhng v. I'~rr\, l)7 I'.:\d ~r,(), 263 (81h Cir. 1(96) C'Richcnberg's First
AlllellcllllU)[ argullle!H is wiThout Illeril. [Till' DADT statute I ;lllci the DOD Directive do not
target llH;n; staws or speecll. TIll" polin' secks to it!L-ntif\' and exclude those who are likelv 10
engage ill hOll1oscxl"Il ;lctS.
."); TIIOIU;lSSOll \'. Penv, SO F.!>d (llS, ~I:'\l (4th Cir 1991i) (ell
balle) ("'The statute docs Ilot targel speech declarillg hOlllosexllality; rather, it targets
homosexual acrs and Ihe propensity or intcnt t" l"ng;\gc in homosexual aCTS, alld permissibly
uses the speech as (:videllce. The usc of specclI ;ts evidence in this manner docs not raise <t
constitutional issue .... "). Th(, only exreption among the courts of appeals is the Second
Circuit, which acrll;llly pf:lfOrlllCd ;\ First AmelldnH::nt anal)'sis un the policv. 5,!(, Able v. United
Stares, 88 F.3d J280, 1~(J2-13()0 (2d Cir. l<)lHi); .1('" also injia J':lrt Til (discllSsing these opinions
furl her) .
8.
In pri\'<llc corresponclence concernillg a soldier who was thcn being disch<trged under
the policy, ;1 conservative fedcr<tljlldge with wholll I :nn acqu;tinled onCt: offered the following
trenchant amllysis ol'the policy ill urgiltg th:llthe Clse be subjected to sl'rious First Allleuciment
analysis: "The polic\" is ctllcd 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' This is a speech rcstricr.ion. [The soldier]
told. This is speech." That clarit)· of insight has not yel GllTied the day.
9.
Bowers \'. Hardwick. ,178 U.S. IK{i (]l.J8G), o1ll'rnt!,,(/ by Lawrence v. Texas, JOG S. Ct.
247~ (~O()3).

10.

!.,{IWI'I'J/Cf',

12:-1 S. CI. al 248-1 (overruling I3milNs).
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complying wid1 the pulicy.11 This dynamic implicates the First Amendment
in its role as a protector of individual autonomy, violating the principle that
government may not invade the "individual freedom of mind" by compelling
a person to affirm a blse ident.ity, faith, or belief '2 But there are other
important First Amendment issues implicated by the policy, as well-those
t10wing from the role that the Coun has assigned the Amcndment as a
promoter of public speech values and guardian of the political process. In
particular, the military policy o(fers an important opportunity to study the
relationship between individual identity and the ability of a speaker to make
contributions to public discOllrse that cany authority and persuasive forcean issue that has receivcd inadequate attention in First Amendment
scholarship and thell 1 analyze at length here. Indeed, the striking bluntness
of the policy in restricting the spcech 01· gay setvicemembers rcnders the
principles associated with the First Amendmcnt exceptionally visiblevisible, that is, to those who are willing 10 see thcm. III this regard, the Don't
Ask, Don't Te11 policy offers an important opportunity Cor First AITlendment
scholars to examine tIle shape Clnc! content of those principles; and the sea
changc heralded by Lawlenr;e v. Texas provides a particularly appropriate
OCGlsiol1 to examine the application of those principles to the claims of gay
ci tizens.
I will use this Article to explore two core speech values associated with
the First Amendment that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy offends: the
ability of citizens to communicate dTectivcly with their political
representatives, and thc irnperativt; rhat a democratic system or gO\·ernmcnt
he responsive to criticism and cal1s for political change. The arguments for
each depend upon a basic fact about the operation of the policy that is often
misrepresented or misunderstuod: Don't Ask, Don't Tell pl"Ohibits gay and
bisexual servicemelnbers from ever discussing their gay identities, with
anyone, rm· any reason, whether in the military or in civilian life, on duty or
ofT, in public or in private. This total regulation of gay identity prevents gay
servicemembers from identif)ling themselves in circumstances wherc selfidentification is necessary Cor the dfect.ive exercise of important First
A..m enclll1ent rights.
One such right is the ability to participate in the polit.iecd prucess. A key
requirement for effective sclfgovcrnment in a representative democracy is
the ability of citizens to identify themselves to government ofJ~cials, whetber
alonc or through urganized actioll, and to nuke known their needs and
interests in perso!L11 terms. ·TIIC' milil,lry policy, by its Lcrms and in practice,
prohibits non-heterosexual servicemembers from iclenlif)·ing themselves
honestly to their elccted representalives. It LIllIS prohibits them from
describing their disLinetivt' needs and interests-whether as gay

Wolff, suf)/"a

12.

W. Va. Be!. of Fdllc. v. Bartlelte. :11 D U.S. 624, 637 (J 9·13).

nOlc

2,

11·H..... 'lr,. 1151-66.
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servicemernbers or simply as gay citizens-and from urging changes in those
legislative policies that affect them personally. In so doing, the policy
prevents gay and lesbian servicernernbers from participating meaningfully in
one of the most basic activities of representative governrnent:
communication with the officials charged with promoting their welfare.
In addition, the policy has the perverse effect of shielding itself from
any systematic assessment of the costs that it imposes, the benefits that it
achieves, or the success (or lack thereof) with which it is administered. Don't
Ask, Don't Tell silences the very population of individuals in possession of
the most pertinent infonnation about the policy's workability: the active-duty
gay and lesbian servicemembers who live and work under its mandates every
day. Theirs is the one voice that is consistently absent from public debates
about the policy, because the policy itself forbids them to speak about their
experiences. One of the most important functions that the First Amendment
serves is to preserve accountability and responsiveness in government. The
light of public scrutiny exposes corrupt, outdated, or unworkable policies
and thereby makes political correctives possible. Laws that prohibit criticism
of government, or that suppress the information necessary to develop such
criticism, stand in derogation of this imperative. Don't Ask, Don't Tell
prohibits its targets from providing any personal account of the impact that
the policy has upon their lives, their performance and their units. In so
doing, the policy shields itself from the most basic mechanism of political
accountability.
My purpose in this Article is t"vofold. My principal aim is to explore the
content of these essential First Amendment values-political participation
and accountable, responsive government-and to describe the manner in
which Don't Ask, Don't Tell's selective prohibition on identity speech
derogates fronl those valnes. To that end, Part I seeks to dispel the
misunderstanding that frequently dominates consideration of these issues by
briefly describing the full sweep of the absolute restrictions that the policy
imposes upon the identities of non-heterosexual servicemembers. Part II
then offers an in-depth examination of the burdens on public speech values
imposed by those restrictions. Part ITA discusses the importance of honest
communicarion with one's elected leaders and fellow citizens in a
representative democracy and the surpassing barrier that the policy imposes
to such communication. Part 1l.B details the important role of the First
A.,mendment in preserving accountability and responsiveness in government
and the incompatibility of the military policy with those values. And Part II.C
brief1y canvasses the range of speech activities commonly engaged in by
other members of' rhe military in ol-der to place the restrictions on gay and
lesbian soldiers into sh::n'[JCt relief.
It is also my hope, in Part: III, to illustrate and begin to analyze the
extent of the willful blindness that has been required for the federal
judiciary to conclude, repeatedly, that Don't Ask, Don't Tell does not even
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implicate these speech values or any other values relevant to the First
Arnendrnent. This willful ,judicial blindness has entailed a refusal to
acknowledge the distinctive llLl1nan experience-and, hence, the
humanity-of non-heterosexual litigants, The Court's opinion in Bowers v,
Hardwick both condoned and encouraged this sort of dehumanizing
treatment, a fact that the Lawrence mc~ority understood and addressed with
unusual candor. Though it docs not speak to the First Amenclment directly,
Lawrence forcefully removes the blinders that many members of the judiciary
have heretofore chosen to wear when reviewing the claims of gay litigants in
a broad range of legal categories. Part IILA describes the strategies that
courts have employed to avoid the First Anlendment implications of Don't
Ask, Don't Tell. Part JIl.B then oilers some thoughts about the effect that
Lawrence's shift in paradigm may have on future challenges to the policy,
This paradigm shift may not guarantee a different outcome, but it carries
the promise of an end to the willful blindness that has prevented any serious
assessment of the policy's cost to constitutional values,

1.

Do:\'1' ASK, DON'T TELL ON PAPER AND li'\ PRACTICE

Given the importance of the issue, one might reasonably expect
constitutional and political debates over Don't Ask, DOIl't Tell to
demonstrate an informed understanding of the actual scope and impact of
the policy, The statlltory frarnework that the policy sets forth is quite clear
on the matter. I:, The enforcemen t strategies employed by the military have
been carefully documented-most consistently by the Servicemembers Legal
Defense Netvvork (SLDN), the preeminent organizatioll providing guidance
and representation to gay soldiers, in its series of much noted annual
reports. II And the lived experience of servicemembers under the policy has
been described by advocacy groups, scholarly commentators, and grassroots
organizations alike,lC, Yet most public debates over Don't Ask, Don't Tell
persist in the false assumption that the policy applies only to the conditions
under which gay and lesbian soldiers undertake their active-duty service,
Participants in these debates wrongly assume (or even proclaim) that the

] 3.

10 USc. § 654 (2000).

14. All ten annual reports may be fOllnd on SLDN's "Veb site. See Servicemembers Legal
De£. Network, S[D!V Coudud Unbecoming RejJorls, al http://www,sldn.org/teIllplates/law/
index,htmPseetion=22 (Llst visited I\la1'. 22, 2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); see also
'Don 'I Ash' PoliCY nee/ied as Cay [)isehrnges Oil Hise; :VfilillUy Arlvouuy Group Says Pentagon Nu[es Foster
Anli~J-j()mlJsex1/(d !1masl'llU'IlI, LA, TildES, .\liar. 14, 2002, a'. A27 (discllssing discharges in
conjunction with Ihe SLDN 200] report),
F,.
See lujra notes '15-G2 and accompanying text (discussing SLDN reporb). See generally
Diane H. Manll, nIP {lnll/wllIn ,';oLdier: A Cnli!jw: oj "Ca:)'s in the Mdllm)''' SclwLarshljJ and Litigalion,
29 U.c. DAVIS L REV, 22,1 (EJl)h) (elisclissilig the political and litigation reform efforb
sml'Ounding the policy); Lambda Legal DeL & Ecilic. Fund, [S\"IIC: kIililm)', al
h up:! /www.lambelalegal.org/ cgi~bi 11/ iowa/ issues/ rccorel?rccord= I 0 (last visi teel Mar. 22, 2004)
(collecting inl'orrrLlI ion about the policy).
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policy preserves the privacy interests of gay soldiers in their personal lives;16
strikes a balance between the demands of "unit cohesion" in a military
setting and the speech and associational activities of gay servicemembers in a
civilian setting; or otherwise confines the burdens that it imposes to the
17
battlefield, the barracks, and the military workplace. It is thus necessary to
begin this Article with a return to basics.
I preface this discussion of the policy's scope with an important
reminder. A<; I said above, the current military policy does not prohibit gay
men and lesbians fronl serving in the military; rather, it expressly
contemplates and authorizes their presence. IS Thus, when a gay soldier says,
"I am gay," he is not "adnlitting" to doing (or being) anything wrong, as
would have been the case under the old policy, which declared that only
19
heterosexuals \vere allowed to enter military service. Gay men and lesbians
are now officially allowed to serve. Courts routinely ignore this fact and
behave as though a statement of gay identity constitutes an "admission" of
wrongdoing-a maneuver that no doubt helps to mitigate the cognitive
dissonance that would otherwise result from disregarding the manifest First
AmenclInent concerns raised by the policy. Indeed, given the invasive quality
of the enforcement procedures that I describe below, some conrmentators
have concluded that Don't Ask, Don't Tell must be under-stood to impose a
complete ban on gay servicemembers, despite the policy's repeated
disavowal of that position.~o 1 give closer attention to tbis issue in Part III. For
16.
See, e.g., Able v. Uniled Stalcs, R8 F.;\d 1:!80, 1299 (2d Cir. 1996) (characterizing the
policy as creating "a balance between a scrvice member's privacy interest and the military
interesl in prohibiling homosexual ans"); David Crary, 'Don 'I /l.sk' Policy Resl.l1far:ing, SALT L'\KE
TRII3. (~ilar. I!, 2003) (describing public dclxlle surrounding policy in which "public"
declarations of gay identit), are the primary focus), hup:/ /www.sltrib.com/2003/tvlar/
03112003/ nation_w/37182.asp (on llJc wi th the Iowa Law Review); Tom Phil port, Don'l Ask,
Don't Tell i\rchilect Says Gore StejJ/Jed Into 'Briar Patch, ' MI L. UPDATE (Dec. 16, 1999) (nOling thaI
Charles Moskos, amhor of lhe military policy, c!lar-acterizes restrictions on gay soldiers as "don't
ask, don'l teJl, don't seek, don'l r1aunl"), al hup:/ /www.fra.org/l11il-up/milup-archive/12-16-99rnilup.hlml (last visited Apr. 30, 2003) (on file wit.h the Iowa Law Review).
17.
See SERVICEME\IHERS LEeAl. DEr., CONDUCT U, llECOMI'\IC: TilE INTI-j A ''\IUAL REPORT
ON "DOf':'T ASK, DON" TLU., DOI'\'T PURSUE, DON'T H.'\RASS" 9 (2003) [hereinafter SLDN
.11 '"1"1-1 REPORTI ("tvlany Al11eriealls view 'Don't Ask, Don't Tcll' as a benign gentlemen's
agreement with discretion as lhe key tojob security. That is simply nOl the case.").
18.
See su/na note '1. and accom pan)'i ng texl.
19.
See, eg, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 1:)81 F.2d 40,1, 40b-57 (7lh Cir. 1989) (describing the
exclusionary policy under old regulations); see also Wolff, sU/Jra nOle 2, at 1209-10 (discussing
rh is disLincrion between old and new policies). But see Mei nholcl v. Un iteel States DCP'l of Def.,
34 F.3d 1469, 1477-78 (9th CiL 199'"1) (inlerpreting lhe old policy to require discharge only in
tile case of a conducl violation in order lO avoid consli1.utional problems raised by regulating
the "st,nus" of gay soldiers).

20.
Prominent presentalions of lhis argumenl may be found in the work of two vel)'
different commentators: an academic crilic of tile polic)" see generally JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T:
A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MIJ.lTARY'S ANTI-C,W POLlCV (l0~L)), and a judge who views an
absolute ban as bOlh ;lcceptablc and appropriate, see Thomasson v. Pen)', 80 F.3d 915, 934-49
(41.11 Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Luuig,.J.. concurring). CJ. 'vVoIIT,m/na nOle 2, at 1209-10 (pointing
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now, I take che policy on its own terms. Vhthin the framework upon which
Congress and the Defense Department have insisted, che discharge policies
described below do noc involve the "discovery" of gay and lesbian soldiers
who are nor supposed to be in the military and have been "found out" by
their commanders. These are speech restrictions, imposed upon a
population of soldiers whose presence in the military is both avowed and'
sanctioned.
i\..

THE' SCOPE OF TIlE POLICY ON PAPER

The Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, which appears at 10 U.S.C. § 654
("Policy concerning llOrnosexuality in the armed forces"), imposes two
essential restriCLions upon gay and lesbian servicemembers. The first
restriction, ofrt:n referred to as the "acts" provision, requires that a gay
soldier be sep:udLec! :wd discharged if he "has engaged in, attempted LO
engclgc in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts,"
where the term "homosexual act" includes any form of same-sex physical
contact that is IllutivaLed by sexual desire, and also any physical contact that
a "reasonable person" would believe to demonstrate a "propensity" to
commit such a sexually motivated act (like holding hands, or hugging).2!
Trans latioll: No to'll ching~ at all. The seco n d restriction, til c "staternen ts"
provision, requires separation and discharge if a gay soldier states honestly
"that he or she is <l homosexlJal or bisexual, or words to that effect."n
Translation: NiJ telling, at aLl.~:i

out th;\t Don't Ask Don't Tdl, if taken at it" word, "places the: powet' of the Sr.ate behind an
offense to scrvic<::nlcntbe:rs' First Amcndment rights that the rnilit,u)' could previously argue
that mOSI gay servicell1emlwrs were imposing UpOll themsell'es")
21
10 USC § 651(b)(J), (f)(3)(A)-(B) OWOO); see also Able v. United States, 88 F.3d
1280,1291 (2d Cir. 19(6) (explaining that the policy prohibits any affectionate conduct "from
handholding to i I1lercourse").
22.
Id. S 6:i'l (b) (2). fn thCOlj', a sen,;,cemell1ber call avoid being discharged under the
statcment's provision if siw can c1ell1onstrClte that despite saying that she is gay, she does not
have a "prop,:usity" ID cOlnmit homosexual acts. See iei. § (b) (1) (A)-(E). This is commonly
lcfnrcd to as "rclJuttillg the: IJrcsu1l1plion." Sec TholJiIlsson, SO F.3d at 920 (discussing the factors
r.hat Inay be considered in "rebutting thc presumption"). In theory, r.he military discharges
soldiers who s!Jcak about being gel)' not because of the statement itself, but because the
statement constitutes cvidence: that t.he soldier is likely to violate the policy's conduct
rest.rictions. See inFa Part IlT. In theory, thereforc, if a soldier can rebut the presumption raised
by her StatelllcIH-t.he prcsumption, that is, that. she possesses a "pl'opensity" to commit
homosexu,tl acts--then she call avuid discharge. See, e.p:., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920. In practice,
however, all honest ,mel uliretraned statement. about being gay virtually guarantees that a
sCl'vicl'lIlcmber will he discl·L\rged. Sec, e.g., Thorne V. Unit.ed States Dep't of Def., 916 F. Supp.
1358, I3(j(j (E.D. Va. II)l)6) (explaining that the rebuttal of p"es\1Il1jJtion is a practical
impossibilit)' unless a soldier I'CG1I1ts his statement).
23. The policy ~i1S() conraills a t.hird restrictiou that requires separation and discharge if a
soldier "has marricd or attempted to many ,\ person knowll to be of the same biological sex."
I () U.S.C § (j'i'l(b) ('j) While this prOl'isiol1 ha, rart'll', if evcr, been invukeel. its addition to the
policl' C!t:llluustnted foresight. .'leI:, eg, Cooell-iclge I'. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (Sup,
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The statutory framework for the policy is similarly blunt in describing
the policy's actual and intended scope, which is detailed in a series of fifteen
congressional findings that appear in the first section of the Act. Finding
nine sets forth the times during which Don't Ask, Don't Tell applies: "The
standards of conduct for !1icmbers of the armed forces regulate a member's
life for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the member enters
milital), status and not ending until that person is discharged or otherwise
separated from the armed [orces.,,~·1 The next finding, number ten, details
the circumstances in which the policy's restrictions are applicable: "Those
standards of conduct, induding the Uniform Code of rvIiJital)' Justice, apply
to a member of the armed forces at all times that the member has a military
status, whether the member is on base or off base, and whether the member
is on duty or off duty.,,2" And, lest any doubt remain, finding eleven makes
clear that application of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is intended to be
"per",asive" in the Jives of gay and lesbian servicemembers, in both a civilian
2li
and a mi1itar~y setting. Translation: No touching and no teLLing, at all, an,')'where,
{"(JeT.

The Depanment of Defense bas promulgated regulations and policy
statements to implement the statute, as have all branches of the service.
Some of tbese regulations purport to place limitations on the scope of the
policy's restrictions (sometimes by incorporating other provisions of military
law by reference) n Thus, within the military, statements made to
.
. .
90
chaplams,' statements made to some medical profeSSIOnals," and answers to
questions asked during the course of a security clearance interview are
~8

.Iud, Ct. 2003) (ruling that the MassachusetLs Constitution entitles gay and lesbian couples to
equal access to the state institution of marriage),
24.
10 USc. § ()~J4(a)(9) (~003),
~5.

Id.

S (a)(IO),

2G

[d.

§ (a) (I I).

27, The Stanford Law School library has cOin piled a valuable archive of military
regulations concerning tlie policy, See Robut Crown Law Library at Stanford Law Sch" Don't
Ask, Don't Tetl, Don't ]JuHue, at http://c!o1H,st;lllford,cdu/doclisl.hlInl (las1 visited Apr. 3, 2004)
(on file \vitb the [owa [.aw Review),

28,
See MIL, R, EVID. 503 (setting fort:b the exdusionalY rule for statements made to
military chaplai ns),
29,
See Exec. Order '0,13,140,64 Fed, Reg, 55,115 (Oct. 6, 1999) (clarifying that the 513
privilege has no application outside criminal proceeding: "Rule 513 is not a physician~patient
privilege,
In keeping with American milita,)' law since its inception, there is still no
physician~patient privilege Cor members of the Armed Forces."); DEI"T OF DEF" DIRECTIVE No,
6485,1, HUMf\' I~'I:V[UNODEFICIEN(YVIRLJS~t(I~rrV-1) § £3,2,1-,1.9, at 18 (1991) ("Information
obtained from a Sen'ice member during, or as a result of, an epidemiological assessment
interview may not be used against the Service member [in adverse criminal or administrative
actions] ,"), available at http://www,dtic.mil/whs/ directives/corres/pdfj d64851 wch1_0319911
d64851p,pdf (on rile with the Iowa Law Review); MIL R, EVlD, 513 (prohibiting the use of
communicatiuns with a psychotherapist in a criminal proceeding uncleI' the Uniform Code of
Milita,yJuslice) ,
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supposed to be confidentia!.:H) More broadly, the Defense Department has
estclblished some parameters as to the circumstances in which investigations
ll
under the policy should be initiated: and the manner in which those
32
investig'ations should be conducted.
Even these modest limitations,
however, have been honored almost entirely in the breach. As discussed
belov,', for example, many soldiers have been discharged on the basis of
statements made Lo chaplains, exclusionary rules notwithstanding, and
commanders routinely overstep even thernodest boundaries contelnplated
by these regulations in conducting their investigations. The implementing
regulations, moreover, expressly provide that gay soldiers enjoy no
substantive or procedural right to enforce any of the provisions contained
therein,33 and if there has been a single instance in which the military has
punished a comlTlander or investigator for violating the limits set forth in
34
those regulations, it has never come to ligh1. It tllus remains the case that
the actual scope of the policy is best captured by the terms set forth in the
broad, llllCjualilled language of the statute itself: No touching and no telling~ at
all., (l'n)'where, ever.

B.

THE S'COPF: OF Tr-jj~' POLICY ON THE GROUND

Over the last ten years, the enforcement strategies that the military has
employed have borne out the apparent breadth of the statutory language.
Military authorities regularly invoke the provisions of Don't Ask, Don't Tell
in a broad array of speech situations-even those that v-'Quld ordinarily
receive the greatest degree of constitutional protection, whether because of
their private character or because of their public importance. In its most
:>0.
See DF.P'TOF OcT., DIRECTIVE NO. 5200.:', DoD PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM § 3.7, at
(199lJ).
available at hllp:/ /www.dlic.miljwhs/direetives/corres/pclC/d52002_040999/
d52002p.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
;31.
See DEp'T or- DEF., DIRECTIVE NO 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINiSTRATIVE SEPARATIONS §
E3.1\4.1.1, at 67 (199:;) (di recting that a commander should only initiate an investigation upon
receiving "credible inform',ltion" that a servicemernber has violated the statute), available at
http:/hV\wi.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cones/pdf/d 133214wch 1_122193/c1133214p.pdf; id. §
E3.A'f.3.3.4, at 69 (setting policy that credible information does not exist when" [t] he only
information known is an associational :lctivity such as going 0 a gay bar, possessing or reading
homosexual pllblications, [or] associating with known homosexuals").

3

3:'.
See iJ. § £3.1\-1.1.3, at 67 (directing that the scope of a commander's investigation
shotdd not reach beyond circumstances of specific credible ~lllegations).
33.
See id. § E3.i\4.1.~), at 71 ("The procedures in this enclosure create no substantive or
procedural rights."); HALLEY, mj)')'(! note 20, at 112 (discllssmg the insistence of the military on
this point).
34.
See SERVICEMEMBERS lXG.'\l. DEI'. . ETWORK, CONDUCT U 'BECOMINC: THE SIXTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T 1\SK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS" 19 (2000)
[hereir:after SLDN SIXTH REPORT] ("The 'Don't Ask' rules are not being enforced ....
[5] uperiors, subordinates and peers ask service members about their sexual orientation with
impunity and hound sen'ice members out of the military."); see aLI'O SLDN NII\TH REPORT, sujJm
note 17, at 5 ("Accountability for those who harass or condone ant.i-gay harassment is little
more than empty words from military leaders.").
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recent report, SLD offers a succinct assessment of the regulatory sweep of
the policy as it is applied on the ground: "An honest statement of one's
sexual orientation to anyone, anywhere, anytime may lead to being fired."%
A brief overview of these "on the ground" strategies is in order to permit a
realistic assessment of the impact of Don't Ask, Don't Tell upon the political
process values discussed in the following sections.
t.

Conversations with Family fembers

Private conversations with hl.1nily members and loved ones have often
served as the basis for discharge proceedings under the policy. On many
occasions, investigators have interviewed the parents of servicemembers to
determine whether their children have ever spoken about being gay at
home."(} Don't Ask, Don't Tell prohibits a member of the military from
talking about being gay in a conversation around the family dinner table,
and such conversations have served as a basis for discharge under the
policy.3? Sorne military prosecutors have threatened family members with
subpoenas if they will not report on these conversations voluntarily.38 The
Air Force, in panicular, has been notorious for instructing its investigators to
question family mernbers in an att.empt to elicit. evidence of forbidden
.
'1')
conversaDons,' .

35. SLDN NI"JTII REPORT, .mjnanote 17, at9.
36.
See, e.g., SLDN NI 'TIL RFPORT, .\'lI.jnn note 17, at 37 (detailing the investigation of
'!<trine helicopter pilot Captain Kira Zielinski); SERVICLME oJBERS LEGAl. DEI'. NETIVORK,
CONDUCT Uf\:BLCOMI. C: 'filL EIGllTH A:-JI':UAL REPORT ON "DON'T AsK, DON'T TELL, DON'T
PURSUE, DO",'T HARASS" 3~1 (2002) [hereinafter SLDN EIGHTH RUORT] (describing. the
persistent questioning of parents in an atreillpt to elici reports of statements about. sexual
orientation); SLDi 51>:1'11 REPORT, 5111JT(l note 34, at ~4 (J't~lating an occasion on which Marine
investigators questioned the Inot/wr of a Marine private about her son's statements concerning
sexualorienl.'ltion).
37.
See SLRVICElvlGvllWRS LEGAl. DEI'. NETWORK, CONDUCT UNHECOMINC: SECOND ANNUAL'
REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL., DON'T PURSUE" 5 (1996) [hereinafter SLDN SECOND
REPORT] (discllssing a scrvicemembcr discharged for revealing his sexual orientation to his
brother in a private conversation); iii. at 6 (noting that the Air Force discharges airmen for
revealing sexual orientation to parents in private conversations); SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEI'.
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING Co TINUES: THE FIRST YLAR UNDER "DON'T ASK, Do '1'
TELL, DON'T PURSUE" 10 (19%) [hereinafter SI.DN FIRST REPORT] ("Air Force Capt. Earl
Brown's parents were asked ill detail about their son's sexual orientation and statements made
by Capl. Brown to his mother and father were included among the statements for which he was
to be discharged.").
38.
See SERVICEML\oJBERS LicCAL DEI'. 'ETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TEU., DON'T PURSUE" 46 (1999) [hereinafter SLDN
FIFTH REPORT].
39. Sa id. at 40 (describing an Air Force memo instructing investigators to question family
members and friends). The Air Force recently issued a clarification under ,vhich investigators
are supposed to obtain formal, high-level approval before conducting a "substantial inquiry,"
which would include the questioning of family members. See SERVICE\'IEMBERS LEGAL Du.
ETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECO II. C: 1'111' SEVEl'o:TH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, Do '1' TEL.L,
DON'T PURSUt:, Do 1''1' H ..\[{ASS" 52-53 (2001) [hereinafter SLDN SEVE TH REPORT] (describing
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Conversations with spouscs have likewise provided grounds for
discharge under the policy, Some servicemembers COUle to terms 'with being
gay only later in life, after entering into an opposite-sex marriage, and this
40
can lead to difficult separations
When divorce proceedings ensue,
disgruntled spouses sometimes "out" their military husbands or wives as a
form of retaliation, reporting their private conversations to command,i
41
authorities The policy prohibits gay servicemembers from speaking about
their sexual identity with their husbands and wives, As a consequence, these
retaliatory outings can lead to discharge, and angry spouses can use the
threat of outing to gain an advantage in divorce proceedings,'12 Other
serviccmembers are bisexual and have fedl and satisfying opposite-sex
marriages, The policy prohibits these sClvicemernbers from having private
discussions wirh their spouses about their bisexualit},,'[3

2,

Friends, Organizations, and Associations

Conversations with friends and acquaintances in civilian life, like
conversations with f~unily rnembers, are also subject to the policy's
restrictions and have frequently served as the basis for discharge, Even
though the Department of Defense has prornulgated regulations suggesting
that "associational" activities like going to a gay bar or belonging to a gay
organization are not themselves grounds for discharge or investigation,H gay
serviceTnembers are frequently interrogated about such activities, and they
rernain as subject to discharge if they speak abollt being gay in these settings
as in any other.'[5 The policy also forbids students who are enrolled in ROTC

modifications to Air Force guidelines), SLDN's most rccent report indicates that the Air Force
is making "some progress" in reforming its investigative techniques. See SLDN NINTH REPORT,
supra notc 17, at 26; see also SER\'ICEMEMBERS LEG'\L DEF, NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING:
THIRD A"NUAL REI'ORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DO 'T PURSUE" 7 (l997) [hereinafter
SLDN TIIIRD REPORT] (derailing an earlier change in policy by which questioning of parcnts
became Opl iona! rather than manclatol'Y)'
40
See Wolff, sujJTQ. note 2, ,][ 1208-09 n,209 (discussing the difficult position of gay
servicemernbers who comc to terms with sexuality late in hCe, and citing further authorities
discussing the same issue),
41.
See, e,g" SLD1 SEVENTH REPORT, S7.t/na llote 39, at 36-37 (noting an Army sergeant
"outed" to command by her husband "fter revealillg to him that she realized she is a lesbian),
42,
See SLDN SIXTH REPORT, su/na note 34, at 26-27 (discussing three such instances of
retaliatory revelation by spouses); id, at 44 (noting that the Air Force initiatcd an investigation
against a senior airman following a revelation by his wife that tbe airman had said he was gay),

43,

See 10 USc. § 654(b) (2) (prohibiting statements of "bisexual" identity),

See, e.g., DEP'T OF DEI'"
DIRECTIVE No, 1332,1'1, ENLISTED ADMINiSTRATIVE
SEI'I\Ri\TIONS § E3,A4 ,3.3.4, at 69 (1993) (stating that "associational acLivity such as going to a
gay bar, possessing or rcading homosexual publications, associating with known homosexuals,
or marclling in a gay rights rally in civilian clothes," without more, is not sufficient to initiate
illvestigatioll or discharge), available at http://www,dtic.rIliljwhs/directives/corres/pdf/
d1332Jtlwch 1_122193/ d] 332 J4p,pclC (011 file wi th the Iowa Law Review),
45,
See, e.g., SLDN
INTH REPORT, JU/J1'a note 17, at 29 (discussing l-epons of Navy
supcrvisors asking sailors whether they wem "to a gay bar"); SLDN SEVE TH REPORT, s'Upm notc
'14.
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prog-rams from speaking about being gay with their fellow students on
campus,'ll> and it forbids soldiers from discussing their sexual identities
privately ,\lith civilian friends or roommates.'l?
\IVritten statements to friends and family about being gay are also
forbidden under the policy, and soldiers have been investigated and
discharged for statements made in their private correspondence and their
diaries. In 1998, for example, a
Larine commander initiated an
investigation against a corpsman under his command when the corpsman's
former roommate stole herjournal and lUrned it over to the commander in
apparent retaliation for adverse testimony that the corpsman offered in a
disciplinary hearing. The corpsman had talked about being a lesbian in her
journal, and Don't Ask, Don't Tell prohibits such statements, even when
written in a diary. As a result, the corpsman's career was placed in
jeopardy4S In another case, the Coast Guard initiated discharge proceedings
against a petty officer based, in pan, on a private email in which the PO had
talked about being gay.4U And a '!\lest Point cadet became a target for
investigation when her commander seized her diary during a room search
and discovered statements indicating that she was gay. The cadet resigned
so
rather than face a conclemnatol;' hearing. Those servicemembers who wish
to attempt honest communication with their friends and family sometimes
write in code and change the pronouns they use in an attempt to avoid the
policy's speech restricrions,'ol and there is no guarantee tha~, even such
strategies will alluw meaningful communication with loved ones.·,L

39, at 56 (reponing thal the Air Force inquired whether an airman is "a member of any
homosexual organization" ant! requested "addresses, telephone numbers" and "points of
cOlllact" so thaI organizations may be "inten'icw[ed]"); id. at 62-63 (reponing that the Navy
sends investigators 1.0 "gay fricndl)' eSlablishmenLs" lU seaITh 1'01' Navy persol1nel and seck, inter
alia, 1.0 clicil staleIllel1ls); SERVIL:EtvIEtv·IIIFY.S LeeA\. DEF. NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMINC:
FOURTH ANNUAL. RI':I'ORT ON "DON'r ASK, DON'T TEL.L., DON'T PURSUE" 8-10 (1998)
[hereinafter SLDN FOURTH REI'ORT] (lltHing thal an Air Force interrogation of a sergeant's
civilian rOOIllmateS included qlll·:stions aboul whether the sergeant has "eve]· been lO a gay
bar") .
46.
See, e.g., .'iLD' 'INTI-I RepORT, .I'll/JUl. note 17, at 24-25 (reponing that l"\-I'O Air Force
ROTC cadels disf'l1rolled after a friend reported 1.0 command tlMt lhey spoke about being gay
OIl campus).

'17.
See, e.g., SLDN SEVENTH REpORT, .mpm note 39, at 61-62 (detailing the pursuit of a
,n·y officer for discharge on the basis of a conversation in which the police misidentified a
civilian roommate as a "boyfriend" and reponed the conversation to command); SLDN FOURTH
REPORT, supra nOle 4:" at 8-10 (reporting thal an Air Force officer interrogated the civilian
roommates of a sergeant, asking whethcr the serge,mt "lh]as ... ever stated that she is gay").
48.
See SLDN FIFTIIREl'ORT, supra note 38, ,It 4~-51.
49.
See SLl) ! FOURTH REI'OJ(T, supra nOle 45, at 29-33 (detailing the case of Petty Ofticer
Tim Bauer).
50.
SeeSLDN THIRD REPORT, ."'/1"1"{ll1ote 39, al 12-13.
51.
See, e.g., SLDN SEVE 'TH REPORT, supra note 39, al 93 (noting a peuy officer second
class disguised the identities or friends, bOlh in conversation and in privale correspondence, as
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and Psycl1otherapisr.s

'The completeness of the policy's restrictions upon speech ,vithin
traditional military settings is confirmed by the manner in which the armed
forces treats conversations with chaplains and therapists. Despite the general
proposition that conversations with clergy are supposed to be confidential in
the military,5'1 gay soldiers are investigated and discharged ""hen chaplains
decide for themselves to report the contents of their private conversations to
51
commanders, as sornetimes happens.
In 2000, the Pentagon actually
instructed gay soldiers to speak wi th clergy if they had questions about the
55
policy, implicitly suggesting tbat confidentiality would be respected. But
this instruction provided little security, as the military has continued to
initiate discharge proceedings against gay soldiers when chaplains report tbe
56
statements that the soldiers nlake during counseling sessions.
In the case of doctors and psychotherapists, there is not even a formal
pretense of general confidenLiality,57 and gay soldiers speak about their
58
sexual identities to health-care professionals at their peri1. Indeed, some
military commanders instruct doctors and therapists that they are required
to report any soldier who speaks about being gay during treatment,59 and
an attempt to avoid harassrncnt); Wolff. supra note 2, at 1155-56 (recounting a similar story
from an anonymous officer on active duty).
52.
SeeWolff, sulJm note 2, at J164 (discussing the inability of gay servicemembers who are
deployed overseas 10 cornrllunicate with loved ones).
1)3.
See'vJIL. R ..EVllJ. 50:1(a) ("A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
another h·om disclosing a cOlllidelHi;t! cornrnlillication by the person to a clergyman or to a
c1ergyrn;lIl's assistanl, if such cOlllmlinication is made either as a formal act of religion or as a
(natter of COllscience.").
54.
See, e.g., SLDN FIFTH R.EPORT, mpra not.e 38, at :18-39 (describing the problem of
discharges following revelat.ions by chaplains); SLDN FOURTH REI'ORT, sulJ7'a note 45, .at 18-19
(describing a similar problem, though with less frequency than appears in subsequent years).
55
See SLD SIXTH REPORT, .>ulna note 34, at 25.
56.
See Sl.DN NINTH I'..EI'ORT, .Il1p·w not.e 17, at. 25 (not.ing that dischar-ge proceedings were
initiated when an assistant chaplain broke the confllJence of an airman);' id. at '1
("[C]haplains.
must be given clear instn.lctions not to out service members who seek their
help."); SLDN SEVENTH REPORT, sulnr, note 39, at. 35-38 (describing incidents of discharge and
harassment following conversations with chaplains).

57.
See, e.g., SLDN FWn-I REPORT, SHim, note 38, at 35-37 (discussing DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
NAVMED P-5131, GENERAL. MU)!CM. OFFICER (GMO) fY1ANUAL U"lay 1996) and noting that
conversiuions with medical professionals are not confidential and some docl.ors consider
reporting of gay soldiers mandatory). 8-ut see id. (indicating t.hat the Pentagon denies that
reponing by medical professionals is ever mandatory).
58.
S(:e, eg., SLDN NINTI I REPOJ(T, S7.1jna note 17, at 36 (quoting a gay hrine stating "r was
depressed, and T couldn't even talk to a psychiatrist because t:ley'd be obligated La report me
for being gay"); see alm Wolff, sHjna note 2, at 1160--61 (noting that an Air Force captain
experienced difficulu<cs associated with m~lI1datOl·y gynecological appoinunents due to the
threat of disclosure).

59.
See, e.g., SLUN SI'.vENTI·r R.EPORT, supra note 39, at 33 (detailing Army briefing in which
the M<0or assigned 10 provide training for the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy instructed health
care providers tInt. they were required to report gay soldiers).
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soldiers are regularly investigated and discharged when doctors or therapists
report conversations in which the soldiers speak about being gay.50 In one
remarkable incident in 2001, an Air Force airman sought the assistance of a
military psychiatrist after a civilian raped him. The psychiatrist announced
that the airman must be gay if he allowed himself to be raped, and he
threatened to out the soldier to his command if he spoke about being gay
61
during' their therapy session. (The airman was later able to secure the
assistance of a more sympathetic counselor.)52
4.

Public Statements

Open and notorious public statements about being gay, of course, fall
squarely within the restrictions of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy and
practically guarantee separation and discharge. This mode of operation for
the policy is a rnatter of common understanding. Even so, it is important to
remember the range of speech situations in civilian life that are
encompassed by such "open and notorious" public statements-situations in
which speech regulation might be expected to provoke high levels of
constitutional scrutiny.
The military has sought to discharge one reservist, Steve May, for
identifying himself as gay during the course of a political debate on the £1001'
of a state legislature. (I discuss the May case at length in Part I1.A, below.)63
Another soldier, who brought a prospective challenge to Don't Ask, Don't
64
Tell in federal court, had to proceed anonymously in her suit. Identifying
herself in a Federal district court as a potential target of the policy would
itself have been a violation of the policy that would render her subject to
discharge. The policy, in other '''lOrds, even reaches into civilian courtrooms
to prohibit gay servicemembers from discussing their sexual identities. In a
similar fashion, the active-dutl ' officers who contributed their stories to my
55
earlier article on the policy asked that their names be withheld. They
violated the terms of the policy merely by speaking about their sexual
identities with me in their interviews and had good reason to fear that they
would be discharged if those intervie,·\is could be traced to them.
Don't Ask, Don't Tell, in short, does not merely dictate standards of
conduct and speech within the confines of a "military environment,"
however broadly one might define that term. Don't A"k, Don't Tell
constitutes a total regulation of the speech of all gay men and lesbians
connected with the military. The policy prohibits gay soldiers from
60.
See, e.g., SLD SIXTH REPORT, sulJro note 34, at 22-24 (describing outing incidenLS
involving doctors and therapists); SI.DN fOURTH REPORT, SlIl)T(I note 45, at 15-16 (same).
6J.
SeeSLDN EICHTH REI'ORT, supra note 36, at25.
62.
See iii.
63.
See inFo notes 119-3.1 and accompanying text.
64.
See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d J 280, 1284 n.] (1996).
65.
S,'evVolrr, sujJmnoLe 2, at 1155, IJ62-63.
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identifying themselves as gay, talking about their sexual identities, or
otherwise speaking honestly about the relationship between their sexuality
and their emotional or spiritual lives, to anyone, under any circumstances,
ever. Gay soldiers must erase their identities in civilian as well as military
settings or else they will violate the terms of the policy. They may not discuss
their experiences in living under the policy, whether in public or in private.
Nor may they report those experiences to their own superiors vvithin the
military, for even that act would itself subject them to separation and
discharge. They must remain silent about the difficulty of complying with
the policy's mandates, the effects of the policy upon their own performance
or that of their units, even the possibility that the policy might be
contributing to an environment of physical threat and danger for gay
55
soldiers.
It bears noting here that the justifications that the military has offered
for the policy-primarily, a need for "unit cohesion" and "morale" in service
57
of the military mission-are indeed confined to the military environment.
ot surprisingly, the Defense Department has never suggested that it has a
military interest in eradicating gay identity from civilian life. But the means
that the government has claimed as necessary to carry out its military goals
extend promiscuously into the civilian world, restricting conversations in the
media, the courts, the home, and the legislative process. A speech restriction
that sweeps much more broadly than the immediate subject of its stated
goals is a familiar phenomenon in First Arnendment disputes and not one
that should be expected to obfuscate clear analysis. Yet this disjuncture
between the military justifications for the policy and the much broader
sweep of its restrictions seems to have befuddled many who have attempted
G8
to assess the policy's impact upon First Amendment values. As a result, 'the
extraordinary restrictions that the policy imposes upon the speech of gay
and lesbian servicemem bel'S in their civilian lives, and even the restrictions
that the policy irnposes upon communication w1thin the rnilitalY itself, have
received little attention in popular discussions and have been practically
ignored in the courts.
The frequent repetition of a mistake, however, does not render the
mistake correct. It merely indicates that the mistake is tenacious.

II.

REPRESENTATION, ACCOUNTABlLIlY, AND I'DIVlDUAL IDENTIlY

I begin my account of the public speech values burdened by the policy
vvith a qualification that I also issued in my previous examination of the

66.

See infra text accompanying notes 201-16.

67.
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (7)-(8) (2003) (offering the need for "unit cohesion" as a
justification for the policy); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3cl 915, 921-22 (1996) (describing the
"carefully crafted national political compromise" purportedly aimed at protecting these values).
68.

See infra Part Ill.A.
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policy's cost to individual autonomy My aim is to analyze the policy's impact
upon those norms that the First Amendment protects, not to argue that the
resulting constitutional calculus will necessarily result in the policy's
69
invalidation. A5 a doctrinal matter, at least, this is an inevitable concession,
for the imprecise mode of "deference" that the Court has exhibited in its
analysis of the constitutional claims of military personnel renders any bold
proclamations of unconstitutionality largely aspirational. I examine these
issues in Part lILA, below, and mention only two points for now. First, all of
the First Amendment cases that the Supreme Court has placed in the
category of "military deference" have involved speech restrictions within
physical or discursive spaces that were themselves clearly "military" (a protest
on an army base, command instructions issued by an officer to his
subordinates, and so forth) .70 The Court's 'Vvillingness to defer to the
military's judgment about the necessity and appropriateness of a speech
restriction may well depend to a large degree upon such locationa] selfrestraint. v"hen the military enforces speech restrictions that sweep broadly
into civilian life-as the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy does-the deferential
posture that the Court has adopted in those cases might prove inapposite.
Second, it is a common assumption that many of the speech activities upon
\·vhich I focus in this Part are not available to any members of the military,
whether gay or straight. In fact, as T will explain, members of the military
enjoy broad latitude to engage in all the speech activities that are forbidden
to gay and lesbian serviceni.embers. The widespread contention that the
military context renders ordinary analysis under the First Amendment

69. In that earlier analysis, I offered the following observations about the qualifications
that the Court has placed upon the constitutional rights of military personnel and the
relationship of those qualifications to rhe speech restrictions imposed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell:
The Coun has frequemly noted-though
not without dissent-that
servicemembers enjoy reduced First Amendment protecrions in the military. There
are some restrictions on speech that may be permissible in the armed forces even
though they I'I'0uid be illlolerable in civilian life .... [However,] the one limitation
that the Court has consistemly imposed on the military's ability to restrict
servicemembcrs' First Amendment rights is to require that any such restriction be
applied in a neutral and evenhanded fashion. The Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy,
which targets only the identities of gay and lesbian servicemembers, deady fails to
satisfy this basic limitation.
Wolff, mlJTa not.e 2, at 1 J 93-95. These observations remain true today, and they apply as
forcefully to burdens on public speech values as to burdens on individual autonomy.
70.
See generally Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 1503 (1986) (enforcing a dress code
that prohibited an observantJew from wearing a yarmulke while on duty); Brown v. Glines, 4'14
U.S. 3'18 (1980) (upholding a requirement that militali' personnel receive prior approval
before handing OLlt written material on base); Creer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (authorizing
milit.ary authorities to exclude political demonstrations from military bases); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974) (authorizing the prosecution and conviction of an Army captain who counseled
subordinates to refuse to fight ill Vietnam in protest of race discrimination in troop
assignments) .
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inapplicable is thus mistaken and certainly does not offer a sufficient answer
to the harms to public speech values that I describe below.
it

POLI7JCAL REPRESt.iVTA TION AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

My discussion of the military policy's impact on political representation
and public discourse rest.s upon a basic assertion about political speech:
There is sometimes an essential and necessary relationship between the
individual identity of a speaker, on the one hand, and the speaker's
interactions with the political process-that is, the set of institutions,
procedures and practices by which agents of the State acquire legitimacy in
their interactions wit.h t.he governed-on the other. Citizens do not come to
the political process as fungible units, each possessing an equal capacity to
articulate and advocate any set of views or policy positions that may require
debate. Rather, citizens engage with politics from a position of personal
experience and identity. Personal experience provides the font of
information that nourishes the formation of political beliefs; identity offers a
vernacular through which those beliefs can find expression. To single out
and silence a group of speakers who possess a distinctive identity that is
germane to an issue of public importance-like active-duty gay and lesbian
servicemembers in the case of Don't Ask, Don't Tell-is to distort the terms
of political debate and call into question the legitimacy of the State's
authority.
Free speech commentat.ors frequently draw a sharp distinction between
two types of argument: those invoking the First Amendment as a guardian of
public speech values, and those invoking the Amendment as a protector of
7l
individual autonorny or privileged social practices. The first asks whether
restrictions on speech constrain the terms of robust public debate in ways
72
that may interfere with truth-seeking and political self-governance. . The
second focuses upon individual dignity and assigns ontological value to the
preservation of a zone of non-interference for human cognition and
73
expression. I employed these terms myself in the introductory section of
74
this Article. Alexander Meiklejohn was among the first to articulate the

71.
But see Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's NIistake: Individual Autonomy and the RPf01'm of Public
Discoune, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1124 (1993) (employing these categories for analytical
purposes but also critiquing proponents of "collectivist" First Amendment approaches who
believe thal "'private autonomy is logically distinct from democratic self-government'" and
hence that '''public discourse [can] be managed so as to improve its quality and diversity''')
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, F-ree Speech NolV, 59 U. CIII. L. REV. 255, 277 (1992)).
72.
See j .Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (describing the First
Amendment as embodying "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ").
73.
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (19'13) (identifying one
purpose of the First Amenclmen t as preserving "individual freedom of mind" from state
imenerence) .
74.
See slljJ1'a text accompanying- notes 11-12.
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distinction clearly,7S and his taxonomy has largely defined the terms of
76
debate among First Amendment theorists ever since. And while the
Supreme Court has shown an unfortunate lack of consistency in observing
these analytical forms,77 the distinction between autonomy and public
speech values does sometimes playa role in explaining the disposition of its
78
cases, as welJ. I mean to reaffirm this analytical framework and to situate
the present discussion firmly within the realm of the public and the political.
Within this analytical framework, the harm associated with a particular
speaker being denied an opportunity for self-express ion-as distinct from
the silencing of particular viev'1)oints or ideas-is usually conceptualized
exclusively in terms of the speaker's autonomy. Under this view, a
commentator's sympathy with the claim that an individual has been
impermissibly "silenced" usually rises or falls with the importance that the
commentator attaches to the subjective experience of expressive activity and
79
its relationship to individual flourishing. The analytical separation of the

75.

ALEXANDER MEIKU]OHN, POLITICAL FREEDO,vl: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE

PEOPLE8~9

(Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1960).
76.
Campa", C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LinERIY AND FREEDOM or SPEECH (1989) (defending
the proposition that the First Amendment should be understood as a protector of individual
freedom and autonomy), and Robert Post, Recuperating FiTSt Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1250 (1995) (rejecting the proleclion of "speech as such" as an incoherent basis for
developing Firsl Amendment jurisprudence and calling instead for a doctrine that "focuses
clearly on the nature and constitutional significance of.. [particular social] practices"), with
OWTN M. FI5S, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM or SPEECH AI\D THE MA]\.'Y USES OF STATE POWER'
(1996) (arguing that the First Amendmelll aims principally to safeguard robust public debate
and should incorporate antisubordination Ixinciples in defining speech protections), and
Robert H. Bork, Neutml PrincijJles and Some Fint Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 20 (1971)
(contending that there are no principled justifications or limiting principles for speech
arguments based in autonomy ane! hence that First Amendment protections should be available
only to speech that is purely "political").
77.
See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elee. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of CaL, 475 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (conHating arguments about the "autonomy" of a corporate speaker vrith
arguments about the distonion of public debalc through \'iewpoint discrimination).
78. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-78 (1978) (utilizing
the distinction between autonomy values and public speech values to frame the analysis in
reviewing the rVfassachusett.> limitation on corporate expenditures during referendum
campaigns) .
79. Thus, Owen Fiss and Robert !3ork (despite their wildly divergent views) both see the
grounding of a speaker's prerogatives in "autonomy" as a ['eason to accord those prcrogatives
little weight in free speech analysis, while Ed Haker attaches much grcater v,due to the role of
self-expression in the pursuit of individual fulfillment. See sources cited sUjna note 76. Professor
Fiss offers his critique in the following terms in a discussion of pornography regulation:
[Some] critics view the First Amendment as a protection of individual autonomy: a
freedom to speak, to say whatever one wishes. To me, however, such an
interpretation of the First Amendmcnt is unappealing either as a rule of law or as a
philosophic principle, for no reason is given to prefer the autonomy of the speaker
over that of those who migh t be harmed or offended by the speech.
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private interests of the speaker from the public interest in speech, in other
words, often carries with it an implicit suggestion that the individual
characteristics of speakers are a matter of concern only where private
autonomy interests are at issue. And, finally, the notorious difficulty of
deriving a workable First Amendmel1l doctrine from the starting poin(of
autonomlO means that the distinctive characteristics of individual speakers
often play only an atmospheric and not a determinative role in this'received
view of First Amendment analysis.
But conducting a First Amendment analysis through the focused lens of
public speech values need not result in the relegation of the speaker's
distinctive identity to an analytical backwater. Quite apart from any
questions of autonomy or individual nourishing, the identity of a speaker
can have a profound impact upon the meaning and impact of a message.
I-Ience, even a First Arnendment analysis grounded entirely in a "collectivist"
view of the political must be attentive to the role of individual identity In
81
.
shaping the terms of debate.
In making this assertion, I depart sharply from a central tenet of
l'vIeiklejohn's vision of political discourse-one that has had a pervasive
impact upon the field. IIeiklejohn famously envisioned the political process
as a town meeting governed by rules of parliamentary procedure, where
"abridgments" of the "freedom of speech" would be identified and assessed
s2
against neutral rules of order. In this arena, speakers do not have value as
rights-bearing individuals, but rather as possessors of viewpoints.
(Meiklejohn was among those who ascribed little value to the autonomy
H3
interests of speakers. ) As a result, in Meiklejohn's view, speakers are
essentially fungible so long as all arguments can be "covered" by available
debate participants. "What is essential," Meiklejohn wrote in summarizing
his philosophy, "is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said."s4 'VVhile some scholars have critiqued the low value that
Meiklejohn attached to expressive autonomy,8~ and others have questioned

FISS, S'UjJTa note 76, at 82-8~. Then-Professor Bork levied a similar critique, in broader terms, in
his influential 1971 article: "An individual may develop his Caculties ... Cram trading in the
stock market, Collowing his profession as a river pan pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in
sexual activity, playing tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors."
Bork, sujnn. note 76, at 25.

80.
See CASS R. Su 'STEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM Ol' FREE SPEECH 141 (1993) ("[1]1
is unlikely that an autonomy principle will be able to account for all the features of a wellfunctioning system of free speech law. [t is only part of r.he picture.").

1 borrow the term "collectivist" from Post, sUjJra note 71, at 1109-10.
82.
MEIKLl'JOHN, sUjJra note 75, at 21-28.
83. ld. at 25-26.
84.
ld. at 26.
85.
See, e.g., Davie! A. Strauss, Persua.sion, Au/onom)', and .Freedom of Exjnession, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 334, ~51-52, ~53-60 (l991) (exploring r.he inadequacies of the Meiklejohnian approach,
which leaves no role for autonollly-hased arguments).
81.

POLI71CAL REPRESENTA110N AND ACCOUNTABILITY

1655

the possibility of developing truly neutral criteria for constraining political
speech,86 Meiklejohn's assumption that the meaning of speech may readily
be divorced from the identity of the speaker has received little sustained
attention.
One of my purposes in this Article is to aid in dislodging Meiklejohn's
assumption. The posture that I adopt-embracing the distinction between
public speech values and individual autonomy, but then focusing closely on
the impact of a speaker's identity upon those public speech values-is an
underutilized one in First Amendment analysis. In the present context, it is
the very bluntness of the military's speech regulations that demonstrates the
need for such analytical refinernent.
1.

Communication with Elected Representatives

I turn first to the impact of the military's speech restrictions upon
communications with government officials. That impact is as stark in the
political context as in any other: Don't Ask, Don't Tell categorically
prohibits gay and lesbian servicemembers from identifying themselves
honestly to their elected representatives ..As Part 1's overview of the policy's
scope m.akes clear, the military regularly applies its speech restrictions in
civilian settings and enforces those restrictions vigorously. Thus, Don't Ask,
Don't Tell prohibits a gay soldier from contacting his representative in
Congress and saying, "The lTlilitary policy on homosexuality inflicts great
harms upon me and the other gay soldiers I work wlth-I urge you to lead
an effort to have it repealed," and the threat of discharge attached to that
H7
prohibition is very real. A lesbian servicemember is likewise prohibited
from contacting her state senator and saying, "Our State prohibits lesbians
from adopting children, and that policy is preventing me from starting a
family. I urge you to reconsider your support for this harmfullaw.,,88 either

86.
See, e.g., Post, sUjJra note 71, at 1117 (queslioning the coherence of 1eiklejohn's
theory as, among other things, "refleet[ing] an insufficiently radical conception of the reach of
[collective political] self·determination, which encompasses not merely the substance of
collective decisions, but also the larger framework of function within which such collective
decisionmaking is necessarily conceived as taking place").
87.
See, e.g., SLOt THIRD REPORT, .\'U.jna note 50, at 22-23 (recounting the story of it
"Dedicated Army VValT,ml Officer" who felt the need to write a letter to Senator Diane Feinstein
anonymously, ralher than id(~ntiry herself or schedule an in-person visit, in order to describe
the hardships of living under the policy).
88. There are currently lhree states that irnpose categorical prohibition on the adoption
of children by gay people. Nat'l etr. for Lesbian Rights, Lesbian.l and Gay NIm as AdojJtive and
Foster Parents: 1\12 In/ormation Sheet, at http://wwvJ.nclrights.org/publications/adoptive·
information.hun (last visited lar. 22, 2004) (on file with the lowa Law Review). In Florida, the
prohibition is complete-gay men and lesbians cannot adopt under any circumstances,
whatever their relationship slatus. Iii. In Utah, couples who live together cannot adopt unless
they are married (an institlll:ion that is denied to gay couples). Id. In Mississippi, same-gender
couples are prohibited from adopting, whether they cohabit or not. !d.; see also Lofton v. Sec'y
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can a gay soldier go to the local law enforcement authorities, explain that he
feels unsafe from the threat of gay bashing in his neighborhood, and request
89
that the police step up their efforts to reduce bias-related crime. Indeed,
even a soldier who was himself gay bashed would have good reason to fear
discharge under the policy if he were to report that crime to the civilian
authorities (as evidenced by the airman who was threatened with discharge
90
.
when he S011ght treatment for a sexual assault). vVhether the Issue relates
to a soldier's status and conditions of employment within the service itself or
his circumstances within the larger civilian community, Don't Ask, Don't
Tell threatens gay servicemembers with immediate separation and discharge
if they disclose their identities to the officials charged with representing
their interests and setting and enforcing state policy.
Any student of free speech doctrine will readily identify these scenarios
as lying at the proverbial "core" of First Amendment concern. Since it first
invoked the First Amendment to impose substantive limits on the actions of
the State, the Court has identified the "free discussion of governmental
91
affairs" as a central commitment of that provision. Petitions directed to
92
3
state officials and criticism of government policl both define essential
of Oep't of Children and Family Sen's., 358 F.3d 804, 806 (lIth CiL 2004) (upholding Florida
adoption ban).
89.
Non-milital)' Jaw enforcement authOl'ities oftcn share information with milital)'
officials, making honest communications with the police exceedingly dangerous for gay and
lesbian soldiers. See, e.g., Complaint of Loren Stephen Loomis at 4-5, Loomis v. United States
(Fed. Cl. July 7, 2003) (describing the events leading to Loomis's discharge. in which police and
fire officials came La Loomis's burned-out home following an arson, happened upon materials
indicating that he was gay. and fOl'\varded those materials to military authorities).
http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ART1CLES/pdf~file/1
006.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); mjJ'ra note 47 and accompanying text (recounting the
sharing of information between civilian law enforcement authorities and milital)'. officials,
leading to discharge pl'oceedings).
90. SLON EIGHTH REPORT. supra note 36, at 11-19 (detailing instances of violence and
harassment in the U.S. Army during 2001, including the aftermath of the murder of PFC Barry
Winchell at Fon Campbell, Kentucky); see supm text accompanying notes 61-62.
91. !VIiJls v. Alabama. 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). The full text of this passage from MilL5 is
worthy of reproduction:
'vVhatever differences may exist aboLlt interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is pract.ically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and aJl such matt.ers relating
to political processes.

Ill. at 218-19. Mills itself involved an Alabama regulation prohibiting newspapers and magazines
from printing editorials on election day urging citizens 10 cast their votes in a panicular
manner. Id. at 215.
92. SeerVlcOonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (noting that the Petition and Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment togcther preserve substantial (though not absolute) protection
for "people [to] 'communicate their will' through direct petitions to the legislature and
government ofticials") (quoting James Madison, in I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 738 (1789»; see also
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parameters of the "political process" that the Amendment covers with its
mantle. As with all else under the First Amendment, these areas of concern
do not receive absolute protection,94 but intrusions into these speech
situations-especially intrusions that target particular speakers or
messages-provoke intense scrutiny.
A defender of Don't Ask, Don't Tell might offer two types of response
to this apparent affront to political process values. First, the policy does not
absolutely forbid gay and lesbian servicemembers from communicating ,vith
their representatives and government officials; rather, it only forbids them
from speaking about their own sexual ident.ities. Thus, one might. argue that
a gay soldier could still make effective use of government processes under
the policy, albeit with a more limited vocabulary, simply by avoiding any
mention of his own identity. (The irony of arguing that a speech restriction
is less troubling because it only restricts discussion on a particular subject
should not be lost upon the reader.) Second, the policy does not place any
restriction upon the ability of civilian speakers to have discussions with
government officials concerning the military policy, or gay adoption, or hate
crimes, or any other topic; rather, it only limits the speech of military
personnel. One might thus suggest (following Meiklejohn) that the policy's
harm to public speech values is minimal so long as non-military personnel
remain free to press these issues before political representatives and state
authorities. In other words, the Meiklejohnian argument would go, the
political process does not suffer substantial harm when particular speakers
are silenced (whatever the impact upon the autonomy of the affected
individuals), so long as the Stat.e does not totally suppress particular
viewpoints or topics of discussion. Both of these rejoinders, however, seek to
disaggregate individual experience and identity from the meaning and
effectiveness of speech. For this reason, both are descriptively untenable and
analytically inadequate.
Political speech operates OIl multiple levels. To be sure, one of its
functions is simply to inform: to communicate facts and set forth reasoned
arguments. These are, as J.L. Austin would have it, the "Iocutionary" goals of

MEIKLEJOHN, supra nOle 75. at 38 ("[AJ petition, whatever its motivation, raises definitely a

question of public policy. It asserL, an error in public decision. The petitioners have found, or
think tbey have found, that in tbe adoption of a government policy, some private interest has
been misjudged or overlooked.").
93.
SeeN.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (finding that attempts to limit
commentary on official policies must be considered "against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open").
94.
See, e.g., McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485 (permitting libel action to proceed even when an
objectionable statement is contained in a petition to a government official); United States Civil
Servo Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (upholding the
authority of government to impose carefully defined restrictions on partisan political activities
of federal employees).
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speech-the set of communicative purposes bound up with the denotative
95
meanings of the words spoken. As to these, Meiklejohn's assertion about
the potential fungibility of speakers in a political debate may come closest to
having merit. But locutionary goals comprise only a part of the meaning
conveyed by a political entreaty. Political speech can have powerful
"illocutionary" effects, as well: The communicative act can effect changes in
the status or condition of the speaker, or of his interlocutor or audience.
Thus, a political speaker may draw upon reputational capital that only he
possesses by personalizing the terms of his support for an issue, thereby
transforming his own moral status in a manner that, in turn, can engender
in the audience a feeling of gravitas in the moment. (Imagine
Representative John Lewis of Georgia saying: "This is the most important
civil rights issue on which I have ever taken a stand.") Or, a speaker may take
the irrevocable step of supporting a position that he has previously opposed
with consistency and vigor, once again effecting a change in his public
identity that will mark his message as one of singular importance for an
audience. (Imagine Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago
saying: "I have always opposed the enactment of antidiscrimination laws
because I think them inefficient and immoral, but this issue convinces me
that I must make an exception.") Such illocutionary effects form a part of
the "meaning" that is communicated to the listeners as surely as the
denotative meanings associated "'li.th the words spoken. And political speech
also serves "perlocutionary" goals: that further set of results (like the
formation of political coalitions, or the reform of state policies) that the
speaker seeks to bring about by delivering her message. A speech that
conveys only sterile facts and arguments on the anonymous printed page can
issue a powerful call to action when delivered by the right speaker. By taking
a public position on a particular issue, for example, a speaker may caU upon
his allies to rnake the issue a high priority and, at the same time, make
implicit offers for political coalition with other groups. (Imagine the
President of the AFL-CIO giving a public address in which he argues, "The
interests of labor and the interests of the women's movement are closely
tied.") Once again, such goals are as much a part of speech's "meaning" as
the denotative content of the message itself. "Free trade in ideas," the Court

95. Austin, a philosopher of language, gave a series of lectures at Harval-d in 1955 that
have become the classic text in describing the "perforrnative" aspects of speech. J.L. AUSTIN,
How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 94 U. O. Unmon & Marina Sbisa eds., 2d ed. 1975). My own
discussion of the heuristics that Austin introduced-the locutional)', illocutionary and
perlocutionary goals of speech-derives greater influence from Professor Rae Langton, who has
done important work in translating Austin's termino!ot,'Y for use in anal)/zing speech disputes
\vithin a legal framework. See, e.g., Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 29],305-30 (1993).
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has said, "means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not
f
,,96
mere Iy to d escn'b eaets.
'When a class of speakers wi th a professional or personal identity that is
highly pertinent to a particular issue is prevented from delivering a political
message about that issue, the distinctive illocutionary and pedocutionary
meanings that they would have contributed to public discourse will not be
conveyed by the mere presence of other speakers in the town meeting (or
the Senator's office, or the police department) who are prepared to offer
the same set of information and arguments. Thus, in some instances,
Meiklejohn's assertion is exactly wrong. Quite apart from any concern over
individual autonomy, it may be essential that a particular individual or group
have the opportunity 1O speak in order that a particular, worthy message be
contributed to public discourse.
Consider again, in this light, the scenarios outlined above:
• A gay soldier contacts his Senator and seeks to convince her that
the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is unjust and should be repealed.
If he were free to speak openly, the soldier could explain in
personal terms the hardship that he suffers under the policy. He
could convey the reluctance that he ordinarily feels in complaining
about the conditions of military service-an ethic of stoic fortitude
that is common among career soldiers-but explain that the
dignitary and emotional harms [hat the policy imposes have
convinced him that he needs to ask his elected officials for
assistance. He could detail the impact that the policy has upon his
morale, and, by extension, that of his unit in the United States's
current military operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. He could, in
other words, place the weight of his own character and
experience-his distinctive identity-behind a personal appeal to
reconsider an important issue of public policy having an immediate
impact upon U.S. interests. And the Senator, in turn, could
incorporate that message into her own entreaty on the Senate
floor. She could craft her arguments around the story of this
soldier who is being treated so unjustly even as he serves his
country in a foreign theater of war-an anecdotal mode that has
become a favorite rhetorical style of Presidents in their State of the
97
Union addresses. Neither a concerned civilian, unable to describe

96. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address Uan. 29, 2002), in The
State of the Union; President Bush's State of the Union Address to Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2002, at A22 (inviting Shannon Spann, the wife of a CIA operative killed during
operations in Afghanistan, to be personally acknowledged during the presentation of policy
prescriptions in the region); President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address Uan. 27,
2000), in Transcript of President Clinton's State of the Union Addms (2/5), U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 28,
2000, available at 2000 "VL 4140719 (inviting Tom l\'lauser, the father of a student killed during
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the policy's impact in personal terms, nor a gay veteran, unable to
convey a sense of immediacy or ongoing personal investment,
could capture this distinctive set of emotive and political appeals.
The message can be conveyed only by a speaker for whom the
policy is a source of immediate, personal concern: a gay soldier
currently serving on active duty.
• A lesbian soldier, stationed in a state that prohibits gay people
from adopting children, contacts her state senator in order to ask
that he lobby for the repeal of that ban. "Vhre she free to speak
openly, the soldier could explain the need that members of the
military feel for the stability and emotional connection of a family
and the harm that she will suffer if she must wait to start her own
family until she is stationed in a more hospitable community. She
could express the particular sense of outrage that she feels in
contributing her efforts to her country's defense and yet being
denied full citizenship status in civilian life-a type of argument
t.hat had a m,~or impact on t.he reduction in the national vot.ing
98
age during the Vietnam vVar.
And she could invoke her
dedication and accomplishment in military service as a
demol1strationof her fitness to be a parent (and, hence, of t.he
irrationality of denying her that opportunity simply because she is
gay). Only her status as an aerive-duty lesbian "vould permit the
soldier to invest these arguments with immediacy and affect.
• A gay soldier who feels terrorized in his local community
contact.s the police or other officials to request their assistance. If
he were able to speak openly, he could explain the specia·l
vulnerability that he feels as a gay soldier in a neighborhood that
exhibits both hornophobia and patriotic fervor. He could argue
that the civilian authorities would seriously betray t.heir duty if they
failed to protect a soldier from bias-related violence on the streets
of his own home. And sympathetic civilian authorities, in turn,
could use the experiences of this gay soldier to construct a
powedul coalition of city officials, across ordinary lines of political

the Columbine massacre, to be personally acknowledged for anti-crime work during the
presentation of policy prescriptions on crime).
98. As Professor Elaine Scarry has explained: "Both the House and Senate judiciary
hcarings 011 the twenty-sixth amendment repeatedly cite the participation of those fighting in
Vietnam and of those exercising power to consent by refusing to be drafted having earned for
that generation and all that followed the right to vote at a YO:_ll1ger age." Elaine Scarry, War and
the SociaL Contrael: NucLeaT PoLic)', Dist1"ibution, and the Right 10 BeaT Anns, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257,
1304-05 (1991); see al.so id. at ]301 n.148 (assembling portions of the congressional record
surrounding the proposal of the Twcnty-Sixlh Amendment that make emphatic references to
this dynamic).
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affiliation, to aim at combating homophobia and making the
streets safer for gay citizens. The stark juxtaposition embodied in
the soldier's story-a man pledged to defend his country yet
unwelcome and unsafe on the streets of his own home-would
carry a message similar to the appeal that Black soldiers made to
powerful effect after returning home from combat in World War
9
11. ,! It is the soldier's status as an active-duty gay man that gives him
access to this rich vocabulary.

In arguing that the distinctive identity of the active-duty gay soldier is
central to the meaning and effectiveness of the political message in each of
these cases, I rely upon some broad assumptions about the relationship
between the production of knowledge and the particular set of social
orderings of which a speaker is a part. Many thinkers have raised incisive
questions about such an epistemology of identity. Kendall Thomas and
others have suggested, for example, that people of color are often the
objects of a racialized epistemology of identity rather than its subjects, and
hence that they should be '..vary of claiming to possess a distinctive "racial
. "1 est tl1elr
' c Iall11S
'
Ien'd'Inc[.lrect ere d ence to repressIVe
. outcomes. 100 Th e
VOlCe
relationship between gender identity and the production of knowledge has
been a subject of active debate since Carol Gilligan published her influential
work on the subject. 101 AndJudith Butler has challenged the extent to which
an individual should be treated as the "author" of her own identity when
engaging in social discourse, and hence the role that individual identity
102
should play in shaping First Amendment claims. \Vhile these debates are

99.
See, e.g., eil R. McMillen, Fightingfor What We Didn't Have: NIississijJjJi's Black Veterans,
in REMAKING DIXIE: THE IMPACT Of WORLD WAR [ION THE AMERICA SOUTH 93-110 ( eil R.
McMillen, ed., 1997) (describing the impact of Black veterans upon the social status of Blacks in
the Ametican South following ''''odd War II).
100.
See Kendall Thomas, Comments at the Duke Law School Frontiers of Legal Thought
Conference (Jan. 26, 1990), in Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
SjJeech on CamjJus, in MNU J. IYlATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND 53, 61 (1993). Alex
Johnson's anicle on the distinctive voices of people of color in the law provides one of the
standard accounts of the "racial voice" argument. See Alex M. Johnson, The New Voice of Color,
100 YALE LJ. 2007 (1991).
101.
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ewluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal P1'Ofession l\1aking
New Voices in the Law, 42 U. IVIlAMI L. REV. 29 (1987) (discussing the impact upon the legal
profession of increasing the prominence of female voices). See generally CAROL GILLIC.A.,"I, IN A
DifFERENT VOICE (1982).
102. In her examination of hate speech, for example, Butler argues that individuals do not
generate the injurious meanings associated with bigoted speech in the way that judicial
treatment of that speech generally assumes. Rather, she argues, an individual who employs
bigoted speech is best understood as invoking, and inscribing himself within, an ongoing
histot)' of injury that preceded the speaker, but as to which he enjoys only a transient
prerogative of authorship. Butler writes:

The subject as sovereign is presumed in the Austinian account of performativity:
the tlgure for the one who speaks and, in speaking performs what she/he speaks,
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important, it is enough for me merely to acknowledge them here and not
engage them deeply. tly concern is "'lith the current impact of the military
policy upon existing political institutions. Whatever normative criticisms one
might levy at the use of identity in epistemological analysis, those very
criticisms indicate the continued salience of personal identity in political
debate-a proposition that finds ample support in the political and social
sciences, as, for example, in studies demonstrating the importance of social
103
cues in message perception during political advertising.
When a political
system is steeped in a contested epistemology, one cannot avoid employing
that same epistemology in measuring the full range of internal distortions
that a restriction on identity speech will impose upon political discourse.
The Supreme Court has, at times, demonstrated an appreciation for
these principles of meaning and identity.lo4 To date, however, it has not
incorporated them into the ornate structure of First Amendment doctrine in
any meaningful way. Its clearest statement concerning the relationship
between the identity of a speaker and the meaning of her message appears
in a case where the issue served a role that was more illustrative than

as Ihe judge or some other representative of the law .... 1f pe!i'ormativity requires
a power to effect or enact what one names, then who will be the "one" with such a
power, and how will such a power by thought? ... Does the "one" who speaks the
term cite the term, thereby establishing him or herself as the author while at the
same time establishing the derivative status of that authorship? . , . Indeed, is
iterability or citationality not precisely this: the operation of that metalepsis by which the
subject who "cites" the fmjonnative is tempol"arily prOd1tCed as the belated and fictive origin of
the peljonnative itself? The subject who utters the socially injurious words is
mobilized by that long string of injurious interpellations: the subject achieves a
temporary status in the citing of that utterance, in performing itself as the origin of
that utterance.
JUDITH BUTLER, Burning Acts, Injurious Speech, in EXCITABLE SPEECH 43, 48-49 (1997).
103.
See, e.g., Shan to Iyengar & Nicholas A. Valentino, Who Says What? Source CTedibility as a
.MediatoT of Campaign A.dveltising, in ARTHUR LUPIA ET AL., ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION,
CHOICE, AND THE Bou DS OF R'\TIONALI1Y 108, 109 (2000) (" [Clues can be derived from the
gender or race of the sponsoring candidate [and] the spokesperson making the 'pitch' for the
candidate ... , The evidence from attitude change research indicates that in everyday situations
involving efforts to persuade, cue-based processing predominates."); id. at 109-10 (discussing
the social science literature on cues and attitude formation); id. at 128-29 (concluding that a
political message is particularly effective when delivered by an individual possessing identity
traits commonly perceived to bear an intrinsic connection to the message, as with a female
Democrat and child care or a male Republican and national defense).
104. Justice Blackmun, in particular, made passing references to speakers and messages in
several First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Ark. Writers' Project v. Ragland, Inc., 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1978) ("It hardly answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that another
person, outside his control, may speak for him.") (quoting Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983) (Blackmun,J., concurring»; Va. Pharmacy
Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 n,15 (1976) ("We are aware of no
general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could
come by his message by some other means.") (Blackmun,J.).
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determinative. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,105 the Court struck down a "visual
clutter" ordinance that barred residents of a St. Louis suburb from posting
signs on their property. The Court based its holding principally on a finding
that the ordinance prohibited too much speech by "completely foreclos[ing]
a venerable means of communication.,,106 A resident who is prohibited from
posting a sign on his property might find no other convenient means of
public expression readily at band, the Court observed, and hence might not
bother to communicate his message at all. This observation led the Court to
conclude that the ordinance did not "leave open ample alternative channels
for expression"lo7-a prosaic type of inquiry in the review of content-neutral
regulations on the time, place, or manner of speech. lOs But the Court
expanded upon this reasoning somewhat further in City of Ladue, explaining
that the availabili ty of alternatives was particularly threatened under the antisign ordinance because of the "unique and important"I09 opportunity for
expression that a residential sign offers: the built-in chance to associate a
message "vith the identity of a particular speaker (the uwner of the
property) .
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message
quite distinct from placing the sanle sign someplace else, or
conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely
because of their location, such signs provide information about the
identity of the "speaker." ... [T]he identity of the speaker is an
important component of many attempts to persuade. A sign
advocating "Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a retired
general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction
than the same sign in a lO-year-old child's bedroom window or the
same message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile. An
espousal of socialism may carry different implications when
displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on
l10
a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.

As it turns out, these observations were somewhat tangential to the
holding of City ofLadue itself. The distinctive identity of Margaret Gilleo (the

105. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
106. Id, at 54. There was some dispute in the case as to whether certain selective
exemptions rendered the prohibition on signs content based rather than content neutral, but
the Court ducked that issue, finding that the ordinance \-vas invalid even if content neutral. Id.
at 52-53.
107. Id. at 56.
108. See, e,g., vVard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("Our cases make
clear ... that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ... leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.").
109.
City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54.
110, Id. at 56--57 (citation omitted).
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homeowner challenging the ordinance) was not a focal point of either the
lawsuit or the Court's opinion. The Court could have made its point about
"arnple alternative channels" simply by observing that, with ubiquitous noise
restrictions ll ! and prohibitions against posting signs on public property,l12 a
homeowner would have few opportunities of any kind to display a message
to her neighbors if she could not put a sign on her lawn or window. The 'i'
1l3
street corner, as Owen Fiss tells us, is frequently empty in the modern era.
Thus, while City of Ladue may indicate the Court's readiness to consider the
relationship between speaker and rnessage in the abstract, it says little about
how the issue might influence the Court's analysis in a difficult case.
For an example of a dispute in which that relationship appears to have
played a more determinative role, albeit within a different juridical context,
l14
one migh t point to (flutter v. Bollinger -the Court's landmark opinion
upholding certain affirmative-action programs against an equal protection
challenge. Gmtter was concerned with the question of "diversity" and the
legitimacy of using race in the admissions process of a state university as one
factor in assembling an entering class. One of the interests that the majority
found to constitute a legitimate justification for race-conscious admissions
was "diminishing the force of [racial] stereotypes" by seeking to admit a
sufftcient number of non-vVhite students to dispel the "belief that minority
students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority
viewpoint on any issue."] l~ The Court upheld Michigan Law School's
affirmative action program in part because of its conclusion-never
explicitly stated in the opinion, surprisingly enough, but necessarily implied
by its holding-that only students who are themselves non-vVhite can
effectively communicate the message that non-vVhite students do not aU
share "some characteristic minority viewpoint.,,116
In setting forth its reasoning, the (flutter Court implicitly invites a
comparison between an all-White class in which the participants attempt to
explore minority stereotypes from a secondhand or hypothetical posture, on
the one hand, and, on the other, a racially heterogeneous class in which
non-White students are actually present to demonstrate the inaccuracy of
such stereotypes through their own expression of a ,·vide range of opinions.
Michigan defended its policy of assembling a "critical mass" of non-White
students by asserting that the latter scenario offers a much greater hope of
dismantling the "minority vicv\lJoint" stereotype than the former, because

111.
See, e.g, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding volume and time restrictions
on the use of amplification in residential neighborhood).
112.
See, e.g., Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincellt, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(upholding a ban on posting signs on Ulility poles and other public property).
113. FISS, mpm note 76, at 49.
114.
539 U.S. 306 (2003). I thank Alan Brownstein for this observation.
115.
[d. at 335.
116.

[d.
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the relationship bet\,veen identity and expression will empower the nonWhite students not just to communicate, but to exemplify a counter-message
about that stereotype, The Court deferred to this assertion, Indeed, the
majority characterized the University's pursuit of diversity under this theory
as a pedagogical choice of "constitutional dimension, grounded in the First
HIli
Amendment.
Thus, to the extent that the Crutter decision really is about
pedagogy, the linkage between the speaker's identity and the meaning and
effectiveness of the message appears to have played a determinative role in
..,
l'
J 18
t. h e maJonty s ru mg.
In this connection, the case of Steve May has presented one of the most
dramatic illustrations of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy's impact upon the
range of voices in public discourse. From 1999 to 2002, May was a member

117.
Id, at 332-3~~. One might well ask what exactly the phrase "of constitutional
dimension" means in this context. It seems unlikely that the present Court would afford a
university a broad First Amendment right to resist any outside interference with its admissions
policies-a claim that the Burger Court rejected out of hand in Runyon v. McCrary. 427 U.S,
160, 175-76 (1976), Rather, this reference to a First Amendment freedom "of constirutional
dimension" might better be understood as a gesture toward the "positive" function that Owen
Fiss and others have ascribed to that provision-that is, the responsibility that the Amendment
lays upon state officials to take affirmative steps for the promotion of robust debate in public
discourse, and the added license that it gives them when they legislate toward that end. See N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, 270 (1964) (describing the First Amendment as embodying
a "profound commitment" that the terms of public debate remain "wide open" and "robust");
Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State CensO'lshijJ, 100 YALE LJ. 2087, 2087-88 (1991) ("The
principle of freedom thaI. the First Amendment embodies is derived from the democratic
nature of our society and reflects the belief that robust public debate is an essential
precondition for collective self-deterrnination."). But see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
(135 U.S, 765, 790-92 (1978) (rejecting the proposition that the stale can restrict one voice in
order to augment anothel' that might otherwise go unheard); Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,4849 (]976) (per curiam) ("[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment.").
118. It is worth noting that Gmt/a may well be about more than just pedagogy, 'While the
majority in Grutterforcefully reiterates earlier statements from Adamnd and Croson in which the
Coun has said that a desire to remedy the general societal effects of past discrimination
provides an insufficient justification for "benign" uses of race in the public sphere. See Grutta,
123 S, Ct. at 2337-38 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S, 200, 227, 229-30, 237
(1995); City of Richmond v,]. A. Croson Co" 488 U.S, 469, 493 (1989)), The Court goes on to
discuss the valuable social goods for which an elite education often serves a gateway function
and the importance of ensuring "visibly" equal access to those social goods for non-vVhite
citizens, See id, at 2341. This species of argument sounds distinctly remedial. See Robert Paul
Wolff & Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Pimple on Adonis's Nose: A Dialogue Oil the Concept of
"Meril" in the Affirmative Action Debate 72-73 (Aug. ] 3, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Iowa Law Review) (suggesting that the Court may have adopted a less rigid
"predominance" approach in reviewing race-conscious programs in education); cf Lani
Cuinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Gua'rdians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117
HARY. L. REV. 113, ]23 (2003) (emphasizing "the dominant role that upward mobility plays in
understanding the democratic mission of higher education").
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1ll) 0
.
of the Anzona
State House 0 f R epresentatives.·
n most Issues,
May-a
120
Republican and a Mormon-is quite conservative
He is also an out gay
man and, during a part of the relevant time period, was a first lieutenant in
the U.S. Army Reserves. Though he was open about being gay when he
campaigned for political oflice, the issue received no apparent attention
from the military at that time. In February 1999-while he was still on')
"inactive" status in the Resenies-Representative May gave an impassioned
speech before the Arizona House Government Reform Committee in which
he urged his fellow legislators to reject a proposed bill that would have
prohibited Arizona state agencies from extending domestic partner benefits
to gay and lesbian employees. May's remarks were prompted by a strongly
antigay speech given by one of his Republican colleagues, Representative
KarenJohnson, and he couched his opposition to the bill in personal terms,
offering himself as a counterexample to the picture of "homosexual
promiscuity" painted by Johnson and describing the impact that denial of
benefits would have upon his own relationship.12l
Two months later, May was called back to active reserve status and
placed on call for deployment to Kosovo, where the U.S. was then
conducting peacekeeping operations. Shortly thereafter, May's earlier
speech on the floor of the legislature came to the Army's attention through
an anonymous complaint. The military conducted an investigation,ln read
the transcript of May's committee remarks, and initiated discharge
proceedings against him for speaking about being gay to his legislative

119.
See Ariz. State Legislature, Rep1'esentative May, at http://lvviw.azleg.state.az.us/
members/431eg/smay.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004) (stating that May began his term of
service in 1999) (on file \Vith the Iowa Law Review); The Data Lounge, Steve l'vIay Loses Arizona
Seat, at
http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/news/record.html?record=20217 (Sept. 12, 2002)
(reporting that May lost his 2002 reelection bid in the primary) (on file with the Iowa Law
Review).
120.
See Re-Elect Steve May (detailing positions on issues), at http://www.stevemay,org (last
visited Feb. 15,2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
121. Representative Karen Johnson urged passage of the bill by arguing that domestic
partnership benefits would promote "homosexual and promiscuous lifestyles." May denounced
the remarks in response, saying, "'When you attack my family and my freedom I will not sit in my
office quietly." Up to the lvlinute News and Commentmy, THE DAILY GUARDIAN (Apr. 2001), available
at http://www.dailyguardian.com/dailyguardian/ApriI2001.htm (on flle with the Iowa Law
Review).
122. DoD regulations specif)' that an anonymous tip does not constitute "credible
information" sufficient to initiate an investigation under the policy, but, as discussed in Part I,
such limitations are honored largel)' in the breach and do not confer any enforceable rights
upon servicemembers in any event. See DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 1332.14, ENLISTED
ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS § E3.A4,3.3.3, at 69 (1993) (explaining that "rumor, suspicion, or
capricious claims" are not "credible information" warranting investigation), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ corres/pdf/ d133214wch 1_122193/ d 133214p.pdf (on file
with the Iowa Law Review); id. § E3.A4, 1.5, at 71 (giving no enforceable rights),
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colleagues. m For two years, the military vigorously pursued its case against
May in an effort to expel him from the reserves and punish him for his
statements v'lith a "general" rather than an "honorable" discharge.
Eventually, however, mounting political pressure at the national level forced
the military to compromise and permit May to separate from the Army
J24
voluntarily, with full honors and benefits.
It is worth taking a moment to catalog the implications of the Army's
discharge proceedings in the May case. Most striking, of course, is the fact
that May was prosecuted for statements he made in his capacity as a state
legislator, on the floor of the Arizona House, while debating pending
J25
legislation.
He was also prosecuted for statements made while he was not
an active member of the armed forces. May had been honorably discharged
from the Army in 1995 and was on inactive status in the reserves when he
gave his address to the committee. The Army reactivated May about two
months after the address, then initiated discharge proceedings when the
address was brought to its attention. The lesson that the military's actions
thus offered to May (and to gay civilians generally) was that self-censorship is
required if one ever intends to enter the service, since even pre-enlistment
statements can serve as a basis for initiating discharge proceedings. This
126
lesson is neither a fanciful nor an isolated one.
As Professor Janet Halley
has revealed, military authorities conducting discharge investigations
sometimes seek out statements about gay identity that soldi.ers may have
127
made to friends or family prior to enlistment. Finally, May's discussion of
his identit~y was not secondary or tangential to his advocacy i.n the Arizona
House. It was of central importance to the emotive and political impact of
his speech. ''''hile any legislator might have spoken secondhand about his
gay constituents who would be harmed by the bill under discussion, or about
his gay friends who did not conform to the unflattering picture of

123. See lvlark R. Kerr, Army "Tells" Politician "No, "TUCSON VlKLY. OI:lSERVt:R & PLANET, Sept.
18, 2000 (detailing the earl)' phases of investigation), http://www.gaymilitar),.ucsb.edu/
ResearchResources/PressClips/news9_21_00c.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with the
Iowa Law Review).
124.
See Gay Jbizona Legislator Will Leave IWilitmy Reserves on Own Tenns, THE DALLAS
MORN! G NEWS, Jan. 21, 2001, at 'llA (describing the resolution of the case resulting from
political pressure in ·Washington).
125. The "prosecution" w::ts not a criminal one, of course, but an administrative
proceeding. Still, the punitive nature of the military's action (and the penalties that the military
sought) makes the r.erm seem apt.
126. See, e.g., SLDN FIFTH REPORT, S11.jJUl note 38, at 46 (quoting the defense attorney for a
soldier subject to discharge uncler Don't Ask, Don't Tell who reported that the prosecutor in a
proceeding "went so far as to question members of the respondent's pre-service place of
em ploymen t" from four years earlier).
127. SeeJanet E. Halle)', The Status/Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions to JVIilitmy Anti~
Gay Policy: A Legal Anhaeology, 3 GAY L.Q. 159,213 (1996) (discussing an Air Force instructional
memorandum to Judge Advocates and military judges concerning investigative techniques for
soldiers who have received educational benefits during military service).
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"promiscuity" that Representative Johnson was painting, only May could
characterize the bill as a personal affront to "my family and my freedom;,,128
indeed, an "attack" that May would not take "sit[tingJ in my office
quietly,,129-martial imagery that May, an experienced soldier, was able to
employ with particular salience.l:~o May's invocation of the personal was not
an isolated instance in this regard. Mter the discharge proceedings against
him were dismissed, he successfully sponsored a bill to have Arizona's
sodomy law repealed, once again invoking his identity and personal
.
. h'IS support f or t11e measure ..131
expenence
111
Finally, I note that this correlation between military identity and the
ability to speak ,vith authority about matters of military policy is one that
members of the military themselves insist upon frequently. The attitude is
common among servicemembers that only those who have actually served in
the armed forces have the specialized knowledge required to speak with
authority about matters of internal policy, and, more importantly, that only
132
they have "earned the right" to contribute to such debates.
To offer one
example among many, I recently encountered this attitude in response to
my own work, in a letter sent to me by a retired Naval commander following
an op-ed essay that I wrote about the policy's impact on working-class gay
men and lesbians. Mter registering his disagreement with a comparison that
I drew between employment policies in the civilian workforce and within the
military, the commander ended his letter with the following sentiment: "It is
obvious to me that you have never served in the armed forces or you would
never have made such a comparison. Until you have so served, you would be
well advised to be silent on the matter.,,133 I take this admonition to spring
from the same basic observation that underlies my analysis throughout this
Part: the close relationship between individual experience or identity and
the ability to communicate certain messages with authority in public debate.
Indeed, the particular resistance of military personnel to external civilian

128.

Up to the Minute News and CormnentQ.1Y, mpra. note 121 (emphasis added).

129.

Id.

130. Journalist David Moats recounts anot.her instance in which a gay st.at.e legislat.or
invoked his own identity and experience to powerful effect in a legislative debate-the speech
by Representative Bill Lippert on the" floor of the Vermont Legislature when that body was
crafting its response to the Vermont Supreme Court decision that led to the institution of "civil
unions." See DAVID MOATS, CIVIL 'WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRJAGE 213-21 (2004).
131. See Will O'Brien, Arizona Lifts Sudomy Ban, WASH. BLADE, l\tfay 11, 2001 (reporting
enactment of repeal and describing t-.>fay's sponsorship), http://www.sodomylaws.org/usa/
arizona/aznews32.htm (last visited Apr. 5,2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
132.
See, e.g., '-Voltl, supm note 2, at 1163 n.52 and intenriew cited therein (relating an
interview with Anonymous Officer Number Two, a homosexual senior command officer, in
which he expresses contempt. for the ability of civilian "gay activists" to understand, or speak
meaningfully to, gay men and lesbians in the military).
133. Letter from Robert C. ''''hitten, Commander, U.S. aval Reserve-Retired, to Professor
Tobias Barring1011 Wolff (Aug. 10,2003) (on file with author).
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criticism is an issue to which I will return in my discussion of accountability
in Part II.B, below.
2.

Participation in ASsociations and Advocacy Groups

turn next to the impact of the policy upon private associations In
civilian life. To avoid confusion, let me begin by specifying the type of
"associational" interests upon which I wish to focus. The Court has fashioned
associational rights of constitutional magnitude under the authority of both
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The distinction between the t\.yo
recalls the divide between autonomy rights and public speech values that I
I34
emphasized in the last ParL
Among the modes of association that the
Court has protected under the Due Process Clause are certain forms of close
personal relationships-"intimate associations"-that play an important role
in human self-realization. Thus, marriages,135 families, and other favored
J36
kinship arrangements
e1-U0Y constitutional protection under this theory
because they are said to bear an intrinsic correlation to important modes of
individual flourishing, like the development of emotional and
developmen tal bonds or the private exploration of sexuality.137 The
associational rights that the Court has located in the First Amendment, in
contrast, are more purely instrumental in nature. When the First
Amendment protects an association, it is not because of any benefit toward
individual flourishing that the association provides to its members, but
because of the role that the association plays in fostering those expressive
118
activities of its members that facilitate political discourse. :
There is much to say about the impact that Don't Ask, Don't Tell has
upon the intimate associations of gay and lesbian servicemembers. A policy
that probibits private discussions about personal sexual identity between a
l39
140
bisexual soldier and bis wiJe
or a lesbian daughter and her parents
would seem to pose at least as great a threat to intimacy and individual

134.
See Roberts v. Uniled Slales Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 6l7-18 (1984) (discussing this
d iSlinclion).
135.
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 43'1 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1978) (staling t.hat the right to
marry is "fundamental" and cannol be categorically prohibited as punishment for failure to
satisfy child-support obligations).
136.
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (staling that parental rights are
"fundamental" and cannot be unduly infringed).
]37.
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,95-96 (1987) (discussing forms of emotional
support offered by marriage arrangemcl1ls).
138.
See, e.g., NAA.CP v Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (protecting a civil rights
organizalion from intimidation through compelled disclosure of membership lists where
"compelled disclosul-e . . is likely to affect adversely the ability of [the organization] and its
members 1.0 pursue lheir collect.ive effor-t to foster beliefs").
139.
See SUp1'a notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
140.
See su!J1'a nOles 36-39 and accompanying text.
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flourishing as do laws that place limits on family cohabitation ! or prohibit
142
parents from placing their children in foreign-language classes or sending
143
them to private schools. And, of course, the "acts" provision of the policy
totally prohibits gay and lesbian servicemembers from exploring any form of
sexual or quasi-sexual gratification in their private lives, prerogatives that
Lawrence v. Texas has now brought squarely under the protection of the
l44
Liberty Clause.
My principal focus for the moment, however, is not
"association" as a form of individual self-realization, but rather those First
Amendment associational activities that the Court has found to playa vital
role in facilitating expressive activities in the public sphere.
In this latter mode, the distorting effects that Don't Ask, Don't Tell has
upon associational activity and advocacy groups come in at least two basic
forms. The first derives from the dynamic described in the previous Part: the
elimination of the unique emotive and political appeal that a gay soldier on
active duty could contribute to the public advocacy that an organization
undertakes. Civil rights organizations, for example, have found great value
in shaping political appeals around the cases of active-duty gay soldiers, like
Steve May, whom the military has sought to discharge following a forbidden
'
statement. 145 " C
omll1g
out un d er fiIre ".111 a d'ISC h arge case (
tod
a apt All an

141. See generally Moore v. Cit), of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing the right
of family to resist government prohibition on cohabitation).
142.
See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing the right of parents
to direct the upbringing of children through instruction in a foreign language).
143.
See generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing the right of
parents to send children to private school).
14'1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Cr. 2472, 2484 (2003).
145.
pon. his retiremelll from the federal bench, fanner Nimh Circuit Judge William A.
Norris \Vas given the Liberty Award by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. In a
much-noted speech, .Judge lonis invoked this connection between the stories of individual
servicemembers and the ability of civil rights organizations to raise awareness (and funds)
around the issue of Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
I believe most of the credit for our country's shift in attitudes belongs to all the
coumless gay men and lesbians-including those who have served with honor and
dignity in our armed forces-who have had the fortitude to expose themselves to
the fOt-ces of bigotry, just as the Little Rock Nine did 40 years ago on the steps of
Central High. In coming out, they have helped clear the air of irrational fear by
putting the lie to baseless stereotyping. And, of course, credit goes as well to the
lawyers from gay and lesbian civil rights organizations-Lambda most prominent
among them-who, with the generous financial support of many like you here
t:onight, have tirelessly represented t.hese courageous individuals, against
tremendous odds, in fight.ing to secure the Constitution's promise of equal rights
[or every American, not just some of us.
William A. Norris, Acceptance Speech at the Lambda Liberty Awards (Ocr. 16, 1997), available
at http://www.larnbdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/doculTlenL~/recorcl?record=125
(last visited Mar.
22,2(04) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
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which active-duty gay soldiers can contribute their stories to public discourse
through group-based advocacy. (Recall the case of Jane Able who could not
even bring a lawsuit in her own name to challenge Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
much less lend her name and story to a political appeal by a private advocacy
147
group, because of the policy's prohibition on self-identification. ) One
might term this an "external" effect-a limitation on the ability of
associations to put forward uniquely effective voices in promoting their goals
in the public sphere. The Court's long-standing recognition that "(e]ffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,,148 invites the conclusion
that the policy's impact upon individual speech will also cascade through
those advocacy groups that could otherwise provide a powerful collective
platform for the voices of gay servicemembers.
This "external" effect of the policy on the contributions of advocacy
groups is amplified by the freedom that heterosexual soldiers retain to
149
express their views about gay people and the military, as they regularly do.
It is a commonplace that restrictions on speech pose the greatest threat to
public speech values when they artificially unbalance debate on issues of
public importance. Don't Ask, Don't Tell does not generally prohibit
discussions about sexuality or even homosexuality within the military. It
prohibits discussions about these topics only frorn the viewpoint of an active1oo
dut)' gay servicemernber.
Perhaps the starkest illustration of this cascading impact of the policy
may be seen in the situation of Gay and Lesbian Service Members for

146.
See generally ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDlOR FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
'''-'OMEN IN WORLD WAR TwO (1990).
147. See sujJl-a. notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
148. ;'\JAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
149. See, e.g., Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Fones: Hemings BefoTe the Senate
Cmmn. On Armed SenJices, 103e! Congo 595-97 (1993) (statement of General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf regarding homosexuality in the armed forces), http://donLstanford.edu/
hearings/I-Iearings5-11-93.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review); 'Wolff, sujJI'{( note 2, at 115657 (relating Midshipman Joseph Stephan's account of the pervasiveness of homophobic
comments by straight soldiers in the military).
150.
Professor Butler makcs this point nicely in her essay on homosexuality in the milital)':
The term ["homosexual"] was not banished (under the policy], but only its
utterance within the context of seli~definition.... The term is to remain a term
llsed to describe others, but the term is not to be used by those who might use it
for the purposes of self-description; to describe oneself by the term is to be
prohibited from its llse, cxcept in order to deny or qualify the description. The
term "homosexual" LIlliS comes to describe a class of persons who are to remain
prohibircd from c1elining themselves; the term is to be attributed always from
elsewhere.
JUDITH BUTLER, Contagious Wonl: Pamnoia and "Homosexu.ality" in the Milit(1)', in EXCITABLE
SPEECH: A POLITICS OFTI-IE PERFORMATIVE 103, 104-05 (1997).
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Equality (GLSME), the only formal advocacy group consisting of active-duty
gay men and lesbians that has ever existed in the United States,IS! It is a
violation of Don't Ask, Don't Tell for gay and lesbian servicemembers to
identify themselves even for the purpose of forming an advocacy group. As a
result, GLSME's members must remain anonymous, and the fear of
discovery has made it almost irnpossible for the group to attract fellow
soldiers. "While the most conservative estimates suggest that there are tens of
thousands of gay men and lesbians in the military, GLSME currently claims
152
only fifteen members.
The group has made just one public appearance
since its formation in 2002, when its President appeared on the ABC
program Primetime to be interviewed by Diane Sawyer. He appeared in
shadow, behind a screen, with his voice disguised, as he would have been
1s3
subject to immediate discharge if identified.
But these external effects, though important, are not the whole story.
The policy's absolute restriction on identity speech can also have important
effects on the internal operations of private associations themselves. If the
members of a distinct subpopulation 'within a larger group are prevented
from speaking on their own behalf-or if they are effectively prevented from
participating in the group at all-then their needs and interests may receive
a less effective hearing and hence become a lower priority for the group
itself. The group's agenda, in other words, will be altered-its internal
politics distorted. Such distortion will in turn affect the contributions that
the group makes to public discourse. These "internal" effects are germane
both to groups engaged in traditional forms of advocacy and to more
informal cultural associations.
Consider first the distortions that the policy introduces into the
activities of a political advocacy group. The Defense Department's frequently
cited reassurance that gay soldiers will not be discharged for "associational
activity such as going to a gay bar, possessing or reading homosexual
publications, associating with known homosexuals, or marching in a gay
rights rally in civilian clothes" 154 has created the widespread impression that
gay and lesbian soldiers are allowed to participate and speak freely in these
venues. As should be clear by now, that is not the case. While a member of
the military may, in theory, be permitted to "possess[] or read[] homosexual

151. See generally GLSME Web site, at http://www.glsme.org (last visited Mar. 22. 2004).
152. See GLSME, About GLSMlo', at http://ww\v.glsme.org/about.html(last visited Mar. 22,
2004) ("We are a unique group of about 15 actively serving members of tht United States
armed forces, with a basic goal: to lift the ban on gays in the military and allow them to serve
without fear or prejudice in the armed services.") (on file wilh the Iowa Law Review).
153. See id.. (noting interview).
154. DEP'T OF DEI'. , DIRECIIVE NO. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS §
E3.A4.3.3,4, at 69 (1993), available at http://www.dtic.rnil/\vhs/direclives/corres/pdf/
dI33214wchl_122193/d133214p.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
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publications" from the Human Rights Campaign,155 he certainly cannot
identify himself with the contents of those publications, whether he is
speaking with fellow soldiers or with members of the organization that wrote
the materials. The prohibition against gay soldiers speaking about their
identities extends into the conference rooms of political organizations and
advocacy groups just as surely as it extends into police stations and marital
bedrooms. Even if the letter of the policy allows a soldier to attend a local
156
PFLAC meeting, it forbids him from identifying himself as a gay man or
contributing the perspective of an active-duty gay soldier to the group's
deliberations.
And it would be well to recall the difference between what Don't Ask,
Don't Tell technically countenances and what it realistically permits. When
courts examine the impact of a regulation upon First Amendment values,
they typically ask about the speech and expressive activities that the
regulation threatens to "chill" as well as those that it prohibits outright. 157
The enforcement history of Don't Ask, Don't Tell can leave little doubt in
the minds of gay and lesbian servicemembers as to the tenuous nature of the
"freedom" that they enjoy to participate in gay organizations and attend gay
clubs and rallies, whatever the safe harbor that various unenforceable
I
Defense Department regulations theoretically preserve. :>8 The sweep of the
policy's explicit restrictions is already so broad that it would be easy to lose
sight of the even broader impact that the policy has through its in terrorem
effect as it "pervasive [ly] ,,159 regulates the expressive activities of gay
servicemembers. Thus, while it is important to consider the paradigm case of
a lesbian soldier who attends an organizational meeting or event (or a gay
bar or parade) vvith a denuded presence, unable to identify herself or
contribute her distinctive perspective to the group's discussions, it is more
accurate to imagine the cornplete absence of any gay military voice in these
settings, anonymous or otherwise.

155. The Human Rights Campaign ("l-IRC") is a national political organization that
engages in extensive lobbying and advocacy work for gay and lesbian issues. See genemlly Human
Rights Campaign Web Site, at http://www.hrc.org/about/index.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2004)
(on file with the Iowa Law Review).
156.
Paren t5, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays ("PFLAG") is a national
organization that offers suPPOrt to gay men and lesbians and their friends and loved ones and
engages in advocacy on their behalf. See PFLAG, Mission Statement, at http://www.pflag.org/
about/mission.hunl (last visited Feb. 15,2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
157. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (indicating that a vague statute
"raises special First AJTlendmen l concerns beca use of it.s ob\~ous chilling effect on free speech").
158.
See, e.g., SLDN SEVENTH REPORT, supm note 39, at 67-68 (describing the punilive
investigation of a Jvlarine observed in attendance at "gay-friendly restaurant"); \-Volft', supra note
2, at 1] 55-56 (describing the pressure felt by an active-duLY officer to avoid any appearance of
affiliation with gay people).
159.
10U.S.C.§654(a)(11) (2000).

/

1674

89 IOWA LA W REVIEW

[2004]

When gay members of the military are barred-or erased-from the
activities of private associations, the impact of that erasure extends beyond
the reduction in the vocabulary of stories that the association vrill be able to
draw upon in making appeals to an external audience. Associations are
themselves political entities. They make decisions and set priorities on the
basis of internal deliberations, and they respond to the personal entreaties
of members as well as to external demands or pressures. When an
organization sets its agenda-when it makes decisions about which issues it
will focus upon and which issues it \'rill leave for another day-those
decisions will be guided, if not driven, by the personal commitments of the
organization's members. In prohibiting active-duty gay and lesbian
servicemembers from participating openly in private associations (and
largely prohibiting even clandestine participation, by making the cost of
discovery too high), Don't Ask, Don't Tell deprives those associations of a
distinctive voice that would othervrise contribute to their internal
governance.
It is not difficult to apprehend the impact of this distortion upon
organized political activism. In the ten years since Don't Ask, Don't Tell
went into effect, gay rights organizations have been presented with an
increasingly wide array of constituencies and issues demanding their
attention and efforts. Gay couples are seeking greater recognition for their
160
relationships and their families.
Gay teens are seeking opportunities to
161
organize within public schools. HIV-positive men want more protection in
the workplace as improvements in rnedical technology allow them to live
J62
10nger.
African-Americans, Latinos, and Asians who pursue same-sex
relationships are dra\'ring attention to the particular forms of discrimination
and isolation that they experience in both their ethnic and cultural
163
groups.

160.
See generally Brief of Appellants, Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, i o. S-1045~
(Alaska May 22, 2002) (seeking spousal benefits for gay and lesbian state employees).
161. See, e.g., Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1148-50 (GD. Cal
2000) (recognizing the right of a gay/straight alliance to enjoy equal access to school facilities)
Letter from the ACLU, to School Oflicials Regarding Gay/Straight Alliances (June 11, 2003
(urging school officials to offer equal treatment to gay student organizations)
http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm)ID=9180&c=106 (last visite(
Feb. 15,2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
162. Seegenerall)'Onisheav. Hopper, 171 F.3d1289 (11th Cir.1999) (en bane) (hearing
suit brought by the ACLU under the Americans with Disabilities Act on behalf of HIV-positiv
prison inmates).
] 63. See, e.g., Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Double Lives on the l)own Low, .Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 200:
(Magazine) at 28 (discLlssing the experience of Black men who have sex with rnen but rejec
"gay" identi ty and experience social isolation); Press Release, ACLU , Judge Allows Transgendc
Discrimination Lawsuit to Go Fonvard in Lawsuit over Illegal Eviction of Latino AIDS Agenc
(Oct. 15, 2003) (reporting on a suit brought by the ACLU concerning discrimination again:
transgender Latinos in a New York agency), available at http://www.aclu.org
LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=14064&c=105 (on file with the Iowa Law Review)

./
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At the very least, these multiple constituencies place advocacy groups in
the position of making difficult decisions about resource allocation as the
needs of the ever-less-unitary "gay community" continue to diversify.J64 And,
frequently, the conflict among constituencies goes deeper than the limits of
time and money. There is great variation among the value systems that gay
rights advocates embrace and champion. For some gay people, maintaining
a sex-positive message in the face of the ongoing AIDS epidemic is of
paramount importance,165 while others place a higher value upon increasing
the opportunities for' gay families to enjoy safety and stability, even if
messages of sexual liberation must be dampened in the process. 166 Some
men who have sex with men want to reject the label "gay" altogether but still
make use of the social structures that enable them to meet and explore their
sexuality, while others condemn this maneuver as a false dichotomy born of
self-hatred and insist that gay rights organizations must continue to place a
167
premium on "coming out" and reinforcing alliances.
Because gay men
and lesbians are born into every ethnic, socio-economic, and religious
group, the values and priorities that flourish among gay people are
enormously variegated. As the level of social and physical hostility directed
toward those who speak openly about same-sex attraction has slowly
diminished, and gay Americans have been freed to expend concomitantly
less time and energy on their common interest in collective safety, those
variegated interests have taken the ascendant and translated into
competition and discord in setting the priorities of advocacy groups.
The issue of gays in the military is no less subject to this type of
disputation. While some advocates believe that opening the way for gay men
and lesbians to serve in the military would constitute all. unambiguous good,
others find their enthusiasm for securing the equal citizenship status of gay
soldiers tempered by their disapproval of militarism and their hesitance to

164.

See generally Robert vVeisberg, Restomtive Justice and the Danger of "Community, " 2003

UTAH L. REV. 343. vVeisberg distinguishes "the [insert group name] community" from other

more abstract or normative, less political usages of thc term. [d. at 348 (brackets in original). As
to the political usage of "community," Weisberg writes that the term can be misleading or even
perilous, as it "can mask fundamental ambiguities of group definition (is 'the Jewish
community' one of religion, ethnicity, culture?) or selious political conflicts within what
otherwise seems a determinate group (i.e., liberal vs. conselVative African-Americans or gays)."
Id.
165. See Patrick Moore, Gays: A.ssimilated and Asexual?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at Bll
(arguing that progress in equal rights for gay people has come at the expense of sexual
liberation) .
166. See Larry Kramcr, Gay CultuTe, Redefined, NY TIMES, Dec. 12, 1997 (taking issue with
activists who Kramer believes to be promoting irresponsible and unhealthy sexual behavior),
http://www.actupny.org/reports/kramer-folly.html (on fIle with the Iowa Law Review).
167. See Denizet-Lewis, mpm note 163, at 28.
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lend even indirect sanction to institutionalized violence. 1GB For people of
modest means, the economic benefits of a military career may overshadow
such considerations, trumping any ethical reservations that they might
lw
othervvise feel.
There is no unanimity of opinion \"fi.thin the gay
community (however that "community" is defined) concerning the
desirability of an open gay presence in the military, and there is nothing
resembling a consensus as to how advocacy groups should prioritize Don't
A5k, Don't Tell in the face of competing demands from couples and
families, minority populations, teens, or people wth HN.
Of course, this is as it should be. The meaning of group identity and the
terms of group membership are always subject to debate, disagreement, and
dissent within private associations. As Professor Madhavi Sunder has written,
diversity within groups, as well as diversity among groups, is an inevitable
l7O
and appropriate component of associational freedom.
"[ C] ultures, now
more than ever," Sunder explains, "are characterized by cultural dissent:
challenges by individuals within a community to modernize, or broaden, the
traditional terms of cultural membership."l?l Sunder has detailed the ways in
which overly reductive definitions of associational rights under the First
Amendment can serve to smother, rather than permit or foster, disputation
and dissent v,rithin private communities. In this connection, it is no
coincidence that the polyglot experience of gay Americans is one of
Sunder's principal vehicles for elucidating her arguments. The
demographics of sexual rninorities in America make them a rich source of
intra-community dissent.
J72
But dissent requires voice.
Disputation can only occur within a
community when the members of that community are able to identify
themselves and assert their distinctive cultural demands. Don't Ask, Don't
Tell prohibits active-duty gay soldiers from setting forth, and insisting upon,
the priority of their concerns within private advocacy groups. It thereby
erases them as an active presence in the politicallifc of gay society.

168.
See generally Justin David Suran, Coming Out Against the War: Antimilita:rism and the
Politicization of Homosexuality in the 1'.'ra of Vietnam, 53 Alvl. Q. 452 (2001) (describing links
between anti-war activism and origins of gay-rights movement).
169. See Tobias Barrington vVoal, Pentagon Should l'ahe a Cue from Wal-Mmt, SAN JOSE
~\'IERCURY NEWS, Aug. 6, 2003 (discussing the economic injustice that Don't Ask, Don't Tell
inflicts upon working-class gay men and lesbians), http://wv/w.mercurynews.com/
mld/mercurynews/6469228.htrn (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
170
See generally Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. L195 (2001).
171. fri. at 498.
172. See id. at 535-44. (arguing that "exit" from associational or cultural groups is an
inadequate option for those who wish to retain their membership but dissent from, or even
transform, majority views); id. at 508-09 ("Cultural dissen tel'S are presumed to be either
voluntary members of a culture despite the culture's discriminatory norms, or free to exit the
cultural group if equality is more important to them. But in the real world, individuals are
rejecting these binary options.").
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And such political erasure is just one component of the policy's larger
removal of gay soldiers [rom the broad sweep of social and cultural life in
the United States. Consider, for example, how daunting it would be for a gay
soldier to take advantage of the Defense Department's promise that he is
free to "associate[ ] with known homosexuals,,173 in common social settings.
While a soldier may (in theory) be allowed to frequent gay bars and gay
pride parades during his otI hours, he cannot speak honestly about being
gay or bisexual in these venues any more than he can discuss his identity
174
with his civilian roommates or his wife. The explicit terms of the policy are
reinforced in this regard by the common understanding among military
personnel that enforcement authorities sometimes go undercover at gay
bars or other establishments near military bases in hopes of catching soldiers
in forbidden statements,175 despite the existence of regulations disapproving
176
such fishing expeditions.
Tor, of course, can a gay soldier hug another
person of the same sex, or hold hands, or do anything else at a bar, parade,
or "associational" venue that might lead a reasonable person to conclude
that the soldier has a "propensity" to engage in "homosexual acts.,,177 Other
than standing ofT to the side and laughing at other people's jokes, one is
hard pressed to imagine just what a soldier is permitted to do when he
.
. h k'nown LIlomosexua I s " at gay b aI'S or ra11'les. 178 I n d ee d , as
.., assoCIates
Wit
Professor Halley points out, the policy's "reasonable person" proviso might
render even such self-imposed isolation ineffective as a shield for a soldier
who attempts to travel in gay circles. "The ... regulations provide no check
on a commander's decision about what a reasonable person would think
T 11
.f'
. ,,17g I-"a
'
Th us, "[ W 0] I1en a COlun1an d er
mal1lests
a propenslt)',
ey exp IalIlS.
thinks that befriending a 'known homosexual' manifests a propensity, that's
.
.
. k es.
reasona bl e. ,,180 S 0 muc I1 fOor I aug I1mg
atJo
deJure
Just as the internal deliberations of a formal political association are
distorted by the erasure of gay servicemembers from its membership, so too
does the erasure of gay soldiers from social and cultural life distort the

173.
See DEP'T Of DEF., DIRECnVE 1':0. 1332.14, E LISTED ADM! ISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS §
E3.A4.3.3.4, at 69 (1993), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ directives/ cones/ pdf!
d133214wchl_122193/dI33211p.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
174. .',·ee sllpm notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
175. See HALLEY, supra note 20, at 111-15 (describing enforcement strategies of military
authorities in different branches).
176. Set, DEp'T OF DEL, DIRECTIVE o. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS §
E3.A4.1.3, at 67 (1993), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ directives/corres/pdf/
d133214wchl_122193/d133214p.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
177. See sllpm note 21 and accompanying texl.
178.
DEP'T OF DEr., DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, ENLISTl<:D ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS §
E3.A4.3.3A, at 69 (1993), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
d133214wchl_122193/dI33214p.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
179. HAl.LEY, sujJra note 20, at 4-5.
180. Id. at 5.
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norm-generating actIvItIes that occur in those settings. lSI Consider, for
example, the struggle that many gay men experience in crafting a positive
vision of their own masculine identity in a society that frequently defines
masculine virtue and homosexuality as mutually exclusive concepts. 182 The
opportunity to speak with a gay man currently serving in the armed forcesthe institution that has traditionally served as the primary marker of
l83
citizenship status and masculine identity in the United States -could be a
transformative event for a gay civilian searching for an exemplar around
184
which to model his own sense of self.
And finding that exemplar in a
member of the military might in turn transform the individual's attitude
toward the position that the armed forces should occupy in American
society. Among many lesbians, the story of Colonel Margarethe
Cammermeyer-a highly accomplished career officer and the highest
ranked servicemember ever to be discharged under the military ban 185-has
served a similar inspirational function, offering a compelling exemplar of
the compatibility of womanhood, motherhood, and lesbian identity with
186
superior military performance.
In this and countless other settings, the

181.
See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and NaTrative, 97 f-L\RV. L. REV. 4, 12-16 (1983)
(describing the role of social intercourse within private communities as situs for important
norm-generating behavior).
182.
See, e.g., JONATH/\N NED KATZ, THE INVE TIOI' OF HETEROSEXLiALITY .Il0-11 (1995)
("Making a heterosexual means instilling a sure sense of masculinity and femininity. . ."); id.
at 101-02 (discussing exploration of masculinity and sexual identity in the work of James
Bald\-\~n).

183.
See generally Kenneth 1,. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegngation of the A1'Ined
Forces, 38 UCLA. I.. REv. 499 (1991) (discussing the centrality of masculine identity in definition
and justification of military personnel policies); Wolff, supm note 2, at 1170-71 & nn. 70-73
(same).
184. The work of Stephen Zeeland provides a robust illustration of the transformative
impact that encounters \\~th gay servicemembers can have upon personal conceptions of
masculinc identity. See STEVEN ZEEl.AND,MASCULINE M.ARINE: HOMOEROTICISM IN THE U.S.
MARINE CORPS 34-42 (1996) (describing interviews recounting relationships between gay
Marines and civilians). See generally STEVEN ZEELAND, MlUTi\lZY TRADE (1999) (relating stories
from interviews describing sexual encoun tel'S \\~th militalY men).
185.
See generally lvlARGARETHE CA/v[MERMEYER, SERVING I' SILL CE (1994) (detailing
Cammenneyer's carcer, her persona.l journey in understanding her sexuality, and her discharge
from the mili t<lI)').
186.

One reviewer wrote the following about Cammermcyer's book:
I am an out lesbian who's been involved with queer politics and !-fIV issues for 15
years, but I just recently got around to reading Dr. Cammermeyer's book~ Even
after all my years of being "out," I found her story and life so far to be fascinating
and inspiring. It's wonded'tl! to have another role model for my own life! I
encourage anyone interested in finding out how women can change society and
military policy to read this book. It's also a good read for the role of women in the
Vietnam war and in the National Guard. Dr. Call1menneyer is truly a "great
Arnerican," as the military admitted while in the same breath sanctioning her
discharge. Her story is all about one person having the integrity and strength to
stand up for what she believes to be right, using the legal system to out-maneuver
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expression of individual identity is bound up with the development of norms
in social intercourse. Yet, as Cammermeyer's example illustrates, the Don't
Ask, Don't Tell policy prohibits gay and lesbian servicemembers from
bearing witness to their own experience. The Colonel was subjected to
discharge proceedings shortly after she revealed the truth of her journey
187
towar d se If-acceptance.
B.

POUTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The effects of Don't Ask, Don't Tell that I have explored under the
heading of "political representation"-restrictions on communication with
politicians, governmental officials, private advocacy groups and so forthare felt largely outside the military. Within the military, the policy has
another feature that bears on the question of its political legitimacy: The
requirement that gay soldiers remain silent about their identity shields the
policy from basic mechanisms of accountability. Political correctives depend
upon the availability of information. Politicians (and the people whom they
represent) cannot develop an informed opinion about a governmental
policy without having access to information about the policy's workability, its
effectiveness, its costs, and its benefits. The design of Don't Ask, Don't Tell
operates to suppress the primary source of such information: It silences the
very population of individuals who are actually subject to its mandates. I am
unaware of any other example of a law that imposes restrictions upon a
defined group of people and then prohibits that very group from identifying
themselves as the target of the regulation and describing the regulation's
.
Impact
upon tIlem. 188

the military, and cOl1linuing to be a passionate and om-spOken supponer of
banishing ALL types of discrimination. But her book is also an amazing window
into the life experiences that fully shaped her to be the person who she is today.
Daughter, mother, soldier, nurse, life partner, healer, activist: Dr. Cammermeyel' is
a hero on so many levels, and )'ou'll have the chance to learn abom all of it in her
book.
Ann Veda, Customer Review, Nov. 21, 2001, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/
tg/ detail!-/0453009050/ qid=1081111911 /sr=8-2/ref=sf_8_xs_ap_i2_xgI14/103-88734682025466;>v=glance&s=books&n=507846 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004) (reviewing Ivl.ARGARETHE
C;\MMERMEYER, supm note 185) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
See CAM ME R.'vl EYER, s'1ljn-a note 185, at 228-35 (explaining that Cammermeyer was
187.
discharged following her disclosure in a military security clearance interview that she was gay).
188. Even the "enemy combatants" being held incommunicado at Cuantanamo Bay, Cuba
do not fit this description. ",rhile unable to speak for themselves, these prisoners are
exceptionally visible: they have been physically segregated in a distinct location, their numbers
and nationalities are known, and the conditions of their confinement may readily be compared
to the conditions experienced by other individuals in U.S. custody. As Professor Kenji Yoshino
has observed, contral)' to the presumption that often underlies equal protection analysis,
conspicuous visibility can strongly augment the ability to secure assistance in the political
process. See genemlly Kenji Yoshino, ilssimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
PTesumjJtion and the Case of "Don't A.sk, Don't Tell, "] 08 YALE: L.J. 485 (1998),
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.Consider, as a point of comparison, the effect of drug laws upon the
expressive activities of the population whom those laws affect most directlydrug addicts. The criminalization of drug use imposes harm upon addicts,
both through the denial of the substance itself (certainly perceived by the
individual as a harm) and through the increased risks that attend drug use
189
when harm-reduction programs like needle exchanges are not available.
Crafting an informed policy about the criminalization of drug use and the
desirability of needle-exchange and other programs requires an assessment
of these harms. If the condition of drug addiction could itself be
criminalized, however, then the regulated population would not be able to
offer this information, since identifying themselves as the regulated
population-that is, those who are suffering harms from the criminalization
of the drugs they wish to use-would itself subject them to punitive action.
19
Thus, Robinson v. CalijoTnia 0-in which the Supreme Court held that the
condition of drug addiction could not be criminalized-is not merely an
expressiorl of equality and anti-cruelty norms, the rubrics under which the
Court issued its holding. The decision also reinforces public speech values in
the realms of drug policy and criminal justice. While drug addicts
unquestionably experience some "chill" in identifying themselves openly
(from social ostracism, or a desire not to attract the attention of lawenforcement officials), they nonetheless retain the ability to do so free from
the threat of direct punishment. Under the military policy, in contrast, the
population that suffers harm under the policy is, by precise definition, the
population that is forbidden to self-identify.
To illustrate, consider the impact of the policy upon the public'S ability
to assess one of the policy's principal justifications: the preservation of "unit
cohesion." The military has argued that the total suppression of gay identity
among servicemembers is necessary to preserve the "high morale, good
l9l
order and discipline, and unit cohesion" of the armed forces.
One might
well ask, however, what effect Don't Ask, Don't Tell itself has on the morale
of the gay and lesbian soldiers whom it regulates; and, consequently, on the
morale and cohesion of the units in which those men and women serve.
Indeed, the stress that the policy imposes upon gay soldiers in this regard is
particularly acute when those soldiers are deployed abroa~l, as Michele
Benecke, former Executive Director of SLDN, has explained:
[VV] hen people are deployed, gay people can't even be honest in
any communication with anyone at home, unlike heterosexual
189. See Seh. of Pub. Health, Univ. of CaL, Berkeley et aL, The Public Health Impact of Needle
Exchange Progranu in the United States and Abroad, at http://W'A'W,eaps,ucsfedu/
publieations/needlereport.html (1993) (concluding that needle exchange programs lead to
reduced incidence of HrV drug-use behavior) (last visited Feb. 15, 2004) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review).
190. 370 U.s. 660 (1962),
J91.
10 U.S.G § 654(a) (6) (2003)
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soldiers, because everyone's mail is censored and their telephone
calls are monitored. These people are not able to be out to their
families because of DADT; they can't be out with their loved ones
because of DADT; and they have to face the prospect of losing their
lives in service of their country. Right around the holidays, when
people are just coming back [from foreign deployments, SLDN
gets] a big spate of calls from people trying to figure out what to
192
do.
Studies frorn leading sociologists, and a report by the Inspector General
of the Defense Department, offer further reason to think that Don't Ask,
Don't Tell may constitute a serious threat to the combat readiness and
193
morale of the U.S. military, as I discuss below. If the "cure" is worse than
the symptom-if morale and unit cohesion will suffer more under Don't
Ask, Don't Tell than they would in a military that placed no special
restrictions on gay soldiers-then the policy would be revealed as
counterproductive and the case for a poli tical corrective would be strong.
But how are we to ascertain the impact of the policy on the morale of gay
soldiers and their units when the policy prohibits those soldiers from
identifying themselves? Not even commanders are permitted to know
whether the soldiers under their charge are gay or lesbian. (When Colonel
Cammermeyer's commander learned that she was a lesbian, for example,
the commander was disheartened that the disclosure would necessarily lead
to discharge proceedings against one of his top officers, but the policy left

192. Telephone Interview with IVlichele Benecke, Executive Director, Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network (Apr. 28, 1997), in'vVolff, supm note 2, at 116'1.
193. See GEOFFREY BATE IAN & AARo BELKIN, DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: DEBATING THE GAY
BA:"J IN THE MILITARY 139-55 (2003) (describing the harms to milital)' readiness imposed by the
policy); OFFICE OF THE I 'SPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF., EVALUATION REPORT ON THE
11LITARY ENVIRONMENT WITH RESPECT TO TIlE HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY 1 (2000)
[hereinafter IG REPORT] (quoting the former Secretal)' of Defense in saying that "disparaging
speech or expression w1t[h] respect to sexual orientation ... can undermine good order and
discipline"); infi'a, notes 201-14. See generaLLy John H.R. Lanou, Restricted Expression and
Immunosuppression: How "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" May Hann Militmy Readiness by Inaeasing the Risk of
Cancer and Infectious Disease in Homosexuals, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2001) (describing the
adverse impact of enforced silence on health practices of gay men).
In contrast, the military's gay ban has another effect on combat readiness that has
been all too apparent: the loss of human capital that results from the discharge of highly
trained gay and lesbian servicemembers in vital positions. The discharges of Alastair Gamble
and Rob I-Ticks offer two among many possible examples. Gamble and Hicks were linguists in
training at the Monterey Defense Language Institute until fall of 2002. Gamble was a specialist
in Arabic; Hicks, in Korean. The two entered into a relationship after they met, and they were
promptly discharged after their relationship was discovered, despite the military's professed
need for expert translators in languages spoken in regions of the ,vorld where some of
America's greatest security concerns are currently centered: Arabic (for terrorism concerns
relating to AI Qaeda) and Korean (for the nuclear crisis in North Korea). See Christopher
Heredia, Anny Dischmges 6 Gay Frneign Language Students, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15,2002, at A2.

89 IOWA LA W REVIEW

1682

[2004J

191

no choice. ) How, then, is it possible to assess the military's claim that the
policy is "necessary" to preserve unit cohesion? How can the political
branches apply a corrective if the policy is, in fact, unnecessary or even
harmful to that goal?
Lest my argument be misunderstood, I do not mean to suggest that the
First Amendment always compels disclosure of proprietary information
about the administration of government policies, even in civilian settings.
Courts have placed significant weight upon the interest that goverll.ment
claims in the uninterrupted functioning of its internal machinery. At the
same time, however, courts have been skeptical of attempts by government
to reach out and affirmatively restrict the ability of the public to collect
information regarding the operation of government. In First Amendment
doctrine, the press access line of cases maps this distinction well. Members of
the press have generally failed in their attempts to gain entrance to closed
installations, like prisons, for the purpose of conducting interviews-the
195
Court has denied them any broad constitutional right of compelled access.
But that same line of cases has found the public speech values of the First
Amendment to be strongly implicated when the state affirmatively restricts
the collection of information about the operation of government in
situations where the public would ordinarily enjoy free passage. Thus, when
states have attempted to close their courtroom proceedings and mandate
the exclusion of the press and the public, the Supreme Court has found that
the resulting barm to public speech values can be justified only in the
narrowest of circumstances and for tbe most immediately pressing of
196
reasons.
The analogy to the military policy is somewhat imperfect but instructive
nonetheless. The Court has protected the ability of military commanders to
194.
See Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing attempts
by the Governor of 'Washington, who is also Commander of the vVashington National Guard, to
retain Cammermeyer); CAlVlMERMEYER, supm note 185, at 235-36 (indicating that after the
interaction with the commander" [the message from Cammermeyer's commanders] was clear:
[e]acb person at tbe meeting knew my sexual orientation
[e]ach person \-"anted me to
continue to ser\le").
195.
See, e.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,846-47 (1974) (denying a claim by a
journalist that the First Amendment compels the state to provide access to interview prisoners).

It is one thing to say that ajournalist is free to seek out sources of information not
available to members of the public .... It is quite another thing' to suggest that the
Constitution imposes upon government 'the affirmative duty to make available to
journalists SOUl-ces of information not available to members of the public generally.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
196.
See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that a
newspaper has a First Amendment right to view transcripts of a preliminary hearing in a
uiminal prosecution absent a robust showing of immediate harm to the defendant's right to a
fair trial); Landmark Communications, Inc., v. Va., 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating the state's
attempt to prosecutc the newspaper for publishing procecdings of the judicial inquilJ'
commission) .
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close their facilities to political demonstrators, deferring to the asserted
need for a controlled and predictable military environment. 197 For similar
reasons, the Court would probably not hesitate to reject a reporter's request
for compelled access to a military base for the purpose of interviewing the
soldiers who work there. These policies are analogous to the denial of
reporter access to prisons. If the U.S. were to prohibit soldiers from ever
speaking to civilians about the conditions under which they work, however,
public speech values like those recognized by the Supreme Court in the
courtroom closure cases would be strongly implicated. (Indeed, the Court
19B
has already suggested as much, as I discuss below. )
Don't Ask, Don't Tell compounds this interference with the external
mechanisms of accountability by adding a severe restriction on the military's
own ability to assess the policy from vvithin, as gay soldiers are forbidden to
speak to their own commanders about the policy's effects upon their morale
and their perforrnance. The mandate of absolute silence that the policy lays
upon gay and lesbian soldiers prevents both the public and the military itself
from measuring the policy's impact upon the soldiers whom it regulates, and
hence from discerning its sustainability and efficacy.
The effect of this mandate of silence is perhaps most dramatic where
harassment of gay and lesbian soldiers is concerned. In the ten years since its
implementation, it has become clear that Don't Ask, Don't Tell is intimately
bound up with violence-both the threat of violence and its consummation.
Gay men have been killed, beaten, and threatened in the military; women
(gay and straight) have been raped and assaulted; and both have been
subjected to verbal harassment, sometimes on a constant basis. All the while,
Don't Ask, Don't Tell has hovered over these mistreated individuals with an
ever-present threat of condemnation and punishment should they seek to
hold their abusers accountable.
On a theoretical level, t.his problem of harassment under the policy
should not be surprising. As Sharon Terman has observed, the path breaking
work of Professor Catherine MacKinnon in defining "harassment" as a
category of proscribed behavior rests upon an interpretation of
antidisuimination principles according to which harassing behavior
relegates its targets to an inferior, subordinated position of power and
S
'1'
h
'
status. 199 1'1.1e U ..
mlltary,
owever,
1as I
no commitment
to
antidiscrimination principles Ul setting policy toward its gay and lesbian
soldiers. To the con t.rary, it. embraces an official policy of broad

197.
See Creer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding Fort Dix's prohibition of partisan
political speeches in areas where civilians are given free access).
198.
See inFa lext accompanying nOles 226-37 (discussing Brown v. Glines and the right of
se"vicemembers to express dissem and circulate pelitions in civilian settings).
199.
See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORK1NG WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DrsCRI II ATION (1979) (setting forth her theory of workplace harassment as a
mode of discrimination).

[:!()O-i)

discrimination, making explicit their subordinated, disempowered status
\\·ithin military institutiolls. Terman has trenchantlv observed thal, gi\t'n its
open embrace of the polin' and practice of discrimination toward Ilonheterosexual soldiers, it IS analytically incoherent and pragmarictllv
unrealistic for the military to profess a commitment to eradicating harassing
behavior toward those same individuals. The behavior is a predictable
expression of tbe- velY nonnative syslem to which the military has claimed
•
"110
alleglance.The truth of Terman's observations is borne out by empirical work
undertaken by non-governmental organizations and the Defense
Department alike. Servicemembers Legal Defense I en.vork has compiled a
long record of the abuse and harassment suffered by gay soldiers, and also
by straight women, under Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Harassment of soldiers who
are perceived to be gay is ubiquitous in the military, and the policy makes it
prohibitively difficult for soldiers to report such abuse without drawing
suspicion upon themselves.~ol Indeed, commanders have often taken
punitive action against the very soldiers who report that they have been
harassed, initiating investigations and seeking evidence of forbidden
statements that would warrant discharge, a practice that has persisted
fol1owi ng the publication of Defense Department edicts purporting to forbid
it.~I1~ And even when commanders refrain from taking punitive actions
against soldiers who report misconduct, the policy prohibits gay soldiers
from giving a personalized account of the impact that the harassment has
upon them, their performance, and their units-the most important
information that a commander needs in order to determine the threat that
the misconduct poses to morale and the best way to respond.
SLDN reports one particularly extraordinary example of the policy's
threat to individual morale in this regard, which arose following the gavbashing murder of an enlisted soldier at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Private
First Class Barry "Winchell, a gay soldier in the Army, was beaten to death bv
fellow soldiers after having suffered months of relentless anti-gay

20().
See Sharon Terman, The I'ractic,t1 and Conceptual Problems with Regulating
Haf<ISSlnenr in a Discriminatory Institution '~()-:~2 (.'v[ar. 1. 20(4) (unpublished manuscript. un
lik with the Iowa Law Review).
:!Ol
.<';t'f', e.g., SLDN SEVENTH REPORT, slI/1m note 39, at 72~102 (describing the persistent
f!robkms of anti gay harassment and the 111 ilit,tr\', ,lcknowledgemen t of problems).

202
Sf'e, P..g., SLDN FIFTH REPORT, slipm llote '~H, at 7'>-76 (detailing the stol")' of a N,j\'y
sergeanl who reported incidents of antigay harassment and was subjected to criminal
investigation for sodomy violations, and possible discharge, as a consequence); iii. al 3 & nJi
(describing an official statement of Defense Dt'partment policy that reporting harassment ()I.
abuse should not give rise to an investigation of the \ietim); Memorandum froIlI Undcr
Secrctal)' of Defense Edwin Dom, Guidelines for Investigating Threats Against Sen'ice
'vlembers Based on Alleged Homosexuality ('vIar. 24, 1997) (making a policy statement of tile
Defense Department regarding harassment) (on file II'ith author).
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harassment.
The i\nny surgeon who was on duty when Winchell was
brought into the emergency room happened also to be gay, and the event
presented him with a serious crisis of conscience about which Don't Ask,
Don't Tell forbad him to speak. The surgeon, Major Paul Gott, chose to
violate the policy and inform his command of the impact of these events on
his morale. His letter eloquently captures the harm that the policy imposes
in discouraging gay soldiers from reporting anti-gay harassment or violence
and preventing them from discussing its impact upon their working
conditions.
I am writing to inform you that I am gay ... I had the misfortune to
be the surgeon on call the night Private First Class 'Winchell was
brought to the emergency room at Fort Campbell. The obvious
brutality and hatred that must have motivated his attacker struck
me deeply. In the days that followed, the knowledge that the attack
was an anti-gay hate crime filled me \,,~th outrage and disgust. Yet I
remained silent. Imagine the stress and anxiety of working in an
environment where the brutal murder of a person simply for being
gay was the topic of casual conversation... the response I
perceived was that it: was a tragic, though not unexpected,
consequence of gays serving in the military. I am sure I am not
alone among gay ser-vicemembers who sat silently through these
204
conversations with a sense of nausea and fcar.
SLDI has also documented regular problems ~th "lesbian baiting"
under the policy. When male soldiers harass or abuse their female peers,
they can use the threat of an accusation of lesbianism as a tool for securing
compliance or silence. The tactic has an insidious logic: Demand sexual
favors from a woman and explain that, if she refuses and reports the
incident, you \-\~ll say that she refused your advances because she is a lesbian
and admitted as much to you at the time. Lesbian baiting has been a
consistent problem throughout the life of the policy and has severely
impeded the ability of women in the military to report instances of
205
harassment or abuse.
A study and report on the harassment of gay soldiers issued recently by
the Inspector General of the Department of Defense provides a particularly
apt illustration of the manner in which Don't Ask, Don't Tell cripples
203.
See SLDN SIXTH REPORT, sup'ra nolC 34, passim; Sue Ann Pressley, Hate A1ay Have
Triggered Fatal Banach:; Beating, WASI-j, POST, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al (reporting the murder of
vVinchcll and the investigation into the motivations of the killers).
204. SLDN SVVENTH lZl'pORT, wpm note 39, at 39 (alterations in original).
205
See, e.g., SLDN INTH REPOl{T, supm note 17, at 42-43 (describing the problem of
lesbian baiting in light of the disproportionate impact of the policy upon women generally);
SLD SECOND REPOl{T, sllpm note 37, at 22 (describing an instance of harassment and "gay
baiting" against a female soldier); SLDN SIXTH R.EPORT, sllpm note 34, at 61-63 (detailing the
continued persistence oClesbian baiting under the policy).
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internal mechanisms of accollnrabiliry on these problems. The report
summarizes the results of a study thal sought to evaluate the e~tent to which
"harassment of Service members based on perct'ived or alleged
homosexuality" occurs and is toleratecl.~l)!i Secret,u'y of Defense \Vil1iam
Cohen commissioned the study in 1999, explaining thal "'disparaging speech
or expression with respect to sexual orientation.. can undermine good
order and discipline," and it is the most extensive internal investigation of
.
the pohcy ever undertaken.
The report bears out SLDN's long-standing admonitions, delailing a
pervasive atmosphere of disparaging remarks and harassment against gay
and lesbian soldiers coupled with a fear of reporting such harassment to
commanders or other officials. Eighty percent of the 71.570 soldiers who
took part in the study reported hearing disparaging remarks about gay
people in the twelve preceding months, eighty-five percent reported that
such remarks were tolerated in their units, and thirty-seven percent reported
having personally witnessed or experienced an incident of harassment in
their chain of command.2(J~ At the same time, twenty-two percent of soldiers
said that they would not feel safe in reporting such acts of harassment if they
experienced them personally.~()0 This last figure is particularly significant.
Women make up fourteen percent of the armed forces,~lll and while there is
no official estimate of the number of soldiers who identify as gay or bisexual,
estimates in the general population usually run from three to eight
percent.~11 Thus, the proportion of soldiers who feel unsafe in reporting
sexual-orientation abuse corresponds closely to the proportion who are the
targets of that abuse-gay soldiers and straight women who are "lesbian
baited" to keep them from reponing other types of harassment.~I~
Even more telling, however, is the methodology that the Department of
Defense employed to conduct the study. The Department designed its survey
to permit a breakdown of the results along three indices: branch of service,
~()7

20(-i.

IG REPURT, slI/Jm note 193, at i.

207.

Id.atl.

208.

fd. at 4.

209

fri. at 1:-,.

210.

Id.at4.

211
Spp vVilliam Rubel1Stcin, {)o Gay Righls '-allis iv/attn': ,\/1 f'-"III/Jirimi .iSSI'S5/1lPl!I, 7:'> S. c..,L.
L Rn·. (is. H3~H(i & nl1.56-6S (2001) (collecting different sindies <I!ld figures concerning the
percentage of g,l~: people in the general popnlation).
212.
Although the report breaks down the twenty-two percenl who fear reponing abnse
according to rank, it does not indicate the gender distriblltiu!l within that figure. Sa IG
REPORT, Hl/Jm note 193. at 15. That omission is unf'onll!l<lte. as it migl1[ add to our
understanding of the manner in which Don't Ask, Don't Tell ,erves to reinforce other forms of
abuse and harassment that women encounter in the military. Sa. p.g., Mike Soraghan, u.s.
Cadds Coufd Faa 5 Yf'flI:~ of Sf'.': Sume)'.\', DE"". POST, i\ov. 9, 2003. at lH (reponing on proposed
legislative responses tn the high incidence of l-epuned se:-;Ilal <lss,lIdts at U.S. military
academies) .
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rank (or "pay grade"), and gender. 213 What's missing here? The
Department's own Evaluation Report on the Military Environment with Respect to
the Homosexual Conduct Policy does not permit the Department to assess ·the
impact of the policy according to sexual orientation. The Department
cannot ask soldiers to identify themselves by sexual orientation because the
policy forbids non-heterosexual soldiers to disclose that information. For the
same reason, the survey clusters two distinct inquiries into a single question:
its inquiry about soldiers "witnessing" abuse, and its inquiry about soldiers
"experiencing" abuse, which together produce the figure of thirty-seven
214
percent mentioned above. This design feature introduced uncertainty into
the interpretation of that key index, as the report takes pains to point OUt. 215
The reason for conflating these two inquiries, of course, is that admitting
that you have experienced harassment because you are perceived to be gay
comes dangerously close to an actual statement that you are gay. Although
the Inspector General's (IC) Office took elaborate steps to ensure the
anonymity of the survey participants, Don't Ask, Don't Tell still forced the
IC to disclaim any attempt to ascertain the respondents' sexual identities,
216
perceived or actual-a disclaimer that the IC insists upon in the report.
Don't Ask, Don't Tell has thus prevented the military itself from obtaining
what is arguably the most important datum in assessing the impact of the
policy upon unit cohesion: the extent to which gay soldiers experience
harassmen t or abuse and feel safe in seeking redress when they do.
Such a structural limitation on the mechanisms of accountability takes
on a special significance in the military context. Ac.; I discuss below, the
Supreme Court (and particularly the Rehnquist Court) has crafted a
doctrine of judicial deference in its review of challenges to military
policies. 217 Pleading both a lack of expertise and an obligation to observe the
prerogatives of the political branches, the Court has placed significant
limitations on the ability of civilian judges to restrict the actions of the
military. Underlying that doctrine of deference, as one of its key
213.
survcy) .
214.
question
215.

See Ie Repon, mpm note 193, at 3; see aLw id. at 30 (reproducing the first page of the
See id. at 31 (addrcssing both "witnessed" and "experienced" harassment in survey
sixteen).
See id. ar 3, which states:

The number of Service mcmbels who acknowledgcd witnessing a panicular type of
harassment toward a perceived homosexual [or expeliencing such harassment-the
repon itself seeks to erase the experiencel and the number' of actual harassment
incidents are not necessarily the same. For example, a single incident involving a
perceived homosexual might have becn witnessed by numerous Service members."

Id.
216.
See ic!. at 21 ("In addition to protecting thc anonymity of the survey respondenL~,
administration of the survey was designed to avoid the appearance that Service members were
bei ng sun'eyed because of t!lei r atD tude, be !lavior, 01' preference.") (em phasis added).
217.
See infm Part lILA.2.
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justificliions, is the assulllption that civilian dllthoritics will, in fact, han> the
capacit\· to apply appropriate limits and correctives to the militan' through
the political branches. Thus, in one of the earliest statements of the modern
doctrine of militcll)' deference, the Court explained that its respect for the
"professional ... judgments" of military authorities in governing "complex,
subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training,
equipping, and control of a military force" re-sted on the assumption that
military forces would be "subject alwa}s to civilian control of the Legislative
and Executive Branches.,,~ls
Don't Ask, Don't Tell actively frustrates this opportunity for civilian
control. The policy's speech restrictions prevent civilian and military officials
alike from developing an informed understanding of the effects that the
policy has upon the population whom it regulates.

C.

SPI:"lXJf IN THE SrRVICf:': SOMI': POINTS' OF COA1PARlSON

As is the case with all matters of constitutional disputation, an analysis
of the speech restrictions that the military policy imposes'on gay and lesbian
sel\licemembers benefits from being placed in a larger context. One
response that defenders of the policy frequently offer when faced with First
Amendment arguments is the assertion that members of the military are
never permitted to engage in the forms of political speech and associational
activity outlined above. In fact, this is quite untrue. Members of the armed
forces enjoy the right to organize, petition, and express their views about
matters of public importance, even when those views take the form of
protest. While military personnel must sometimes operate under more
restrictive limitations than would be the case for civilians, there is a well
established tradition of political dissent by active-duty soldiers.
Some of the most vocal protest by soldiers in the modern era centered
on the Vietnam War. Discontent among soldiers who had served combat
dut;: in Vietnam became widespread during the course of that conflict, and
large numbers of military personnel took part in demonstrations and protest
activities after returning to the United States.~I~1 While many soldiers were
disciplined or even prosecuted for violating certain military regulations
(wearing their uniforms while engaging in protest, or combining their
protest with civil disobedience~:!()), thousands of soldiers made their critical

~IH

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 10 (1973).
219.
Sa DAVID CORTRIGHT, SOLDIERS Ii'< REVOI.I 'iO-7:; (197:» (offering a highly critical
view of milital)' restrictions on servicemcrnbers' speech that nonetheless dOClllnents
opporulIlities for protest and dissent); RWII,\RD R. MOSER. THE NEW VI/INTER SO!.DIERS: CI ANI)
VFTEK-\"< DISSENT DURING THE VIETNAM EK-\ ()l)-I 0 I (1996) (providing an overview of protest
and disobedience among active-duty soldiers).
220.
.'il'l'. P.g., CORTRICHT, .lll/1m note 219. al 'iK-(; I (discllssing the case of the "FOri .Jackson
p,"): 'VI0.~FR. s/llna note 219, at 82-84 (soldiers disciplined for protesting while in uniform): iii.
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221

views known through the available public avenues. Associations such as the
American Servicemembers Union, the Concerned Officers Movement, and
the United States Servicemembers Fund formed to support servicemembers
'with dissenting views and to serve as a vehicle for their expression. 222 And, to
this day, soldiers regularly speak with the press or write letters to military and
general-interest newspapers expressing their dissatisfaction "vith the
conditions under which they rnust work,223 Throughout the Second Iraq
War, for example, the Stars & Stripes newspaper has served as a forum for
soldiers to air grievances about their working conditions, their morale, and
224
the policies that brought them to Iraq in the first place. The shift from a
draft-based military to an all-volunteer force has changed the character of
protest and dissent by soldiers, but not the fact of it. 225 While
servicemembers must sometimes adhere to restrictions aimed at maintaining
decorum, order, and clear lines of authority, they can and do regularly make
themselves heard on divisive political issues.
The persistence of these types of expression and dissent in militarycivilian relations throws the speech restrictions under which gay and lesbian
soldiers now serve into sharp relief. One of the Supreme Court's military
First Amendment cases provides a particularly useful point of comparison in

at 92-94 (discussing the case of the "Fort Jackson 8," who were disciplined for allegedly
escalating an organizational meeting into a riot).
221.
See, e,g" MOSER, supm note 219, at 81-88 (describing demonstrations in which large
numbers of active-dul)' servicemembers protested U,S, policy in Vietnam),
222.
See CORTRIGHT, sn/Jm note 219, at 54-66 (providing a broad overview of organizational
activities of soldiers); id, at 69-73 (discussing the formation and activities of ASU); id, at 88-93
(same for COM and USSF),
See, e,g" Suzanne Goldenberg, Feeling Low: US, Troolis Question Pnsence in Iraq, THE
223.
CUARDIAN, Oct. 17, 2003, at 16 (discussing the results of a survey showing discontent among
U,S, troops serving in Iraq and describing "scores of letters from disenchanted servicemen"
received by Stars and Stripes, a newspaper for military personnel funded by the Pentagon),
224. Stars and Strijies has summarized the first sixth months of GI expression in the
following terms:
The letters page was filled with notes from servicemembers raising concerns in the
Middle East. ]VIany complained about living conditions, inequities and problems
with the mail. .As the warfighting force evolved into a stabilization force, the letters
continued to flow into Stripes offices. Between June and September, Stripes
printed 200 letters from troops in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait and other remote
outposts that have led the fight against terrorism, Roughly 60 percent complained
about various things, ranging from living conditions to redeployment dates back
home, The remaining 40 percent urged the others to get on with their duty,
St"il;es Re-jJorters Visited Nearly 50 Camps in Im.q to Cauge Sentiment, STARS & STRJPES, Oct. 15, 2003,
available at http://www.slripes.com/article ,asp?seetion= I 04&article=17458&archive=true (on
file with the Iowa Law Review),
See Diane H, Mazur, Why Progressives Lost the War When They Lost the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L
225,
REV, (forUlComing 200'0 (manuscript at 10-11, on file with the Iowa Law Review) ("A
fundamental shift in military culture and in constitutional civil-military relations began when a
draft-based militalY was transformed into an all-volunteer force thirty years ago,"),
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this regard. In the I ~HO decision of Brown P. C;Linps,~lt' the Court upheld an
Air Force regulation concerning the ability of airmen to circulate petitions
within the confines of a military base. The regulation required airmen to
obtain the prior permission of a base commander before seeking support
for such petitions on military property, and it authorized commanders to
deny permission where circulation of the petition on base would present "a
clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of members of the Armed
Forces, or material interference with accomplishment of a military
mission.,,~~7 Albert Glines, a captain in the Air Force reserves, was displeased
with the Air Force's standards relating to hair length, and he organized a
petition addressed to several members of Congress and the Secretary of
Defense to have the grooming regulations changecL.1~x Glines limited himself
to circulating the petition among civilians at first. but he later decided to
distribute the document to soldiers on a military base while he was on a
training flight through Guam, and he did so without first obtaining
permission.1~') Glines was disciplined for his (~lilure to have the petition
approved before circulating it, and he brought a facial First Amendment
challenge to the prior restraint provision. The Supreme Court reversed two
lower federal courts and sustained the regulation.
Although the Air Force obtained the limited right of censorship that it
sought in Brown v. Glines, the opinion offers a detailed map of the avenues
for expression and dissent that members of the armed forces nonetheless
retain, even during active duty. Glines was disciplined only when he sought
to circulate his petition on a military base without first obtaining the
commander's approval-he was entirely free to collect support for his vocal
disapproval of rnilitatl' grooming policies in civilian settings, as he in fact
did. Indeed, he had a statutory right to do so. The C.S. Code for the Armed
Forces provides that "[n]o person may restrict a member of the armed
forces in communicating with a Member of Congress or an Inspector
General,,,~:l() and it specifically protects the rights of servicemembers to bring
evidence of "unlawful discrimination,,~:\l to the attention of such officials

22fi.
227

Rrown v. CI i 11 es, 444 U.S. ;)48 (19RO).
,~r)o n.2.

SI'f' ill. at

228.
SI'P irl.. at :~" 1-:')2. The reponed opinions from the district (ourt, appellate (ourt, and
Supreme Court do 110[ specify the exact nature of Clines's cOl1lplailll.. It appears, however, that
the dispuw centered arol1nel modes of CIIltural expression and race. 1\t one point in his
petition. Glines wrote: "v\"e feel that the presenT reglliations (lll grooming have caused more
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect [or authorities than any
other official Air Force policy." lrl.. aT 351 n.3. SI'I' alsu Glines v. Wade, .'18fi F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.
1978) (explaining that Glines violated a hair-length regulatiol1 by shaving his head), wv'c! sub
110111. Brown \'. Clines, 444 U.S. 3'18 (19RO).
229.
See Chili'S, 444 U.S. at 351-52.
230.

10 USC:.

231.

fd.

~ 1O:~4(a)

§ (c)(2) (.-\).

(2003).
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without reprisal or penalty.m One of the disputed issues in Glines was
whether the prior restraint on circulating petitions ",rithin a military base
violated this very statute. The Court found that the challenged regulation
was consonant with the statute precisely because it preserved the right of
servicemembers to collect civilian support for petitions and send those
petitions directly to their elected representatives. 233 What is more, the
regulation itself specified that commanders could not refuse permission for
the on-base circulation of petitions solely because the petitions were "critical
of Government policies or officials.,,234
Glines thus illustrates multiple avenues of dissent that are eyUoyed by
members of the armed forces-avenues that are qualified only by limitations
specific to controlled military spaces, like bases, foreign theaters, and
activities undertaken while in uniform. The opinion presumes the ability of
soldiers to criticize government policies, to complain about working
conuitions within the service, even to question the actions of military
commanders,235 and Congress preserves as sacrosanct the ability of
servicemembers to communicate such grievances directly to their elected
236
representatives.
And finally, Glines reiterates the principle adhered to in
every free speech challenge that the Court has considered in the military
context: that any speech restriction be administered in a neutral fashion,
237
free from discrimination against disfavored viewpoints or speakers.
A comparison of this mode of analysis with the form and scope of the
speech restrictions that Don't Ask, Don't Tell imposes is telling. The policy
targets only one form of expression by one group of soldiers-speech by gay,
238
lesbian, or bisexual soldiers about their own identities -and it prohibits
those soldiers from discussing their sexual identities "24 hours each day
beginning at the moment the member enters military status and not ending
un til that person is discharged or otherwise separated from the armed
forces,,,239 "whether the member is on base or off base, and whether the
232.
See Glines, 444 U.S. at 375-76.
233.
See id. at 359-61. Soldiers wishing to marshal civilian support for such a petition were
required to dolT their uniforms before doing so. See id. at 349 (citing Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9)
(1971». Additional restrictions applied to active-duty soldiers while in a foreign country. See id.
See id. at 350 n.2 (quoting Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(4) (1970».
234.
235
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 103'1(c) (2) (B) (2003) (preserving the ability of soldiers to bring
complaints about" [g] ross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, all. abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety").
236.
See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1986) (forbidding an Air Force
captain from wearing a yarmulke while on duty at the military base, but imposing no similar
!'estriction in private, off-duty spaces).
237. See Glines, 444 U.S. at 35811..15.
238.
See 10 USc. § 654(b) (2) (2000) (requiring discharge if a soldier states "that he or she
is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless [soldier demonstrates] that he or she
is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual acts").
239.
10 USC § 65'1(a) (9) (2000).
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member is on duty or off dutV.,,!HI The restraint that the military has shown
ill preserving civilian spaces and the pulitical process as avenlles of
expression and dissent for soldiers-a restraint that the Court clearly viewed
as ~ltl important prerequisite to sustaining the speech regulation in Brown v.
Clines-is entirely absent under Don't Ask, Don't Tell.

III.

\NlLLFl!l. BU:\D:\'FSS .\.

'f)

THE PRO\,i!IS[ OF

L4. 'vIRJ:':\'CF

\:Vriting in 1996, the Department of the Navy instructed its medical
professionals in how to respond to gay and lesbian soldiers \vho wished to
talk abollt their sexual identities during a consultation, In its Cmeml i'vlnlical
Ojficer iVfanual-the official policy manual for medical personnel-the Navv
offered the following guidance:
One way of looking at homosexuals in the military is to distinguish
between those who adapt to the military environment and those
who do not. The adapters are invisible and do not seek to disclose
their homosexuality. The nonadapters realize that they made a
mistake in joining the military, and they need to get OUt.:!41
It is not often that the distinctive dynamic of subordination experienced
by gay ITlen and lesbians-their compelled invisibility or erasure-Is
articulated and embraced so forthrightly.
The federal courts of appeals, in summarily rejecting the First
Amendment claims of gay and lesbian soldiers under the policy, kl\e
reiterated this saITle form of erasure. Navy Lieutenant Richard ""'atson and
National Guard Lieutenant Charles Holmes were both discharged from the
service for identifying themselves as gay. The inth Circuit concluded that
this application of Don't Ask, Don't Tell raised no speech issues under the
First Amendment: "[B]ecause Watson and Hohnes were discharged for their
conduct and not for speech [the totality of that "conduct" being the
utterance of the words, "I am gay"], the First Amendment is nol
illlplicated,~4~ Navy Lieutenant Paul Thomasson, too, was discharged from
the service solely for identifying himself as gay, yet the Fourth Circuit saw no
First Amendment issue: "The statute [Don't Ask, Don't Tell] does not target
speech declaring homosexuality; rather, it targets homosexual acts and rhe
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, and permissibly lIses the
speech as evidence. The use of speech as evidence in this manner does not
raise a constitutional isslle.,,~43 And when Air Force Captain Richard
Richenberg was discharged for identifying himself as gay, the Eighth Circuit
curtly denied his Free Speech challenge: "Richenberg's First Amenclnlent

~40.

fd.§(a)(10).
SLDN FWIII REPORT. supra note 38. ,H 36 (quoling DEP'T OF THE 1\',\\'1', \f..\\·\'IUl 1':)1:1'1, GF."'E~\l.MEDICALOFFI(:F.R (GMO) fYL\;\:l,-\L ('\-lay ]996)).
~4~.
Holmes \. Cal. Army Nal'l Guard, 124 F.:1d 1126, ll36 (9lh Cir. 1997).
'2'13.
Thomasson v. Pen)', 80 F.:~d9F), ~1:\1 (4rh Cir. 1996) (en bane).
~4 1.
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argument is without merit. [Don't Ask, Don't Tell does] not target mere
status or speech. The policy seeks to identify and exclude those who are
likely to engage in homosexual acts.,,2-l1 Only the Second Circuit has given
any serious attention to the claim that Don't Ask, Don't Tell implicates
important speech values, and that court rejected a facial challenge to the
policy by focusing narrowly on the autonomy rights of servicemembers and
reaching the somewhat fantastic conclusion that the policy "restricts no
more speech than is reasonably necessary" and adequately protects "a service
..
mem b er ' s pnvacy
lIlterest. ,,2'15
Professor Eve Sedgvrick has written about the central role that silence
often plays in the subordination of gay men and lesbians. In her
path breaking Epistemolo,gy oj the Closet,24G Sedgwick discusses the dynamic of
aggressive silence and studied ignorance that those in positions of power can
employ to erase non-heterosexual identity-or, to use the term I introduced
earlier, to deny the homosexual possibility- within the frame of reference
that they control. This erasure confers a "Privilege of Unknowing,,,217 as
Sedg-wick has put it: a license to employ ignorance, whether feigned or
actual, as a means of limiting the terrns within which a dialogue can
248
unfold.
In its most aggressive form, such chosen ignorance denies the
most elemental features of the human experience of the disempowered
interlocutor. In discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, for example, Sedgvvick
describes the majority's seemingly deliberate misconstrual of Michael
Hardwick's privacy claim as a "contemptuous demonstration ... of how
obtuseness itself arms the powerful against their enemies."HY

244. Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cil". 1996).
245. Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1299 (2d Cil'. 1996). In fairness to the Second
Circuit, the plaintiffs in Able brought a facial challenge and at the time they filed suit much of
the record of invasive l"egulation, described in the sections above, had not yet been compiled.
See id. at 1297-98 & n.11. While the broad scope of the written policy is explicit and
unambiguous, the Second Circuit might have believed thal the "militalY deference" doctrine
required it to accept the Defense Department's representation that it would implement the
policy in a manner that would respect the "privacy interests" of gay selvicemembers. 'While
erroneous, the Second Circuit's analysis was less egregious than that of its peers.
246. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990).
247.
Seeid.at8&n.13.
248.
In her most frequently cited example of this dynamic, Sedgwick writes, "If M.
tvritterand knows English but Ml'. Reagan lacks ... French, it is the urbane M. Mitterand who
must negotiate in an acquired tongue, the ignorant Ml'. Reagan who may dilate in his native
one." [d. at 4; see aLIO Wolff, supra note 2, at 1149.
Sedgwick's obselvation certainly holds true in legal analysis, where the ability of a
claimant to benefit from an established legal doctrine is always limited by the
ability of a judge to recognize, after engaging in a formal dialogue with the
claimant, that the doctrine in question should in fact apply.
ld.
249.

SEDGWICK, supra note 246, at 7.
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Don't Ask. Don't Tell, and the judicial opillions that have turned aside
First Amendlllent challenges to the policy. partake equally of this
"contemptuous obtuseness." The policy instlucts heterosexual soldiers to
participate in the fantasy that the gay, lesbian, and bisexual soldiers in their
midst will simplv cease to exist when they are compelled to absolute silence.
And the judician protects that fantasy from any serious constitutional
scrutiny by erasing the human experience of these mute soldiers and
defining their selt~identifying speech-their "I am," that most primal,
intimate, and basic form of selfexpressioll, the necessary prerequisite for
establishing a distinct social existence~:'()-as "conduct," "evidence," anything
but speech. Justice Blackmun's words were prophetic: Bowers did indeed
herald, and authorize, a period of "willful blindness" to the lived experience
of gay men and lesbians seeking relief in the federal courts.~51
For the remainder of this Article, I will seek to map the contours of that
willful judicial blindness. I begin that task by examining the doctrinal
strategies that the courts of appeals have utilized to avoid any serious
engagement with the manifest harms that Don't Ask, Don't Tell imposes
upon public discourse. I will end with an exploration of the true promise of
!,awrence v. '/rxas: the extirpation from our judicial culture of the
contemptuous obtuseness that has made such dehumanizing treatment of
gay litigants possible.

1.

No Speech, No Problem

The prilllctrv avoidance strategy that the federal courts have employed
their review of the policy exhibits a certain seductive simplicity. The
Fourth, Eighth. alld Ninth Circuits have simply defined the speech of gay
and lesbian servicernembers as "conduct," rather than speech, and hence
concluded that it is not a proper subject for First Amendment analysis at all.
Each of these courts has employed the same doctrinal mechanism in
1Il

250.

Professor Hallev's observation on this score remains among the most cogent:
[Hlomosexuals who experience their sexual desire as immutably oriented toward
persolls of thl·i r own sex nevertheless may be coerced to pretend that they
conform w the lIorm of heterosexuality. Such a rcsult is 110 mere fib: it is a change.
To be sure. "'hat has changed is not the supposed essencp of sexual orientation, but
the IP!HP.If'II{ali'Jl! of it available for social interpretation. Rut essences, conceding
for a mOIllel11 their existence, are not visible to legislatures, .judgcs. cmployers, or
police. Social ~tgents I,ork with social meaning; the fairness and indeed lhe
cOlistitulioll;dill of their acts must he measured in the context of the practical, not
the ideaL epistt'rl!ology of their decisionmaking .

.Janel E. Hallt·\·. FliP /-'olilics oj lhe Closet: Towards r;qllal PIolprtili1l
Identity. % lICL\ I.. RI·I. 915, 9')4 (1989) (citation omitted).
:-25\.

BowI'rs \.

H~lldwick. 478

.101

Gay, Lesbian, and Bispxua{

L: .S. 180, :-205 (19t\6) (BLtckm 11I1,.J.. dissenling).
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banishing the speech of gay servicemembers from the protection of the First
Amendment in this fashion. That mechanism has rested on an astonishingly
facile distortion of Wisconsin v. NIitchelL,~52 the Supreme Coun's leading
decision on hate-crime laws. It is worth taking a moment to map out this bit
ofjudicial legerdemain.
In NIitchell, the Court unanimously upheld a sentencing enhancement
statute that imposed harsher penalties on offenders who commit a violent
crime "because of' the victim's race, religion, sexual orientation, or other
253
specified traits.
Mitchell and several other Black defendants, who were
convicted of assault, had their sentences enhanced for singling out a White
victim on the basis of his race after they saw the movie Mississippi Bmning. 254
In order to establish the defendants' motive in choosing their victim, the
State offered a statement by Mitchell, made immediately prior to the attack,
in which he said that he was looking for a "white boy" to attack because he
255
was angry about the images of lynching in the film.
Mitchell challenged
the sentencing enhancement provision, arguing that it impermissibly
256
punished him for his thoughts and his protected specch.
In explaining its unanimous rejection of Mitchell's challenge, the Court
made three observations. First, the Court considered whether hate-crime
laws constitute punishrnent for "bael thoughts" (which would be
impermissible) or, instead, the identification of particularly dangerous or
injurious motives for committing a crime (which would constitute an
acceptable basis for enhancing a criminal sentence) .257 It concluded that a
properly drawn hate-crime law was more accurately characterized as
targeting particularly' dangerous motives, rather than politically unpopular
258
thoughts.
ext, the Court asked \·vhether the existence of hate-crime laws
would chill protected speech by dissuading people from expressing bigoted
259
views.
The Court concluded that a hate-crime provision (unlike a hatespeech law) posed no serious danger of chilling speech because bigoted
2GO
expressions did not themselves provoke any sort of immediate sanction.
Rather, the sentencing enhancement provision came into operation only
after a person had committed a violent offense. In other 'words, a hate-crime
law would only chill the speech of someone who thought to himself: I would

252.
508 u.s. 476 (1993).
253.
See id. at 480 (discllSsing statute).
254.
Id.
255.
See id. (quoting jvlitchell as saying, "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a
white boy; go get him").
256. Ill. at 481-82.
257.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
258.
See id. at '187 (recognizing that antidiscrimination statutes that target particular
motives have been upheld against constitutional challenge).
259.
Id. at 488.
260.
Ill. at 488-89.
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lil« 10 f'x!Jrf'SS II/Y idcas It/}{Jilt met, but I might 7/)rt! wanl 10 IISS({U!t S(JIIIN)I/.(' ill tlte
Iulure, an.d if I do, my ideas about mce might br usn! as ('vidmll' lor I!u' /lIOllva/iOlI
beltilld my assau!l, .III rei !Jest remain silent. Because it \'icwecl "tlte fJrospeCl of <t
citizen suppressing his bigoted belids" in such <l fashion to be entirely
"speculative," the Court rejected this First Amendment argllll1ent.~liI
Third, and finallv, the Court explained that tl1f' First Amendment
imposes no categorical prohibition against the use of a defendant's own
speech as evidence in a criminal pr()ceeding.~';~ That is, using Mitchell's
statements to prove his bad intent did not constitute some sort of f)N .Ie
violation of the Fi rst l\.mendment. This was an utterly prosaic conclusion,
and the Conrt offered it as a sort of toss-off at the end of its ()piniol1.~I>:\
It is the language associated with this last, prosaic conclusion that the
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have put to such extraordinary work in
their review of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. In confirming that the entire
foundation uf the law of testimonial evidence had not, in fact, been
unconstitutional ali along, the Mitchell COLlrt said in its closing paragraphs
that "[tJhe First Amendment ... does not prohibit the evidentiary use of
speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.',2Ii.!
The Fourth, Eighth, and \iinth Circuits have seized upon this passage and
cited it for the proposition that the First i\mendment rlPlwr prohibits the
evidentiary use of speech to prove motive or intent-in other words, that the
Speech Clause never imposes limits on government regulations that are
framed as rules of evidence.~(i-· Of course, the Coun's opinion in NIitchell
makes perfectly clear what common sense would dictate: While the use of
speech as evidence cloes not constitute a pel se violation of the First
Amendment, an evidentiary provision that has the effect of chilling
protected expression among a defined population of regulated individuals
(as Don't Ask, Don't Tell obviously docs) raises a serious First Amendment
issue, as would any other law with such an cffect.~';f'
If a further illustration of this point is needed, one might compare the
posture adopted by these courts of appeal to the Supreme Court's tr-eatment
of alleged Communists at the height of the McCarthy era. In the 1940s and

~61

.

frl. at 489.

~62

jVrilfhell, :'lOR l .S. at 4K~).

263.

Sel' iii. at48~ (oHering this conclusion in rhe last paragraph of the opinion).

26'1

fd. at 48~.

26S.

See Holmes v. Cd. Nat '[ Guard, 124 F.3d 112G, 11 :.\6 (~rh CiJ. 1997) (citing the passage

and stating its equal application to Don't A.sk, Don't Tell); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d ~:'l6, 263
(8th Cir. 1996) (citing the p,lssage in its agreemem with the conclusion reached by the Fourth
Circuit in Tlwma.lsolI): Thomasson \'. Pern', SO F.3d 915, 931 ('lrh Cir. IlJ~6) (en bane) (citing
the passage's statemen t thai .. [ t J he use of speec h evidence in th is manner does not raise a
constitutional iSSlIC").
~66

See Milfhell, SOK L.s. at 488-89: cf generally R.A.V. \'. City of Sl. Paul, 505 U.S. 9,77

(1992) (striking dm,'n a hate-speech law that outlaws onl\' certain "fighting words" <Ind hence

imposes speech restriction that discriminates on the basis of COIHenl and viewpoint).
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1950s, Congress enacted laws purportedly aimed at identifying and
prosecuting citizens who were working tow<J.rd the violent overthrow of the
267
U.S. government.
Enforcement authorities focused their primary efforts
upon those who claimed membership in the Communist Party or who
espoused the teachings of Marxian economics and philosophy, often using
their statements (of membership, or of philosophy and advocacy) as the sole
"evidence" of their "intent" to commit treasonous acts. For a time, it was
essentially a crime to belong to the Communist Party, and many people were
deterred from espousing any political views that might provoke a subpoena
2GB
and a punitive investigation.
In its decisions reviewing these enforcement
efforts, the Supreme Court sometimes upheld the actions of federal
authorities against First Amendment challenge and sometimes struck them
down, but it never entertained any illusion that the government could shield
the penalties that it was imposing upon group membership or political
advocacy from careful analysis under the Speech Clause by its framing of
' d ence. ,,269 T 0 th e contrary, t 11e C ourt
.
t h ose pena ItIes
as ru 1es 0 f "evr
eventually rejected its own suggestion from decades earlier in Whitney v.
Califmnia that a legislative designation could resolve the First Amendment
problems that arise when the State takes punitive action based solely on a
· or 1'd entHy.. 970
statement 0 f mem b ers 111p
There are some difficult issues of theory, doctrine, and policy
surrounding Don't Ask, Don't Tell. This Wisconsin v. Mitchell argument is not
one of them. The clever trick of definition by which the courts of appeals
have conjured away the speech of gay and lesbian servicemembers (and the
serious impact upon public discourse that has resulted from their compelled
silence) is an act of avoidance, not analysis.

267. See Subversive Activities Control Board Act of ]950,50 U.S.C. § 786 (repealed 1968);
Smith Act, 18 U.s.c. § 2385 (2000).
268.
See generally ALBERT FRIED, MCCARTHYlSM: THE GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1997) (examining case studies of ACLU advocacy during the period
and examining cases invoh~ng blacklists and imprisonment of academics and essayists).
See, e.g., NoLO v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 300 (1961) (construing evidentiary
269.
provisions of the Smith Act narrowly in order to avoid First Amendment problems); Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 230 (1961) (same); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505
(195]) (plurality opinion) (" [vVlhere an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or
nonpress terms, a conviction relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be
sustained only \vhen the speech or publication created a 'clear and present danger' of
attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime.").
270. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (overruling Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)) (permitting prosecution for particular forms of assembly and
advocacy where the legislature has determined that they may lead to proscribed conduct). But
see Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509-10 (indicarjng that congressional deterrninarjon of a dangerous
form of advocacy may possibly factor into the constitutional calculus); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
447,447 n.2 (indicarjng that Dennis remains good law).

I ~()(HI
2.

Militarv Deference

judicial attempt to analyze or restrain the internal policies of the
l11ilitan: must also navigate the doctrine of "military deference." It will come
as llO surprise that the courts of appeals have relied heavily upon this
doerrine in turning aside challenges to Don't Ask, Don't Tell.~/l Cnlikc thc
distortions of Wisconsin v. Mitchell described above, the principles underlying
military deference do pose some legitimate and serious questions that
require close attention, though the doerrinc ultimately does much less work
than the courts of appeals have assumed.
[n its current form,~/~ military deference constitutes both a statement
about limited judicial competence in assessing the conditions under which
members of the military serve and an expression of separation-of-powers
principles to the effect that primary responsibility for restraining the military
should lie with the political branches of civilian government. The
"deference" contemplated under the military doctrine is broad: The
Supreme Court has at times suggested that some questions sounding in
military expertise may be largely beyond the power of civilian judicial
revie\V,~/:\ and some lower courts have seized upon these suggestions to
disclaim all responsibility for policing the actions of the military.~74 Thus,
All\

nl.
SI'I'. e.g., Richenberg \'. Pern. 97 F.3d ~:)Ii. ~(}I (8th Cir. 1996); Able v. United St<ltc~. KH
1280. ]293 (2d Cir. ]996); Thomasson \, Pnn. KO F.:~d 9]5, 925 (4th Cir. 1996) (en hane).
The only coun of appeals ever to ill\·~t1id'l!t' the militarv's exclusion of a gay soldier on
constitutional grounds \\'a~ the Nimh Circuit, ill thl' much-noted ca~e of Walkins v. Cnill'll StrUt'S
.-1 nil)', ::i7.'> F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Il'atkilis concerned the blanket exclusion of gal'
soldiers that preceded Don't Ask, Don'r Tell. TIll' tlllel'~judge panel in that case f(Jund th<n g,ll
men and lesbians constitute a suspecl class, 'lpplied strict ~crlltiny to r.he military'~ b,lI1 on g,ly
soldier~, and declared the policy IlllCllllstitutionaL fd. at 704. The ('n banc Ninth CirCllir.
affirmed on a different ,heory, applying a \'inu,t1ly llllheard of e~toppcl w the lllilital~' on thl'
grounds that r.be plaintiff, Perry \\'atkins, hac! consistently told the Army' that he was gay and the
,\rmy repeatedly reenlisted him nonetheless. fd, at 70.'>-11.
F,:~d

Ironically, the "narrower" opinion of the en banc coun arguably constituted a much
more aggres~ive rejection of tbe doctrine of military deference. The original panel lI'a~
enforcing a constitutional right-the circumstance where a court would seem to have the
~trongest duty to conduct an independent rC\·ie\I·. The en banc coun, in contrast, a\'oided r.he
constitutional issue by relying upon general principle~ offairne~~ and equity-a circumstance in
\I'hich the military would seem to have the strollgc~r argument that civilian notions of fairness
and consistency of treatment have no application, a~ this Pan will make clear. Cj Lnited States
v. :YlendoLa, 464 U.S. 154, J 64 (1984) (forbidding the u~e of non-mutual issue preclusion
against repeat-litigant government where importallt public policies would be frusr.rated).
272.
Professor Diane Mazur has demunstrated that the current manifestation of the militalY
deference doctrine is a recent creation \I'ith a pedigree of only a few decades and owes mIlch of
its existence to Justice Rehnquisl. SI'I' Diane H. Y[azur, Rehnq'llisl's Vietnam: Constituliollal
Se/Jam/ism andlhe Sleallh Advance oj Martiall.mu, 77 [:\D, LJ. 701,73+-40 (2002).
27:~,
See Rostker v. Goldberg, "1.'>3 L .S, .'>7. !1ll-()7 (1981) (canvassing broad application~ of
military deference).
27-1,
SrI', e.g., Thomassoll, 80 F.?>d at 92~-2·1 (anicnlating an almost nonexistent roll" for
judges to nc\-icw military policies that result Irom t1ation,t! political "colllpromise").
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"military deference" offers a clear path to any coun that IS inclined to
dismiss the claims of gay servicemembers.
While this is not the place for a comprehensive review of military
deference, my analysis of the constitutional values burdened by Don't Ask,
Don't Tell does invite a reconsideration of the contours of that doctrine. In
particular, my focus on the policy's impact upon public speech values in
civilian life calls for more precise questions than the Court has asked
heretofore about the circumstances under which judicial defer..ence to the
mili tary is factually supportable and, perhaps more importantly, when such
deference is consonant with a constitutional tradition that has always been
275
wary of military intrusions into civilian life.
There are three distinct components to the "deference" that the
military claims in seeking to limit judicial review of its policies: (1) deference
in reviewing the need, or justification, for a policy; (2) deference in
reviewing the impact that a policy has upon constitutional values; and (3)
deference in determining the level of individual constitutional protection
that members of the military enjoy while on active duty. Federal courts often
treat these elements of deference interchangeably. The case for deference
where Don't Ask, Don't Tell is concerned, however, looks quite different
under each of these distinct inquiries.
a.

Justification or Need

The first consideration, deference in reviewing the justification or need
for a military policy, will generally present the strongest case for deferring to
276
military judgment and expertise. This element of deference looks to the

275.
See, e.g, U.S. CONST. amend. III (forbidding the quartering of troops in civilian homes
during peacetime and imposing limits on such quartering during wartime); Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
352 F.3d 695, 714-]5 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Third Amendment's prohibition on the
quartering of troops during times of peace ret1ected the Framers' deep-seated beliefs about the
sanctity of the home and the need to prevent miliuu)' intrusion into civilian life."), cer!. granted,
121 S. Cl. 1353 (2004). On this point, Professor Jonathan Turley has written:

The acceptance of ... a semi-autonomous [milital}'.1 system within the larger
republic lIlay be the ultimate testament to the milital}"s reputation of
professionalism and political subordination. This degree of tolerance is all the
more impressive given the extent that the military system expressly rejects some of
the founding principles of the Madisonian system. The tolerance of such a system
was all but unthinkable at the formation of our government. The establishment of
a milit,u}' society \-vas a subject of considerable concern among the Framers and
almost universally viewed as one of the greatest dangers to liberty.
Jonathan Turley, TriaL\ and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of lvlilitary Governance in a
Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 652 (2003); see also Jonathan Turley, The
Militmy Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. I (2002) (arguing that the modern shape of the
milital)', both in size and scope and in political influence, is inconsistent with the vision of the
drafters of the Constitution as to the role military should play).
276.
See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("The complex subtle, and
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force
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impact thar the regulated behavior, if left unchecked. \\"(luldltaw: on Illilitan;
t'ffeetivcness, along with the relative \veight of rnilitan priorities itl assessing
whether the costs associated with the rnilitaI)i s chosen corrective are
jllstified.~77 As a threshold matter, DOll't Ask, DOtl't Tell does implicate this
concern, for the claim that the military offers in tlte policy's defense is that
heterosexual American soldiers would be less able to do their jobs if they
knew that certain of their peers were gay-a claim that the preamble to the
statute goes to great lengths to couch in terms of the special "Iaws, rules,
customs, and traditions" of "military society.,,"'H
Even in the matter of justification and need, however, there are reasons
to be somewhat skeptical of the military'S claim for deference where Don't
Ask, Don't Tell is concerned. First, the policy creates structural impediments
to the military's own ability to assess the net impact of the policy upon
"morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion,,",'I- its primary
rationale. As discussed in the previous Part, the policy silences the very
population of people whom it regulates: If operating as intended, the policy
makes it impossible for rnilitary commanders themselves to know whether
there are gay soldiers under their command, and hence what impact the
policy's invasive restrictions are having upon the morale of their units.
That being so, the militatY' must rely upon a broad claim that military
effectiveness is so dependent upon the exclusion of openly gay soldiers that
any other threats to morale created by the policy itself are categorically
outweighed by that central imperative."xo While that broad claim might be
entitled to some deference (on the theory that it involves specialized
knowledge), it is strongly at odds ",,,ith the experience of the militaries in
Great Britain, Israel, Australia, Canada, and twenty other developed nations
that have removed their restrictions on gay soldiers and yet recorded no
erosion to good order, discipline, or morale."H' It is also at odds with the

are essentially professional JudgmenLs, subject always to civilian control of rhe Legislative dud
Executive Branches.").

277
See, eg, Chappell v. vVallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (noting rhat the feder;d
judiciary is "ill-equipped ro determine the impact upon discipline rhat any particular inrrusion
upon military authority might have").
278.
10 USC ~ fi54(a) (8)(B) (2000).
279.
fd. § 654(a) (14)
280.
See v,'olfC I/lpm nore 2, at 1164 & n.54 (discussing feelings of isolation thar gay and
lesbian soldiers fecI when deployed overseas and unable to commltnicate openly with loved
ones).
281.
See, e.g., Aamn Belkin, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: fs the Gay Ban Ba.led on tvlilitary NeCf'ssity?,
PARAMETERS, SUlllmer 2003, at 110-16 (detailing the effeer rhat the lifting of the gay han had in
the militaries of Australia, Canada, Israel, and Britain). Professor Belkin summarizes the
report's findings as follows: "Nor a single one of the 104 experts interviewed believed thar the
Ausrraliau, Canadian. Israeli, or British decisions to lift their gav bans undermined military
performance, re~ldiness. or cohesion, led to increased difficulties in recruiting or retention, or
increased the rate of IIIV infection among the troops." frl. ,It 110; .Il't' alm id. (lifting of the han
in Australia "was 'an absolu[(~ non-event"'); Aaron Belkin & Jason 'vlcl'\ichol, FJfl'rts of thl' 1992
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increasingly large number of cases in which openly gay soldiers have
continued to serve in the U.S. armed forces while judicial challenges to their
discharges were pending, once again \vith no recorded instance of erosion
282
to unit cohesion or effectiveness.
And, finally, the morale justification is
belied by the military's consistent practice of reducing the rates of gay
discharges (or suspending them entirely) during times of war or armed
combat, when "unit cohesion" is most important, only to resume discharges
at full tilt once combat operations have ceased and the contributions of gay
283
and lesbian soldiers are no longer immediately vita1.
The "specialized
society" of military life may justify the government in claiming some measure
of deference in assessing its own personnel needs, but there are threshold
reasons for questioning the reliability, and good faith, of the military's
invocation of this argument where Don't Ask, Don't Tell is concerned.

b.

Impacts on Constitutional Values

The second consideration, deference in reviewing the impact of a
military policy on constitutional values, makes reference to the manner in
which the policy is implernented and the context in which it operates. The
basic insight here is that one must understand both a policy's operative
effect-the activities that it will mandate or prohibit, the groups that it \vill
impinge upon, and so forth-and the significance of that operative effect in
context-that is, hoy\, it operates in light of the other limitations that
Lifiiug of Resl'rictions un Gay and Lesbia.n Service in the Canadian Fones: Aflpmising the Evidence, at
http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/CanadaPubl.htITl (Apr. 2000)
(same for
Canadian experience) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); Aaron Belkin & RL. Evans, The
l~jfects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Fones: Appraising the Evidence, at
http://www.gaymilitaI)..ucsb.edu/Publications/bl·itish_publ.htm
(Nov.
2000)
(providing
detailed findings regarding British experience) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); Aaron
Belkin & Melissa Levin, The EjJects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the Ismeli Defense Forces,
at http://\vvvw.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/Israelpub1.htm aune 2000) (same for Israeli
experience) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
282. See Meinhold v.
nited States Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Gil'. 1994)
(describing Meinhold's cominued service following disclosure of his homosexuality); Watkins v.
United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701-01 (9th Cil'. 1989) (en banc) (describing Watkins's long
and successful tenure in the U.S. Army as au out gay man before being discharged); SLDN
SECOND REPORT, mpm note 37, at 21-22 ("An ironic exception 10 the prevalence of anti-gay
harassment in the ranks is found in the more than one dozen units where gay men and lesbians
are and have been serving openly for one to fourteen years. In tbose units, harassment has
become almost nonexistenl."); Interview with Keith Ieinhold, in Berkeley, Cal. (Aug. 2003)
(describing successful service in the U.S.
avy as an out gay man following disclosure);
Intelview with Zoe Dunning, in San Francisco, Gal. (Aug. 2003) (describing successful service in
the U.S. Marine Corps following disclosul'e of lesbian identity); RJlQnda Evans, U.S. Military
Folicie.1 Conceming HomosexuaL,: De-velofnnent, Implementation and Outcomes, at 36-73, at
http://www.gaymiliralyucsb.edu/Publications/evans1.htrn
(Nov.
2001)
(detailing
the
continued success of gay and lesbian servicemembers and their units while challenges to
discharge proceedings remain pending) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
283.
See Evans, SUfJT(t note 282, at 22-26 (describing the inverse relationsbip between gay
discharge rates and manpower needs during times of war or milita,)' crisis).
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characreriLt' a servicelTlcmber's enVirOJllllCllt. [f a policy imposes restriuions
that would stand out as highly intrusive in civilian life, but that merely
constitute one part of a larger web of limitations on behavior in militar) life,
that fact might be highly relevant to am analysis of the impact on
constitutional values attributable to the policy itself. To the extent that a
challenged policy operates internally to the rnilitar-y-regulating on-duty
activities, or establishing rules for beha\ior on military property-the
argument is stronger that an assessment of the policy's impact on
constitutional values requires proprietary knowledge of the exigencies of
combat or the working conditions that attend the "specialized society":!K~ of
ll1ilitar: life. [n GoLdman v. Weinberger,:!K:. for example, the Court upheld a
dress regulation that prevented Captain Sinlcha Goldman from wearing a
varmulke while on duty at an Ajr Force base. Since the regulation applied
only to the physical spaces of the military work environment itself (Goldman
was not IJrevented from wearing his yarmulke in civilian life), the militarv
could argue t hat the regulation's effect upon individual autonomy had to be
considered against the backdrop of the other homogenizing regulations that
characterizt' a military workplace.:!KI; Similar arguments have obtained in
most of the military cases in which the COllrt has applied an explicitly
cld'erenrial mode of constitutional analysis.:!"
In cases involving military policies with effects in the ci\'ilian worleL in
contrast, rhe (:OUlT has seen much less need to defer to the judgment of the
military concerning the policy's impact on constitutional values. While the
Court has not been entirely consistent in its approach to such cases, a
distinction betwC'en civilian and military impacts does appear to have guided
irs analysis. In this connection, consider three opinions that are included in
eHTy cOllstiturional law casebook, each growing out of a military policy that
posed some threat to constitutional values in the civilian context: F'rDlltlf'l'O 71.
Ritfwrdslin.:!sK United States v. O'Brien,'!K~) and Rostka v. GoLdberg.'!~H)

~R·L
P~lIkn \. Le\)', 417 liS 733. 743 (ICJ74) ("Thi, Court has long recogllilnl lhat Ilw
milit;lIY i.,. III IIITe,sity, a specialized ,ociety separate from civilian society. v\'e h;\H' also
recognized til~1I illt' military has, again by necessitv, developed law, and traditions of ii' own
durin.l!; its loug hislory.").
~1F,.

-ITi L S

:-,():~

(19Rfi).

~~(;_
.\1'1' iiI. ~lt ,,07-0S (discussing the effect of uniform requirements and other rl'gll!<lIiollS
tklt pe,Yasi\l'k restrict opportunities for individual t':\.prt'ssiOIl within a military t'll\-ir01ullcnt).

~H7_
SI'I'. i·g.. Bn)\m v. Glines, 444 U.S- 348. 3:,4-"H (1'J80) (citing Parker in upholding priol
restrailll_ (III cirCltl~lI.ion of petitions on a military base); Creer \'. Spock. 424 U.S. ~~~, :-n7--l0
(I ~)iti) (strt'SSillg tlte imp0ll.ance of order and discipline in the military workpbce as a Icason
fl)l- e:\.cllldin;,; ci\ilian protestors from a base); Parlin, -IIi L:.S. at 74:~-44 (1974) (strt'ssillg a
need for imli,-idllality to yield to "overriding demands of discipline and duty" in the Illilitan
workplacr'" _
2K~.
III L.S (i/7 (1973) (plurality opinion).
2K9
:)~) I L S % 7 (1 %8) .
~~)O
-I:):~ l .S :J 7 (19R I ).
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Fmnliem involved a statute reqUInng the husbands of female
servicemembers to prove actual financial dependence in order to claim
entitlement to spousal-employment benefits, but permitting the wives of
male servicemembers to enjoy those benefits without any special showing.
The provision was clearly "military" in nature-it related only to the benefits
available to servicemembers and their spouses. But the statute did not
regulate any feature of the servicemembers' official duties; rather, it
concerned monetary payments and access to medical and other services that
were analogous to the employment benefits enjoyed by ordinary civilians. 291
There was thus no particular reason to think that assessing the harm to
constitutional values that the policy imposed-applying a different standard
to men and to women in awarding prosaic employment benefits and making
stereotyped assumptions about the relative abilities of men and women to be
primary breadwinners-required any special expertise to assess,292 and the
Court struck the statute down on a vote of eight to one with no mention in
any of the opinions about a need for deference to military expertise.
U.S. v. O'Brien follows a similar pattern. O'Brien, the draft-card burning
case, established the doctrine of "symbolic speech" under the First
Amendment. David Paul O'Brien, a civilian, was prosecuted for burning his
draft card as a protest to the Vietnam 'Val', and he challenged the statute
under which that action was made criminal, arguing that the statute had
been passed for the purpose of stifling protest. While rejecting O'Brien's
argument on the facts, the Court recognized in principle that "symbolic
speech" enjoys protected status under the First Amendment, and it
articulated a test for the protection of expressive conduct that has become
293
the governing standard.
Once again, the provision in question was clearly

291. 1n fact, the purpose of the military-benefits scheme, as the Court described it, was to
provide "fringe benefits to members of the uniformed services on a competitive basis with
business and industry." 1'1-ontiero, 411 U.S. at 679-80.
292.
One might argue that availability of on-base housing, which was one of the benefits at
issue in the case, constituted an exception to t.his assertion. See id. at 680. Had the military
claimed, for example, that the presence of female servicemembers with dependent husbands
on milital)' bases would threaten the manhood of male soldiers and harm their morale and unit
cohesion, it might have had a stronger claim for "deference" in assessing both the justification
for the policy and the harm to constitutional values in context. (If this sounds like a fanciful
argument, recall the justification for the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy itself.) The military does
not appear to have taken this position, however, and no member of the Court. gave the on-base
housing issue any special attention.
293.

The Court stated:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation [prohibiting expressive conduct]
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if tl1e incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.

O'BTien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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"military" in nature-it was part of the statutory scheme governing forcible
294
coriscription.
But the impact on constitutional values that O'Brien
brought before the Court concerned speech and protest in the public
sphere, and there is no hint in the Court's opinion that it would be
appropriate to defer to the military in assessing the burden that restricting
O'Brien's expressive conduct placed on First Amendment values. 295 The
Court employed the same mode of analysis in another case two years later,
finding that the First Amendment prohibited the military from punishing a
civilian actor for wearing a military uniform in a dramatic production that
296
was critical of the Vietnam War.
Once again, the regulation in question
was "military" (prohibiting the misuse of official uniforms), but the harm to
public speech values occurred within the civilian world, and the Court
unanimously agreed that the First Amendment prohibited this military
intrusion into public discourse with no mention of any need for
defe rence. 297
Rostker v. Goldberg, 111 which the Court offered one of its strongest
statements of military deference, does undermine the operative force of this
distinction somewhat, though only in a limited fashion. Rostker involved a
challenge to Congress's policy of registering men, but not women, for the
selective service. In rejecting an equal protection challenge to this sex-based
classification, the Court explicitly considered the civilian context in which
the classification operated-that is, the use of segregated administrative
procedures for men and women before they were inducted into the
military-and found that the doctrine of "military deference" still operated
to shield the policy from constitutional challenge. More precisely, the
majority explicitly rejected the assertion that an identifiable harm to
. constitutional values in the civilian world rendered the doctrine of military
29H
deference wholly inapplicable.
Even in Rostker, however, the broad

294.
See id. at 370 (describing statutes under which O'Brien was prosecuted, which was
"pan of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948").
295. The only reference to Congress's special role on military mallers in O'B'1l:en concerns
the ability of Congress to institute a dr"aft and the apparatus necessary to sustain it. See id. at 377
("The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support: armies and to make all laws
necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping."); id. at 377-79 (confirrning the
authoriC)' of Congress to maintain selective seJ'lice). The Coun's extended discussion of this
issue (now uncontroversial) appears to have been provoked by Justice Douglas, who wrote in
dissent that the power of Congress to maintain a draft in the absence of a formal declaration of
war was in doubt and hence should have been a particular focus of the Co un's attention. See id.
at 389-91 (Douglas,]., dissenting); see also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316 (1973)
(stating that Congress must formally declare war before the U.S. can engage in non-defensive
hostilities) .
296. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970).
297.
See id. at 62-63, 65 (Harlan, j., concurring) (agreeing with the m'\iority'sFirst
Amendment analysis); id. at. 69 (vVhite,]., concurring in the result) (same).
298.
See Rostker v. Goldberg, 153 U.S. :'57, 68-69 (1981). The Court specifically explained:
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deference that the Court afforded to Congress centered on the justification
and need for the challenged provision, not its impact upon constitutional
299
norms.
On the latter issue, the Rosther Court retained for itself the
prerogative of measuring the normative significance of the challenged sex
classification and its impact on the civilian population, and it refused the
invitation to adopt a lower level of scrutiny for such claims as a formal
matter.~oo The Court then went on to conduct a thorough analysis of the
legislative justifications for the policy (with deference to the legislative
findings underlying them) and it assessed the policy's harm to constitutional
101
values in light of those justifications.: Thus, even Rosther-the most robust
statement of the Court's deference doctrine-retains an active role for the
judiciary in assessing the harms that result when the military reaches out to
impose constitutionally disfavored regulations in civilian settings.
Consider Don't Ask, Don't Tell in light of these familiar precedents.
The policy's impact upon public speech values does not derive exclusively,
or even primarily, from its regulation of behavior within the military itself.
Rather, the greatest part of that impact flows from the restrictions that the
policy imposes upon the speech of gay servicemembers in their
communication with government officials, advocacy groups, and others in
civilian society-the subject of Part II.A, above. While gay servicemembers
are "special" in that their distinctive identities empower them to contribute a
unique and important voice to public discourse, no "specialized knowledge"
is required to appreciate the ]larm to public discourse that results from
silencing these soldiers in civilian life. As in Rosther, the military's
justifications for this feature of the policy might make some claim to

Appellees also stress that this case involves civilians, not the milital)', and that the
impact of registration on the milital)' is only indirect and attenuated. We find these
efforts to divorce registration from the military and national defense context, with
all the deference called for in that context, singularly unpersuasive.
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but rather the first step in
[]1e induction process into the military one, and Congress specifically linked its
consideration of registration LO induction.
Id. (citations omitted).
299.
See id. at 68-69. The Court indicated that deference is required when milital)' need is
an issue.

Congressional Judgment.~ concerning registraLion and the dl"aft are based on
judgments concerning milital)' operations and needs, and the deference
unquestionably due the latter judgments is necessarily required in assessing the
former as well. AJthough the District Court stressed that it was not intruding on
military questions, its opinion was based on assessments of milital)' need and
flexibility in a time of mobilization.
Id. (citations omitted).
300. See id. ar. 69-72; id. ar. 70 (reasserting "constitutional responsibility" to assess the
military policy's harm r.o constitutional values).
301. See id. at 72-83.
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specialized knowledge (as I discuss below), but its effects are a matter of
common understanding.
~ to the questions of accountability that I explore in Part II.B, the
argument for deference in assessing the policy's impact on constitutional
values is somewhat stronger. While the basic hostility that the First
Amendment exhibits toward the suppression of information about
governmental policies would seem to transcend any boundaries between
military and civilian life, the military might take the position that systems of
accountability-mechanisms for bringing complaints, systems of internal
review, and so forth-operate in a fundamentally different fashion in the
military. The impact of Don't ~k, Don't Tell upon the value of political
accountability, this argument might go, is less remarkable than might first
appear when viewed in the context of the military's distinctive reporting
structures. A fair argument can be made that assessing the merits of this
assertion would require some specialized knowledge of military culture. To
my knowledge, however, the military has never made such an argument in
defense of the policy. What is more, the substance of any such argument
would be undermined by the recent report of the Inspector General of the
Defense Department, discussed earlier, which identifies Don't A.sk, Don't
Tell as embodying singular problems of accountability and reporting even
302
within the military context.
c.

Levels of Constitutional Protection

Finally, the concept of military deference includes the assertion that
members of the military el~oy lesser protection for their individual rights
than do civilians. This is not, strictly speaking, a matter of "deference" in the
narrow sense of that term-that is, judicial reticence in revievving the factual
303
premises underlying a military policy due to lack of expertise. Rather, this
element of deference embodies a broader proposition: that the paradigm of
rights enforcement-an individual asserting her own prerogatives and
seeking judicial assistance in establishing the primacy of those prerogatives
over state policies-is structurally inconsistent with military life, where
individuality must be subordinated to secure the benefits of a cohesive

302.
See sUjxra text accompanying notes 206--16.
303. The Court does sometimes characterize this issue as one of "deference" to Congress's
determination as to the rights that a servicemember should enjoy. See, e.g., Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (explaining that servicemembers enjoy less robust due process
protection in a court-martial proceeding than a civilian would in criminal prosecution, and that
the Court "defers" to Congress's determination as to appropriate protections). Having
distinguished the issue of justification or need from the issue of levels of individual protection,
however, it seems more appropriate to characterize the broad abiliry of Congress to confer
lesser protection on soldiers as a threshold issue of constitutional policy rather than deference
to any particular fom1 of expertise.
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group in which soldiers are willing to sacrifice their lives to accomplish a
..
304
I arger misSIOn.
There are established limits even to this feature of military deference.
Most notably, in the case of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the military must restrict speech in a "neutral" and
"even-handed" manner if it wishes those restrictions to be understood as a
proper st.ep t.O\vard t.he creat.ion of a cohesive military unit. 305 Don't Ask,
Don't Tell obviously fails to satisfy t.hat. requirement. of neutrality. More
broadly, limit.ations on personal autonomy in the military are largely
inapposite to a revie\v of the policy's impact. upon public speech values. The
subjective experience of individual servicemembers, while of unquestioned
importance, does not. form the basis of my analysis here. My focus is the
public interest. in preserving the political legitimacy and effect.iveness of
government. policies. That. interest is not limit.ed by t.he individual
prerogatives of the speaker asserting a constitutional claim. As the Court
said in Fint National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a case involving attempts by a
state to place rest.rictions on the expressive activities of artificial entities (like
corporations) during a referendum campaign:
The individual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First
Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed
discussion, although the two often converge. The Court has
declared, however, that speech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. And selfgovernment suffers when those in power suppress competing views
306
on public issues from diverse and antagonistic sources.
A. restriction on "open and informed discussion" does not cause "selfgovernment" to "suffer[J" any less when it is effectuated through a military
policy. Indeed, there is reason to think that a military regulation of speech
30
in a civilian setting is made more troubling by that provenance, not less. ?

304.
See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 348,508 (1986) (discussing the importance
of "eliminat[ingOj outward individual distinctions" in the military environment); Chapman v.
\-\lallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy for individual
constitutional violations in the special context of the military).
305.
See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, j., concurring) (explaining that speech
restriction in the military can only by upheld when "based on a neutral, completely objective
standard"); Brown Vo Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 358 n.15 (1980) ("Commanders sometimes may
apply [such] regulations irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily, thus giving rise to legitimate
claims under the First Amendment.") (internal quotation omitted); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 838 (1976) (requiring that regulations restricting political demonstrations on military
properlY be "objectively and evenhandedly applied").
306. First Nat'l Bank or Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (J 978) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
307.
See Thomasson v. Pen)', 80 F.3d 915, 949 (4th Cil'. 1996) (en banc) (Hall, j.,
dissenting) .
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The component of military deference that rests on the reduced autonomy
interests of active-duty soldiers is simply inapposite here.
Military deference is, in short, a mixed bag for Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
Those features of the doctrine that involve claims of military justification
and necessity present the strongest case for judicial reticence. But there are
both structural and empirical reasons to doubt the adequacy (and good
faith) of the military's invocation of "unit cohesion" as a justification for the
policy, even if one accepts the general proposition that the military has a
superior ability to assess its own internal dynamics. And those features of
military deference that involve an assessment of a policy's impact on
constitutional values-and the content and scope of those values
themselves-have little application to the broad effects that the policy's
speech restrictions impose upon political and cultural discourse in civilian
life.
Thus, despite the heavy reliance that the courts of appeals have placed
upon the shield of military deference, the doctrine does not offer anything
like a complete ans,·ver to the constitutional problems associated with Don't
.Ask, Don't Tell. And even the partial answer that deference offers is
equivocal, at best, when viewed against the growing body of evidence from
foreign militaries, 'which have lifted their gay bans and yet experienced no
recorded problem of morale or cohesion. Given the extraordinary burdens
on public speech values that the policy imposes, it is not an exaggeration to
say that the casual invocation of military deference to avoid all meaningful
First Amendment analysis of the policy amounts to the type of judicial
nonfeasance that the Supreme Court has disclaimed in even its most
. Iy d eerentJa
i~
. I moments. 308
aggressive
B.

THE PIWM.lSE OFL\WRE CE

\Vhat is the likelihood that the federal courts can be shaken from this
"abdication of [their J ultimate responsi bili ty to decide constitu tional
.
" ..
309 anci'In d uce d
e
'
f
d
questlOns
to perwrm
a senous
assessment o'f t I1e prooun
harms to public speech values that Don't Ask, Don't Tell imposes? The
answer to that question changed dramatically on June 26, 2003, when the
31o
Supreme Com'! issued its decision in Lawrence v. Texas.
If the Court does
not turn aside from the path it has mapped, the case may playa role similar
311
to that of Brown v. Board oJEducation in transforming the manner in which
the claims of a previously disfavored group of litigants will be heard and
assessed on a broad array of claims in American courtrooms. Precisely what
impact Lawrence will have upon the shape of substantive due process

308.
309.
310.
311.

SeeRo.stkerv. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1981).
Rusther, 453 U.S. at 89.
123 S. Cl 2472 (2003)
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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doctrine remains to be determined, as the Court was, in the words of one
commentator, "magisterial but vague" in describing the liberty interest that
m
it was vindicating.
BUl the opinion's intended impact upon the claims of
gay litigants, across doctrinal categories, is clear. The promise of Lawrence is
to root out and abolish the judicial mindset of casual neglect toward the
humanity of gay citizens that has made possible the impoverished analysis
characteristic of constitutional challenges to Don't Ask, Don't Tell and its
predecessors.
The parallels between BTOwn and Lawrence exist partly on the level of
analytical methodology. In both cases, the Court made a conscious break
from a mode of interpretation under which traditional social mores had
created presumptive limitations on the quality and the scope of the
individual rights that the Constitution was understood to protect. Where
Plessy v. Ferguson had upheld racial segregation as an appropriate expression
of "the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people,,,313 the
BTOwn Court refused to "turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth]
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written,,,314 in addressing the question of school segregation before it.
Instead, the Court defined its task as discerning the principles that underlie
the Amendment's broad statement of equality and asking how those
principles operated to constrain, rather than confmn, the State's
I:
' 1 ord
'
315
enlorcement
0 f accepte d
sOCIa
enngs:
In a similar fashion, the Lawrence majority identified and rejected its
earlier conclusion in Bowers that the historical condemnation of same-sex
sexuality in most ''''estern societies offered a sufficient answer to the claims
of gay men and lesbians for liberty in their intimate lives. \!\There Bowers
asserted that "[p]roscriptions against [same-sex sexuality] have ancient
roots,,3l() and invoked the Due Process Clause to confirm that historical
hierarchy of status, Lawrence rejected that formulation and asked instead
how the Lib~rty Clause might serve to constrain the State's enforcement of
312.
Pamela S. Karl an , Loving Lawrence, 102
iICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 5, on lile with author); see also Robert C. Post, Fon:waTd: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: CUltU1B, CmlTts, and Law, 117 H/IRV. L. REV. 4, 11 (2003) (arguing that uLawTence is
best interpreted as an opening bid in a conversation between the Court and the American
public" as to what place gay people should have in civil society).
313.
Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
314. 13wwn, 347 U.S. at 492.
315.
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and SlavelY in the Global Economy,
102 COLU 1. L. REv. 973, 976 (2002) (UCustom and usage were a sufficient response to a
constitutional challenge under the dispensation to which the Plessy majority subscribed. One of
the revolutionary changes wrought by Bwwn was a deliberate rejection of this interpretive
method."); id. (U [1]n concluding that legally enforced segregation in educational facilities is
inherently unequal, the Bwwn Court dramatically rejected custom and tradition, holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment embodied substantive principles that do not automatically defer to
established social norms.") (internal quotations omitted).
316. Bowersv. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
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317

traditional mores.
Implementing a shift in constitutional methodology
that it had foreshadowed in Romer v. Evans,318 and apparently rejecting the
pervasive "gay exception" to the Constitution that commentators have often
complained Of,319 the Lawrence Court definitively brought the claims of gay
320
men and lesbians into the post-Brown dispensation.
In the process, the
Court significantly eroded the distinction between the forvvard-looking and

317.

The Court said the following about the Bowers Court's reliance upon history.
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowen' was making the
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. For many persons these are not o'ivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire
and which thus determine the cOUl'se of their lives. These considerations do not
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the libCI,ty 'of all, not to
mandate our own moral code."

Lawnnce, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Planned Paren thood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992)). See also id. (''' [H] istory and tradition are the starting poi-nt but not in all cases

the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.''') (quoting County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998») (Kennedy,j., concurring).
318. 517 U.s. 620 (1996).
319. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5
j.L. POL'y 107, 162 (1996) ("Anyone who has ever represented lesbian and gay parents knows
that there is always a gay exception to family law rules."); Evan vVolfson, The Fn,edom to lVlany:
Ow' Struggle for the Map of the CO'U1~t1y, 16 QUEER LQ., Spring & Summer 1996, at 209 (" [A]s
many of us know, there is a gay exception to virtually every constitutional proposition as well as
evel)' common sense proposition one can think of ....").
320. In an early essay on Romer, I pointed out the majority's quiet suggestions that a
reaffirmation of the methodological principles of BTOwn might be necessary in a future case
involving gay men and lesbians.
The majority's judgment [in Romer] that Amendment 2 is a "denial of equal
protection ... in the most literal sense," and hence not amendable to the type of
balancing normally required by the Equal Protection Clause, echoes its holding in
Brown that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Likewise, the
Romer majority's admonition that" [i] t is not within our constitutional tradition to
enact laws of this sort" is powerfully evocative of the Court's judgment in Bolling v.
Shmpe, the companion case to Bmwn, that "[c] lassifications based solely upon
race.. are contrary to 0111' traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." The
Romer majority clearly invites the comparison with Bmwn and Bolling: It opens its
opinion with Justice Harlan's ringing dissent in Plessy v. Felg1/son, the case that
Bmwn rejected, and conspicuously cites to Sweatt v. PainteT, one of BTOwn's
progenitors, for a proposition of law that originated, not in Sweatt, but in Shelley v.
Kramer.

Tobias Barrington Violff, Pri.ncipled Silence, 10 YALE LJ. 247, 249 n.12 (1997) (citations omitted).
It appears that courts are already recognizing the important parallels between Brown and
LavJ7"ence where the role of tradition in constitutional analysis is concerned. See Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003) (noting parallels between LaWTence and
Brown in convergence of due process and equal protection analysis).

/
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backward-looking roles that Professor Cass Sunstein has ascribed to the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in his much-noted essay seeking
to make sense of the result in Bowers. 321
Even more significant is the breathtaking shift in tone that Lawrence
introduced in its review of the claims before it-a shift that also recapitulates
Brown in important ways. Legal rights, even in their most high-minded and
abstract formulation, always depend upon the assessment of facts for their
vitality and substance. No litigant can hope to benefit from a legal
entitlement unless she can explain in a convincing fashion why her
circumstances entitle her to the relief she seeks under the rules defining her
entitlements and obligations. It is for this reason that the most basic tenet of
the Due Process Clause requires that a litigant e1-U0Y the "opportunity to be
heard" before the State can deprive her of liberty or property.322 "Due
process of law" describes a deeply embedded requirement that the State
recognize the humanity of individual litigants and exhibit a capacity to hear
and understand the experience of those litigants in adjudicating their claims
23
for reliee
As the military cases demonstrate, one of the principal mechanisms that
a court employs when it relegates a disfavored group to a subordinate legal
status is to deprive the group's speech of power and render its claims
unhearable. This type of silencing may derive from an explicit power
relation between favored and disfavored individuals, as Professor Langton
has explained in describing the effects of a master-slave relationship upon
324
the speech, of enslaved individuals.
Or it may operate in a less overt

321.

Sunstein offers the following summary of his conclusions at the stan of the essay:
The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the Due
Process issue whether an existing 0" time-honored convention, described at the
appropriate level of generality, is violated by the praclice under attack. By contrast,
the Equal Protection Clause looks fonvard, serving to invalidate practices that were
widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected to endure. The
two clauses therefore operate along different tracks.

Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Equal
Protection and D'ue P1Dcess, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988).
322. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("The fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.") (citation omitted).
323.
See genemlly JERRY L. rVli\SHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985)
(setting fonh a theory of due process and adjudication based on the individual dignity of
Ii tigan ts) .
324. Langton discusses the limited range of speech acts that a slave is capable of
pel-forming as a result of his enslaved status, describing this form of subordination as
"illocutionary elisablell1en t."
The master can order the slave or advise him. The master can grant or deny the
slave permission to act in certain ways. The slave cannot grant or deny his master
permission. He cannot order the master, though he may entreat him. The
asymmetry of the power balance is reflected in the asymmetry of their abilities to
perform certain illocutionary acts. Attempts by the slave to oreler or forbid will
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fashion, as an implicit but widely understood prerogative on tbe part of
courts to give little or no serious attention to tbe life experiences of a
disfavored group of litigants, blinding themselves to the possibility that
established legal doctrines might warrant judicial intervention. In this
respect, Bowers was reminiscent of Plessy v. Ferguson, not just in the analytical
methodology that it employed, but also in its tone of disregard for the
experience of the litig'ants before it. In one of its most famous statements,
the Plessy Court went out of its way to cabin the legal significance of the
dignitary harms suffered by Black citizens under segregation, pronouncing
that" [if] the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority ... , it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.,,325 The Plessy Court literally defined the experience of Black citizens
under segregation as irrelevant to its analysis, giving its sanction to a period
of aggressive judicial indifference toward the citizenship status of Black
Americans. The Braum Court, in turn, offered the experience of the
segregated children themselves as the principal reason for its rejection of
separate but equal, precisely in order to extirpate this consequence of Plessy
326
from the landscape of American law
and signal to lower courts and
political actors ill a definitive manner that such disregard of Black citizens
"'lOuld no longer be tolerated in any juridical category.327
always be unhappy in Austin's sense. Such acts are unspeakable for the slave.
Something has silenced his speech. Not in the sense of rendering his spoken words
inaudible or writlen marks illegible, but ill the sense of depriving those sounds and
marks of illocutionary force: of preventing those utterances from counting as the
actions they were intended to be.
Langton, SUf)'I'a note 95, at 315-16.
325
163 U.S 537,551 (1896).
326. The Bmwn Court reproduced and embraced the following passage from the Kansas
Lrial court ill resolving the question it framed.
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimelltal
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferioriLy of the negro group. A sense of inferiority aflects the motivation of a
child to learn. SegregaLion with the sanction of law, therefore, has a t.endency to
(reLard) the educational and mental development of Negro children and to
deprive them of some of the benefiL~ they would receive in a racial(\y) integrated
school system.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citalion omitted) (alterations in original). As
the Coun makes clear, it is this passage thai constitutes the opinion's most direct rejection of
the substantive foundations of Plessy. See id. at 494-95 ("vVhatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by
modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.").
327.
See William
'. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Cenlmy, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,2088-90,2089 n.108 (2002)
(describing judicial implementation of BTOwn in a broad aITay of legal contexts). This
"signaling" feature of Bmwn reached its apotheosis in CoojJer v. Aa7'On. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In
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Bowers played a role similar to that of Plessy in defining the subordinate
legal status of the litigants before it. The Bowers Court refused even to
consider the impact that criminalizing sexual intimacy would have upon
Michael Hardwick's ability to lead a satisfying life, famously dismissing his·
claims for equal dignity and privacy as, "at best, facetious.,,328 Bowers thus
licensed other courts to blind themselves to the human experience of the
gay litigants who came before them-an invitation that many accepted with
enthusiasm, including those asked to assess the constitutionality of the
military policy.329 This broad license resulted in the relegation of gay and
lesbian litigants to a formally subordinate status in their ability to prosecute
330
claims of right.
A5 Judge Stephen Reinhardt noted in dissent in Holmes,
the decisions of the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in
their review of Don't Ask, Don't Tell are the inheritors of this tradition of
331
willful blindness.
The passages quoted at the beginning of this Part

Coo!)er, the Court wok the unprecedented step of signing the names of all nine Justices to the
opinion and (more importantly) proclaiming judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the
Constitution in response to the flouting of the norms announced in Brown by southern
officials-a defiance sometimes carried OUt with judicial approval, as the Cooper case itself made
clear. See generally Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958) (authorizing school
officials to delay segregation in the face of popular opposition), l'co'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1958) (en banc), affd. 358 U.S. l (1958).
328. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), ovel'I'Uled by Lawrence v. Texas. 106 S. Ct.
2472 (2003); see SEDGWICK, supra note 246, at 7; Thomas, supl'a note 6, at 1431-60 (describing
the manner in which Bowers and sodomy statutes licensed acts of private and judicial violence,
respectively, against gay men and lesbians) .
329.
See, e.g., Steffan v. Pen)'. 41 F.3d 677. 685-92 (D.C. Gil'. 1994) (en bane) (offering a
clinical assessment of inferences of "conduct" to be drawn from a statement of "status" and
relying on Bowers as sufficient authority to support categorical exclusion of gay people from
civic institutions); see also, e.g, Shahar v. Bowers, ll4 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane)
(relying on Bowers and affirming the authority of state officials to fire an attorney because she is
a lesbian and contemptuously rejecting the suggestion that a "purported 'marriage'" to another
woman is entitled to any associational protection); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Gir.
1989) (relying on Bowen and rejecting constitutional claims of an "avowed homosexual, a
lesbian" who was discharged from the milital)', even while acknowledging that "prejudice" may
panially account for the military policy); 1'.x PartelM.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998) (relying on
Bowers for the proposition that a lesbian mother in a committed relationship is a presumptive
felon and hence that her ex-husband can keep her daughter from being exposed to that
relationship). For a detailed sociological analysis of the impact of sodomy laws on individual
identity formation in South Africa, see Ryan Goodman, Beyond the EnfoTCement Princij)le: Sodomy
Laws, Social Nonn.~, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 (2001).
330. Professor KarJan makes this point in her discussion of Lawrence.
The real problems with prohibitions on same-sex intimacy.
come from the
collateral consequences of such laws: the way in which they undergird
"discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres" and tell gay people
that their choices about how to live their lives are unworthy of respect.
Karlan, supmnote 312, at 9 (quoting LawTence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482).
331. See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'] Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing
Bowers as playing a role similar to that of Plessy in defining the status of disfavored litigants and
chastising the majority for permitting the spirit of Bowas to infect Speech Clause analysis).
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embody the refusal of those courts to acknowledge and engage ""ith the
policy's manifest impact upon the speech activities of gay soldiers and the
civilian communities with which they in teract.
AB in BTOwn before it, the majority in Lawrence understood the farreaching consequences of its earlier decision in excluding the lived
experience of a vast group of citizens from the realm of legal significance,~32
and it set about the task of undoing the damage with forensic
meticulousness,333 repeatedly insisting upon the equal dignity of gay men
and lesbians-in their persons and in their relationships-as the basis for
33 1
this extirpation of Bowen from the legal landscape. ' The effects of this

332. Justice O'Connor, though not joining the m~orit)' in overruling Bowers. also
recognized the impact of sodomy statutes in criminalizing ga)' men and lesbians and made the
eradication of that mode of subordination an explicit component of her equal protection
decision.
And the effect of Texas' sodom)' law is not just limited to the threat of prosecution
or consequence of conviction. Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as
Ctiminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the
same manner as evel)'one else. Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged
the collateral effects of the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that
t.he law "legall), sanctions discriminat.ion against [homosexuals] in a variety of wa)'s
unrelat.ed to the criminal law," including in t.he areas of "employment, famil)'
issues, and housing."
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citat.ions omitted) (alterat.ions in original).
333. The opinion for the Court identifies and dismantles each component of Bowers with
which it finds fault: Bowers's misframing of t.he privac), issue presented by the regulation of
intimat.e sexual relationships, LawTI!nce, 123 S. Ct. at 2478; its reliance upon an historical record
that the Lawrence m~ority finds equivocal, id. at 2478-79; and its failure to acknowledge th'e
"emerging recognition," clear even in 1986, that sexual privacy constit.ut.es an aspect of
protected libert)', id. at 2480.
334. The Court first criticizes Bowers's framing of the issue before it as one concerning a
right of homosexual sodomy:
That stat.ement, we now conclude, discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate
the exten t of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the righ t
to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put fon...ard,
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simpl)'
about the right to have sexual intercourse.
Jd. at. 2478. It then acknowledges the impact that Bowers has had upon the status of gay men and

lesbians in civil society:
vVhen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding
of flowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual' persons.
Jd. at 2482. The Co un acknowledges and affirms t.he role that sexuality plays in the lives of gay
people. Jd. at 2484 ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State

cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduCt. a
crime."). Lest any doubt remain, the completeness of the extirpation is made manifest in a final
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repudiation promise to extend far beyond the constitutional doctrines of
privacy to effect a fundamental shift in the reception that gay men and
lesbians wi.ll receive when they invoke the benefits of well-established legal
335
doctrines.
In fact, despite the hostility of some commentators to the doctrinal
decision to locate privacy rights in the Due Process Clause, there is a sense in
which Lawrence is a "due process" opinion in the most traditional sense of
that term. In proclaiming the equal dignity and humanity of gay people and
gay relationships, the Court has, for the first time, offered gay and lesbian
litigants a meaningful "opportunity to be heard" in pressing their claims for
relief. If the promise of Lawrence is fulfilled, then the life experiences of gay
litigants now stand on an equal footing in American courts.
CONCLUSION

Ncar the beginning of this Article, I disclaimed any intent to argue that
a proper constitutional analysis of Don't Ask, Don't Tell would necessarily
result in the policy's invalidation. 336 At this point, that qualification may
sound somewhat hollow. vVhile a decision about the constitutionality of
Don't Ask, Don't Tell must ultimately involve the resolution of deep issues of
constitutional policy that are not subject to mechanical legal calculation,
one thing is clear: If the First Amendment does not require the invalidation
of this policy as it is currently structured and enforced, then there is no First
Amendment in the U.S. military. Don't Ask, Don't Tell is deeply offensive to
both the public interests in political representation and accountability that I
have explored in this Article and the private interests in autonomy and
freedom of mind that I have examined in earlier work.'J37 Together, these
impacts exhaust the range of values over which the First .r'\rnendment has
been assigned as guardian.
Judge Kenneth Hall, dissenting in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Thomasson v. Perry, spoke directly about one of the primary issues of
constitutional policy that Don't Ask, Don't Tell implicates: the relationship
between the military and the Constitution in our democratic state. Judge
Hall wrote:
[T] hough raising the armIes
exclusive tasks of the Congress
vital one-in ensuring that the
Constitution and civil authority.

and commanding them are the
and President, we have a role-a
military remains submissive to the
We have now had a large standing

act of repudiation: The Court ends its opinion by proclaiming that" Bowers was not correct when
it was decided, and it is not correct today." Id. at 2484.
335
See KarJan, supra note 312, at 13 ("The real question in Lawrence was whether gay
people should be included in the idea of 'everyone.''').
336.
See sujJra text accompanying note 69.
337.
See generally "\lolff, s/.ljna note 2.
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army for balf a century, and the Republic has endured. In the
annals of history, our experience must be counted as tbe exception
rather than the rule, and I am convinced that the presence of a
strong and independent judiciary, upon which the people may rely
to guard individual rights, deserves much of the credit for this
good fortune. Freedom is not inherited; it is earned through
eternal vigilance. The military is a sentinel in its way, and we in
338
ours.
Before Romer and Lawrence, it was possible to argue that gay men and
lesbians could not claim a legitimate place in civil society, and hence that
judicial authorization of the systematic abuse of gay and lesbian soldiers was
a singular phenomenon with no larger implications for our constitutional
traditions. That argument-never correct as a matter of theory or practicecan no longer be sustained as a matter of constitutional policy or doctrine,
either. To authorize Don't Ask, Don't Tell is to relinquish utterly the role of
the First Amendment in ensuring that the military will remain subordinate
to the Constitution and the civil authorities. If I have succeeded in making
that fact obvious during the course of this r'\rticle, then I will consider my
task complete.

338.

Thomasson v. Peny, 80 F.3d 915, 949 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Hall,]., dissenting).

